

CONVERSATIONS IN VILLA DECIUS

REBUILDING PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT COMMUNITIES

Role of Media and Civil
Organizations



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Conversations in Villa Decius 6

**REBUILDING PEACE
IN POST-CONFLICT
COMMUNITIES**

Role of Media and Civil Organizations

29th-30th September 2004

Editor:
Paweł Świdorski



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o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e

WELCOME

Danuta Glondys, Director of the Villa Decius Association

Welcome to the Villa Decius in Krakow.

Today we are opening a conference that Villa Decius has worked on for the past year. A conference on the restoration of peace in post-conflict communities, a conference on the tragic situations that take place so frequently in the world that we have ceased to react to them, that we have ceased to feel what is actually happening. I would like to dedicate this Conference to a friend of mine, a Kurd, Ziyad Raof.

Please, let me welcome the distinguished guests in accordance with the principles of diplomatic precedence. Among us are the Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa to Poland, Sikose Mji; the Ambassador of the Czech Republic to Poland, Bedřich Kopecký; the Ambassador of the Federative Republic of Brazil to Poland, Marcelo Andrade de Moraes Jardim; the United States Ambassador to Poland, Victor Ashe and the Ambassador of Poland to the Republic of South Africa and Morocco, Krzysztof Śliwiński.

I would like to welcome very cordially the former Prime Minister of Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki; the former Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Jan Kavan; Prof. Adam Rotfeld, the State Secretary of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Minister Plenipotentiary and the former Ambassador of Italy to Macedonia, Antonio Tarelli; Lieutenant General Mieczysław Bieniek and Colonel General William Nash. I would also like to welcome the Polish *charges d'affaires* in the Polish Embassy in Baghdad, until recently the Ambassador of Poland to Iraq, Adam Wielgosz and representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Ernest Zienkiewicz and Agnieszka Kosowicz.

Present here with us are also Consuls General: of the United States: Kenneth Fairfax; of Austria: Hermina Poppeler; of France: Michael Raineri; of Slovakia: Janka Burianová; of Russia: Leonid Rodionov; and Honorary Consuls: of the Federative Republic of Brazil: Paweł Świdorski, and of the Kingdom of Denmark: Janusz Kahl.

I would like to welcome the representatives of ministries: the Ministry of Culture – in the person of Colonel Krzysztof Sałaciński, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland – in the persons of Colonel Zygmunt Miłaszewski and Colonel Paweł Żarkowski, and the representative of the Office of the Committee for European Integration – Halina Kostrzewa.

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I would like to welcome representatives of local and regional authorities: Henryk Bątkiewicz, Deputy Mayor of the City of Kraków and Barbara Błąkała, the representative of the Office of the Voivode of Małopolska.

We also have the honor of the presence of directors of institutions, foundations, and international institutions: Alicja Dudziak, Director of the British Council in Kraków; Giovanni Sciola, Director of the Italian Institute in Kraków; Milica Pesic, Director of the Media Diversity Institute in London; Róża Thun, President of the Polish Robert Schuman Foundation; Stefan Wilkanowicz and Jan Piekło from the ZNAK Foundation.

I will also let myself welcome the experts: Professor Michael Daxner, who came to us yesterday from Guatemala; Arne Ruth, former editor in chief of *Dagens Nyheter*, the newspaper that has been shaping the public opinion of Sweden for years; Janina Ochojska of the Polish Humanitarian Action and Professor Andrzej Kapiszewski of the Jagiellonian University.

Among the distinguished representatives of the media, it is our pleasure to host Polish commentators and journalists, and war correspondents. Such names as Adam Szostkiewicz or Jerzy Marek Nowakowski do not have to be introduced to anyone. We are also enjoying the presence of Dariusz Bohatkiewicz, Mariusz Piliś, Marcin Mamoń, Krystyna Kurczab-Redlich, Tomasz Bielecki and Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, who will chair our conference.

I would finally like to extend special words of greeting to the Chairman of the Board of the Villa Decius Association, Professor Jacek Woźniakowski, who I will ask to take the floor in a moment.

This Conference would have never come about if not for the financial assistance of the US Consulate General in Kraków, the British Embassy in Poland, the Swedish Institute in Stockholm, the Italian Cultural Institute in Kraków, and the British Council in Kraków. I would like to thank personally Iwona Sadecka, Press and Cultural Advisor to the Consul General of the USA in Kraków, who has cooperated with me most closely from the very beginning, and helped to overcome all the difficulties that have been arising during the course of planning and implementation of the conference.

I would like to thank the Sponsors of the Conference – BP, and its Director, Dorota Adamska, and the Sponsor of the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize – DaimlerChrysler and its Director, Ewa Łabno-Fałęcka.

The media patronage for the conference has been assumed by the *Wprost* national weekly, the national daily newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the English-language weekly *The Warsaw Voice*, Polish Radio One and TVP 3, the third Polish state television channel.

Introduction

A year ago, while we were finishing the preparations for the *tolerancja.pl* conference, I felt that it was our duty to continue the talks on the sources of international and local conflicts.

A year ago we deemed today's Iraq to be already a post-war country, and that it would now be beginning to function as a safe and peaceful state. We were too optimistic.

Writing the program of today's Conference I was trying to consider theoretically the situation of a country engulfed by conflict, then a country that is leaving the conflict stage, and finally a country that has to re-establish its state instruments. Hence, the Conference opens with a presentation on the genesis and sites of conflicts at the end of the twentieth century: that is, the most recent ones, the ones we have witnessed, the ones we live by. Then, we will proceed to talk about international institutions and mediation tools, considering whether the international community can really prevent escalation of conflicts and, if not, whether it can efficiently help in their termination. One of our panel debates will serve discussing the issues emerging from the *escape from freedom* and the *pressure* of dialogue in democratic *regimes*. Then we shall pass on to the most vivid experiences, brought to us from Iraq by General Mieczysław Bieniek. General William Nash will probably complement this presentation with own experience. Tonight, Mariusz Pilis and Marcin Mamoń will present to us their film about the *Wedding at the Communism Kolkhoz*.

Tomorrow's subjects will focus on the media and non-governmental organizations. We will be listening to those who have returned from battlefields and those who, looking from a certain distance, comment upon the events that their colleagues report on. The limits of truth and emotions, the possibility of conflict termination by the media – these are the subjects of our further discussion. The Conference will close with a discussion about civic organizations and their aid for the community engulfed in conflicts. Our guests are the two exceptional people: Janina Ochojska of the Polish Humanitarian Action and Agnieszka Kosowicz of the Bureau of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

On 30th September at 3pm a unique ceremony will take place at the Villa Decius. For the first time the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize will be awarded, honoring the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, an eminent Brazilian, who died in Baghdad last year, on 19th August.

OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE

Professor Jacek Woźniakowski, Chairman of the Board of the Villa Decius Association

I am extremely glad to be able to welcome so many eminent persons.

A reflection on the nature of a conflict first: conflicts are unavoidable, they are a part of human life. But, as the Pope said in his encyclical about the Slavonic saints Cyril and Methodius: conflicts are given to us not to be “brushed under the carpet” but to be solved. There are quite a number of conflicts that are very difficult to solve and perhaps they can never be solved completely, and you have to adopt a certain method of living with them. This is what probably is called civilization. The progress of civilization and culture means to have a commonly accepted method of dealing with conflicts in a way inflicting no wounds to anyone, to be able to work together either towards a solution or simply living with them creatively. I believe this is possible. Even if conflicts are not solved, they can contribute to making lives more sensible and more humane.

I wish you all a good discussion on the issues of conflicts, how to solve them or to conduct them peacefully, how to find a common attitude or a common vocabulary which enable people to transgress the limits and the borders of these conflicts despite differences of opinion. The differences simply must exist. It would be very boring if there were no differences of opinion. Despite these differences, I wish you to remain connected by assumed human values and to remain friendly.

As the President of the Villa Decius Association, I would like to express my great gratitude to Danuta Glondys and her team who have worked extremely hard for preparing this Conference.

Victor Ashe, US Ambassador to the Republic of Poland

I would like to thank the American Consulate here in Kraków that I can once again be here and participate in such an important conference. I want to give particular thanks to Professor Woźniakowski and to Director Glondys and the Villa Association and its staff for being here today and for the hard work they have done to make all this possible. I also want to acknowledge and thank several people who

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will be participating in this conference: former Prime Minister Mazowiecki, Secretary of State Rotfeld, and General Bieniek. I also want to express appreciation to my colleagues of the diplomatic corps from Warsaw, the Ambassadors of Brazil, South Africa and the Czech Republic for joining me and others here today.

This is the third *Bridges of Tolerance* conference that the US Consul General here in Kraków has helped to organize. It seems this year subjects like rebuilding peace in post-conflict communities or the role of the media and civil organizations could not be more timely at this point in world history. The greatest challenge we face now in the world, whether in Bosnia, Rwanda or Iraq, is how we can help broken nations back together again.

I certainly want to express my appreciation to the people of Poland and to the government of Poland for its support and sacrifices in this effort. The fostering and maintenance of tolerance is the key to the success of rebuilding. For tolerance is truly the glue that binds societies together after they split into ethnic, cultural, and religious groups.

As the American theologian Ralph Stockman once said, the test of courage comes when we are in the minority. The test of tolerance comes when we are in the majority. It makes me glad that, focusing on rebuilding peace in post-conflict communities, this conference has emphasized the role of the media and civic organizations. Today, they play a crucial and capital role in fostering and maintenance of tolerance in any civil society. As free media is essential to this task, they also have a great responsibility. Since its start in 2001, *Bridges of Tolerance* conference series has launched serious, ambitious, and innovative programs on the theme of tolerance and diversity. It focuses on the need to overturn stereotypes and accept cultural diversity: respecting the differences between people, you, and me. The objective is to provoke a discussion that will assist the Poles as well as their neighbors; reconcile and share their past, and help them to adjust to their subsequent multicultural future. I also want to say that I am delighted to see so many students and young people in the audience as well, because education is the key to the development of tolerance, and therefore an important goal of the program which is also to reach out to younger generations that represent the future of society. *Bridges of Tolerance* has already focused on important spin-off from this program. The entire *Bridges to the East* initiative, which brought together Ukrainian and Polish audiences is conducting projects on a wide variety of issues. I am certainly impressed with the results achieved so far, and I am looking forward to the

discussions as well as to the conclusions of the conference which hopefully will lead to the implementation of many positive ideas.

Marcelo Andrade de Moraes Jardim,

Ambassador of the Federative Republic of Brazil to Poland

Professor, my Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a privilege to be here. I fully endorse the remarks made by Ambassador Ashe. Moreover, I think like all of you, we are gratified by the words of a very wise woman, that is, the Director of the Villa Decius, a few minutes ago. They were most enlightening and have made a deep impression in our hearts and minds.

I am here as the Brazilian Ambassador to Poland, and mainly due to the fact that this conference will honor the memory of one of my countrymen, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who I had the privilege of meeting and who gave his life to the cause of peace; to the cause of the very theme of this meeting, which is rebuilding the nation, rebuilding Iraq, and reestablishing peace in what were in the past called 'faraway lands'.

There are a few remarks that I would like to make about some important aspects of the life of Sergio Vieira de Mello.

On 19th August, shortly after Sergio's arrival at Baghdad, a terrorist exploded himself in a truck loaded with explosives and ammunition directly below the window of Sergio Vieira de Mello's office, destroying not only his office but the whole of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad as well. The bomb killed twenty-one people besides Sergio, and injured another two hundred.

That was the first, and as the future would unfortunately prove, the first of a sequence of terrorist acts against innocent people. It was the most significant attack that struck at the very heart of the international system, the very heart of the United Nations. It struck at people who were not on a military, or even a peace-keeping mission, but on a mission to rebuild: to reconstruct the nation that was torn apart by the long dictatorship of which it had just been liberated.

Sergio's arrival to Iraq was as intuitive as planned. Even though it was to be a temporary assignment, Vieira de Mello went to Baghdad at the personal request of the First Secretary of the United Nations as a consequence of his extraordinary background as a peacemaker and builder of bridges between opposing sides, which he had so strongly demonstrated in his previous assignments in Kosovo, Pakistan, and East Timor among other places. To understand it, it is necessary to review Sergio's life. What determined his life were his convictions and the values of the

United Nations. Perhaps he became a victim of the profile which he had consciously or unconsciously, but with a great sense of duty, been carving for himself, especially during the last years of his life.

Sergio Vieira de Mello was born in Rio de Janeiro in 1948, the year in which the International Convention of Human Rights was approved and adopted. He could not have imagined that fifty-five years later, he would fall victim to assailants on the cause of human rights. He was in Iraq, which he tried so hard to consider a friend, and which he stood for.

Sergio was a son of a Brazilian diplomat. His father started his career in the mid-forties. Sergio was born in Rio and his early childhood he lived in faraway countries. First, he lived in our neighbor, Argentina, in Buenos Aires, where his father was the Consul. Then the family moved to Lebanon, Geneva, and Rome to other assignments. Yet, he remained basically Brazilian. The beaches of prewar Lebanon were for him in a sense the beaches of Copacabana or Ipanema; they were his place. Later on, as an adult, Sergio reflected that conflicts are always better understood by children who, unlike adults, find solving them possible. From the Middle East the family went back to Italy, and then back to Rio where Sergio spent the central period of his adolescence and his youth.

Sergio studied philosophy; due to his father's career, he studied abroad at the Sorbonne in Paris where he received his degree. He was in Paris for the events of May 1968 that changed the world: opening the way to the 'contestation' to the protest organized in the United States, in Europe, in China, and in different parts of the world. It was really the year that marked a tremendous change in the world.

Right after his graduation, Sergio went looking for a job and he went straight to the UN and began to work for the refugees' agency: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. He started working with Aga Khan – the unforgettable aristocrat, the great prince, the peacemaker, the man who had a mandate to bring peace to different parts of the world.

Sergio frequently escaped from Geneva: he was basically what is called a field man. He was never a backroom boy. He preferred to go out to the front, to conflicts that were happening at that moment – in order to learn more, to live more intensely, and to try to help in his capacity as an international agent and official, to bring some sort of relief and trying to reestablish peace in many regions where he went to.

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His first assignment was to what was then called East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, a country that some of you might remember had a very troubled path to independence. He later had other missions: in Cyprus, in Mozambique, in Peru, in Lebanon, and even in Argentina where he had lived as a young boy.

He had a most prominent role as the head chief of repatriation in Cambodia in 1992, where he was responsible for an operation that consolidated and made concrete the return to the country of 300,000 refugees. As the head of the Repatriation Division of the High Commission in Geneva, he made way for the return of the bereaved Vietnamese Boat People.

Later he went on to work in former Yugoslavia, as head of civil affairs for UNPROFOR, the Protection Force of the United Nations in Gorazde – and contributed to establishment of so-called safe heavens in the Balkan war. In 1995, Sergio was made a special environment inspector general to the region of Great Lakes in Southern Africa and a humanitarian coordinator in New York for relief operations. His efficiency won him praise and admiration. It was then that the Security Council chose him for Kosovo where Sergio was discovered to be a man of incomparable skill in managing complex operations in conflict zones.

He once admitted he would have liked to see the process through, had another challenge not awaited him. His unmatched skills and background made him the ideal choice to leave for East Timor as that country started on its path to independence. This was the first time when the United Nations gave him an unparalleled mandate to rebuild the whole territory and turn it into a modern state.

I will not allow myself to say more about Sergio's mission to East Timor, as we have the pleasure to have here his personal assistant, Paulo Uchoa who was there throughout the whole mission, and who was closely associated with Sergio. Paulo will be able to tell us in an informal and relaxed way about different facets of Sergio: Sergio the man, Sergio the diplomat, Sergio the peacemaker, and Sergio the nation builder.

After thirty-two years with the United Nations, involved in the worst of conflicts and after his last successful mission in East Timor, Sergio wished to have some time for himself: a break in this very adventurous life and this very fruitful career.

He was truly praised and recognized in being offered the very high function of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which he accepted.

In the context of the debate of the Security Council of the first half of 2003 it became obvious that somebody had to be sent to Iraq, and Sergio had the right profile to take the mission. We have here with us the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Jan Kavan, who presided over the UN General Assembly during the 57th Session who met Sergio many times.

Sergio had maintained himself on a margin of the political aspects of that conflict; he was focused on the protection of people in civil wars and negotiations over the right ways to protect human rights. Finally, he became once again, and that time tragically, the privileged observer of a war that was to be discussed, and a war that did not have the support of the parties concerned.

“There is no other soldier more devoted to their life than a servant”, this is how Sergio addressed the Secretary General Kofi Annan, when he asked him to take on this difficult mission. Sergio went to Baghdad as the Special Envoy of the Secretary General, in accordance to his own background, his past, his own personal history and faithful to his idealism and his desire to solve troublesome conflicts and wars. It was too difficult for him to resist the temptation of going back again into action.

Sergio had a great ability to relate to his adversaries. He was a good player and had a good sense of humor. Sergio had firmness and was equipped with the art of facing and solving complex issues. Maybe, these were his studies in philosophy, his intellectual background, and his Brazilian easy-going way of being. Things that made him a good poker player and a very good and relaxed person to approach problems and issues that would have been absolutely crazy for most of us if we were confronted with one of them. Sergio had a sense of humor even in the heat of war. He used to illustrate the feeling of the Iraqis, sometimes comparing the occupation to how Brazilians would feel if tanks entered the Copacabana beach or how Americans would feel if there were somebody’s tanks in Broadway. He used to say: “we have to understand these things.”

Sergio was very, very keen on the mission, yet at the same time he was aware of the importance of the coalition movements, and of the justice of the war. The aftermath of the war the day after was the “*masse critique*” that we had to put his hands on and to try to work with the mandate of the international community set forth by the General Secretary. We all know what happened on 19th August. The first major terrorist blow in Iraq killed the UN High Representative in the country and Secretary General’s representative in the country together with 20

other people, injuring 200 others, thus setting a tragic trend that unfortunately continues up to this day.

The international community has been fully committed to achieving peace in Iraq, to achieve a role that will lead to stability, and in this process the Polish government decided to play a role in the coalition led by the United States. It is admired and understood by, I think, the majority of the international community. Not that it was an ideal way, but the only possible way to try to establish peace and bring stability to such a troubled area, and in this way to make life's burden less heavy for the people of the region.

These were just a few remarks, I am sorry to have gone through all this, but I did not want to waste what I learned talking to Sergio's mother, and his major associate Miss Caroline Hawley, who was with him when he died, and also from Paul Uchoa. Paulo Uchoa who was with Sergio Vieira de Mello in his mission in Timor for almost two years – in a mission that was considered one of his most successful – will give us some further insights into the personality, work and life of one of the most highly respected men, Sergio Vieira de Mello.

Now I would like to present Paulo Uchoa: a Brazilian diplomat, currently the Cultural Counselor of the Brazilian Embassy in Paris. He arrived here just for this meeting and he is one of the persons who I believe to be best entitled to give witness to the life of Sergio Vieira de Mello.

Paul Uchoa, former Assistant to Sergio Vieira de Mello

Let me congratulate and thank the Villa Decius Association for organizing the conference. I think it is very important that events like yours are organized in order to address better such problems as post-conflict areas; it helps to participate better in these events and actually bring peace to communities that face them.

I am here to share with you a bit of my personal experience with Sergio Vieira de Mello. I met him briefly in 1997 in Geneva as he became a High Commissioner for Refugees and in 2000, shortly after his arrival in East Timor. I was an envoy of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign relations to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor where I worked under his direction for a year as a political officer in political affairs. I was specifically charged with the mission of establishing Timor's parliament. Sergio was the President of the National Consultancy Council and I was the Secretary of the Council, which was composed of 15 members: five foreigners and ten Timorese, with Sergio being the president.

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Sergio was a true peace builder in a post-conflict community. Timor actually had never had a self-government in its history. It was initially a colony of the Portuguese and it briefly declared independence for seven days in 1974, before it was annexed by Indonesia. Later it lived under Indonesian rule for 25 years. Following public consultation, the people of Timor opted for independence, as the Indonesian army destroyed 85 percent of the infrastructure of the country, and this is when the United Nations Transitional Administration was established, not, actually, to rebuild East Timor – because East Timor is not a country – but to build the country. Sergio had brought powers into that mission. Resolution 1266 of the United Nations gave him full authority to introduce all legislative branches of government to this area. He was responsible for establishing everything. He obviously delegated those functions and he created groups that worked with him in task of building up the nation.

One of very characteristic features of his approach was the methodology. From the very early stages, he engaged the local community in building the institutions that related to form the Timorese government. It was a process which was called capacity building. For example, in the National Consultative Council, I had to work with the Timorese, and our job was to create the Parliament and also to train people to run the Parliament after the United Nations and its forces left. I think it was very interesting because this gave legitimacy to his work to his presence and to the presence of the United Nations.

Later, when Sergio was going to Iraq, it was emphasized that his experience in East Timor was very successful. He, therefore, wanted to implement the same methodology in Iraq. It was a tragedy that he died in the circumstances... he died so early in his period and he could never actually carry out the same type of project he had done in East Timor.

What was interesting to see in Sergio was that he was a very patient person: he would give a lot of time to listening to people. He was very understanding, he was very engaging and because of that, I think, he was able to create leadership: the capacity that allowed him to go as far as he did. I think that this is really what made a difference to his missions throughout the world: from South America and Peru, to Africa and Mozambique, to East Timor in Asia, and even to Iraq; even when he was in Geneva and New York as well.

Much has been said about Sergio after his death, he was not really only an international public figure after Timor, I think, he became known to the world

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because of his successful mission in East Timor and obviously when he went to Iraq with expectations that his professional capacities would help in the peace-building efforts in this post-conflict community. For all the people who worked with him, he provided a creative inspiration.

Many initiatives have been established all around the world to honor and pay tribute to Sergio Vieira de Mello. I hope that these initiatives will help the world to become actually a better place and establish peace in all many post-conflict communities.



I n a u g u r a t i o n
l e c t u r e

INAUGURATION LECTURE

Genesis and areas of conflicts at the turn of the 20th century

Professor Adam Rotfeld

I am very pleased and would like to thank the Villa Decius Association for the invitation to participate in today's conference, and would like to use this opportunity to share a few words of reflection concerning conflicts at the turn of the 20th and the very beginning of the 21st centuries. This subject is important for Poland, for Europe and for the whole international community.

Contemporary conflicts have some new aspects that have not been fully recognized or clarified. First, after the conclusion of the cold war, these are the internal conflicts: inter-ethnic conflicts, religious wars, and civil wars are dominant rather than interstate conflicts. Globalization processes, on the other hand, mean these conflicts have a negative impact on international security.

Out of last year's nineteen major armed conflicts, only two had the interstate character: the conflict between Iraq and the coalition led by the United States and the long-standing Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan.

During the last fourteen years, after the cold war, out of 59 great armed conflicts only three were interstate. This is the new quality in international relations that must and does influence the manner of conflict prevention and their solution. This calls for an adjustment of international instruments to more effective prevention and solution of contemporary conflicts. The problem is that neither the United Nations, nor other international organizations have any appropriate or efficient instruments in this regard. Secondly, the origin of conflicts is related to the growing number of weak and failed states. Greater attention must therefore be paid to the questions of institutional reinforcement of weak states.

The questions that many UN documents refer to as "nation building" as well as post-conflict reconstruction are of key importance here; that is, the promotion of good governance practices, democratic principles, efficient market economy and effective administration of justice.

Contemporary conflict prevention and solution requires a multi-layer approach that would cover means of political, economic and military nature. The sine qua non condition for the success of these activities is the harmonious cooperation of the international community.

In accordance with a rather controversial definition, accepted by the most significant research centers, a major conflict is one that in its entirety claims at least 1000 lives.

Conflicts, whose nature is defined by the processes of modernization and globalization may be solved efficiently only by the cooperation of states: both at the regional and at the global level. This does not, however, change the basic assumption that security and stability within a given territory is the responsibility of the state that exerts sovereign power over it. For, following the classical definition, a state should meet three criteria: have defined territory, population, and efficiently executed powers. The most fundamental question is the question of exerting this power. Governments may not resort to lawlessness. Thus authority must not only be effectively exerted but also meet the requirements of the rule of law.

Causes

Among the main reasons for the creation and development of internal conflicts, the consequences of the disintegration of the bipolar system and globalization processes are frequently mentioned. I am convinced that the catalogue of reasons is far longer and more complex. Thus, included into this list of reasons are to be the process of accelerated modernization, unsolved (“frozen”) problems from the past, and yet primarily, these are the economic underdevelopment, poverty, lack of educated elites, corruption, operation of international criminal organizations that find weak states a convenient environment for their operations.

The disintegration of the bipolar system brought a certain lack of security. This system took shape during the cold war, and was based on the one hand on the balance of powers and on mutual deterrence on the other. It was characterized by high stability with parallel high risk of nuclear conflict. Conflicts at the interconnections of zones of influence were to a greater or lesser extent controlled by the great powers and used in the “big game” of influence in the so-called Third World. At present, the risk of an outbreak of a nuclear war between the main powers is close to nonexistent, yet the degree of stability is very low. As a result, the fall of the bipolar system deepened the state of uncertainty, lack of transparency and unpredictability. Withdrawing from what used to be their previous areas of focus, being an effect of the disappearance of rivalry between the superpowers, as well as lack of support of international institutions for the states incapable of independent execution of effective control over their territory and population, make the need to put radical reform of the international security system on the agenda, both at the level of the United Nations and in the relations between the US and Europe in NATO and European Union.

Globalization and modernization

Globalization is a phenomenon with numerous aspects. It simplifies the movement of people, goods, capital and ideas, moreover, it establishes favorable conditions for economic development, and free transfer of information. On the other hand, it is accompanied by fragmentation and intensification of a range of negative phenomena. Neither globalization nor – to a greater extent even – modernization are in themselves sources of danger. Yet, they empower existing phenomena, such as terrorism, with a new dynamic quality and a new global character, at the same time broadening the scope of their impact into the whole range of international security issues. The barriers of geographical distance have been done away with. Traditional communities and cultures are confronted by the pressures of modernization linked to the need for competition in the global market. This is true for ways of life, religions, and all the functions of communities or societies. This is especially visible in the Middle East. This pressure is frequently perceived as an attack against culture, civilization and tradition. A frequent answer to this pressure is aggressive religious fundamentalism and extremism. An example of such an extreme radicalism is terrorism on the grand scale. It would, however, be an error if we explained these phenomena as a form of a clash between civilizations. It is a specific civil war within the Muslim world between moderate forces who accept the need for modernization enforced by globalization processes and those who perceive globalization and modernization as sources of insecurity for their previous lifestyle.

The result is growing violence and terrorism on behalf of Islamist radicals. Violence is directed mostly, though not solely, against the United States and other developed democracies of the West. The goal behind it is the withdrawal of the American and European involvement from the Persian Gulf and all Middle East. This is believed to ensure the continuation of conservative rule and to pave the path to power for the extremists, as was the case in Iran and Algeria.

Consequences

Among the distinguishing features characteristic for internal conflicts there is the growing number of casualties among civilians. The loss of life among them is no longer a side-effect of the fighting. Civilians as such are the targets of attacks. Another characteristic feature is mass migration of people purposefully enforced by the combating parties. It is estimated that currently approximately 90% of all victims are civilians. To compare, early in the twentieth century, losses among civil-

ians did not exceed 15% of the total, while during the Second World War, they amounted to about 50%. The behaviors that were forbidden by international law towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth, such as cruelty to prisoners, persecution of civilians, ethnic cleansing, became the hallmarks of the new conflicts. In 2000, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated in a publication on the situation of refugees in the world, entitled *State of the World's Refugee Report: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action*, that “the phenomenon of refugees is no longer a side effect of conflicts but in many a case it is the main goal and tactical assumption of the war conducted”.

Conflicts in the fallen and weak states are accompanied by the phenomenon of war privatization. Characteristic for these wars is the abundance and variety of parties participating in the conflict. Carried to extreme, the institutions of the state undergo criminalization to a great extent. They become tools for non-state subjects to exercise control over public revenue and natural resources. Competition for power becomes a contest to exploit public resources for private benefit. The dividing line between public and private authority disappears. Thus, the sources of conflict include profound economic crisis, sprawl of criminal activity, pathology of corruption, and organized crime. A specific ‘wartime’ economy develops. The sides of the conflict draw profits through the black market, exploitation of raw materials and exploitation of local people. The continuation of the conflict becomes of key importance to maintain the sources of finance for non-state entities. This leads to situations where no party in the region is interested in the termination of the conflict. Unfortunately, globalization sometimes allows the continuation of such a *status quo* due to the facility of commercial activity and transfer of profits to any part of the world.

Ethnic and religious conflicts

These conflicts are most often accompanied by lack of democratic institutions, appropriate mechanisms or political will that would favor solving the problems of various religious and linguistic groups. Separatist movements continue to exist in various European states, such as the Basque Country, Northern Ireland and Corsica. Nevertheless, in most cases they become a very significant problem where the state has no sufficiently efficient democratic institutions or shows no sufficient political will to conduct dialogue. As experience has shown, resorting mostly to power for the solution of problems of this type leads only to the escalation of conflict, radicalization of the separatist movements, and – in result – to increased num-

bers of victims among all parties involved in the conflict. Examples of such a case within the OSCE are Transnistria, Abkhazia, Northern Osetia, and some other areas, as e.g. Nagorno Karabakh, where the fires of bloodshed and conflict are burning.

Global terrorism: new quality

Terrorism is no new phenomenon. However, both its scale and manner of operation have been unprecedented. The terrorist attack of 11th September was a new departure in the field of international security. Four elements of this new phenomenon deserve special attention:

- **Scale of the attack:** the results of terrorist activity in New York and Washington were comparable to the effects of using limited impact weapons of mass-destruction. More people were killed in the attack than during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and in all previous terrorist acts in the United States.
- **Character of the attack:** though the attack was directed and financed from outside, it was conducted from the inside: that is, from within the territory of the United States; the tools used for the attack were not traditional types of weapons but objects used strictly for non-military purposes: passenger aircraft. No claims were made before or during the attack, nor were any of its goals revealed.
- **New enemy:** it was non-state entities, namely non-state criminal groups that turned out to be responsible for this unexpected, sudden, and shocking attack.
- **The goal of the attack:** for the first time the target of the attack was the world's most powerful nation, whose territory was generally considered the safest: a sanctuary of security of a kind.

Another new element is also the fact that geographic distance poses no protective barrier against global terrorism: the division between internal and external security becomes imprecise. In the contemporary world, terrorism gains new potential for operation. Progress in information technologies lets groups that could previously operate on no more than a regional scale conduct coordinated attacks in nearly all parts of the world – thanks to opened borders, more freedom in capital flow, and progress in communication and transport. The mutual interrelation of the political and economic systems of the developed democratic states means that an attack on one of the elements has a negative impact on the entire system. Access to state-of-the-art weapons, and also potentially to weapons of mass destruction, also results in these attacks becoming increasingly lethal.

Proliferation and other threats

One of the worst threats for the international security in the contemporary world is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Fears related to this originate especially from the declarations and actions of Northern Korea and Iran. Both these states declare their actual withdrawal from the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ostentatiously undertake or continue the development of their nuclear programs. The phenomenon of the states that, through their policies, place themselves beyond the international community require a decided and coordinated reaction on behalf of the community. It is so as they pose a major threat for security at both regional and global scale. More fears result additionally from the possibility of the weapons of mass destruction being passed into the hands of international terrorist organizations. Technological progress makes access to biological and chemical weapons easier. The worst case scenario would be weapons of mass destruction coming into the possession of non-state criminal and terrorist structures. The results of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists would be hard to imagine.

Access to natural resources, and especially to water, is becoming a significant potential source of conflict. The demographic boom coupled with the degradation of the natural environment resulting from the poor economic policy, may bring about numerous conflicts over the control over natural resources which are not only harder to access but also increasingly more limited. This, in turn, may lead to the aggravation of existing conflicts and mass migration of people. Finally, a threat that mars the security worldwide is the erosion of multilateral security structures, and especially of the United Nations.

Reform of the United Nations

The United Nations Charter reflects a perception of the threat to international security as it was perceived during and after the Second World War. The main challenge at that time was the possibility of formerly hostile states, especially Germany and Japan, returning to their policies of aggression. The international system agreed upon in Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco was primarily based on the principle of mutual sovereign equality of the states and the non-intervention principle. With most conflicts, besides their implications for international security, being of interstate character, the international community wields no efficient tools for the solution of such conflicts. This results in the questioning of UN effectiveness and capacity to act. For this reason, Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz

Cimoszewicz presented on 15th September 2002 a proposal of UN reform based on the preparation of the United Nations' New Political Act Initiative for 21st Century at the forum of the 57th UN General Assembly. The basic goal of our initiative is to prevent marginalization of the UN and the strengthening of the position of United Nations perceived as the main multilateral organization in the international system. The new Political Act is not to replace the UN Charter. Its goal is the redefinition of selected goals of the United Nations and identification of new tasks as well as the better adjustment of the UN to contemporary challenges. Convergent with the Polish initiative was the decision of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who established the High-Level Panel to work out a proposal for the reform of the United Nations system. The need to undertake collective action is a result of the global context of contemporary conflicts. The UN remains the most universal international organization and ensures the best potential platform for international cooperation based on the shaping of the new international order. Moreover, it seems essential to revise two so-far fundamental principles of international order, namely the principle of non-intervention in internal matters and the principle of state sovereignty. Abiding by them was to protect states from external aggression, and by the same means to guarantee the maintenance of peace and international security. Nevertheless, as I have mentioned earlier, the main threats are internal in their character. In this situation, the traditional perception of these principles obstructs the effective solution of today's threats.

What we need now is to award the international community a right to "cooperative intervention", primarily so as to protect civilians from mass-scale violence, which it is as a rule subjected to during internal conflicts. In other words, the new task is to seek for effective multilateralism. The European Security Strategy assumed last year as an initiative of Javier Solana, claims that *in the world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on the effective multilateral system. Our goal is the development of a more powerful international society, properly functioning international institutions and international order based on rule of law.*

In the United States, too, eminent authorities and experts in international politics, as Joseph S. Nye, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski have emphasized that even the most powerful states in the world cannot and should not follow the principles of unilateralism in their activities. The multi-dimensionality and complexity of problems we are facing, requires undertaking of close international

cooperation within existing organizations. They must, however, adjust to contemporary challenges, especially as far as the mechanisms of crisis reaction, conflict and prevention solution and post-conflict reconstruction are concerned. It is also necessary to deepen the Trans-Atlantic partnership based on common shared values, similar threats and strategic goals.

Historical experience proves that democracy serves the preservation of government stability as well as social and economic growth. Its lack, on the other hand, is frequently the reason of weakness of the state, internal conflicts and related mass violations of human rights, which is the source of destabilization of international security. It would be good to recollect here the five reasons for which democracy should be promoted, quoted by Bronisław Geremek during the “Towards a Community of Democracies” Warsaw Founding Conference.

They are:

- human rights,
- peace and security: both internal and external,
- economic development and prosperity of citizens and entire society,
- justice and solidarity,
- participation, responsibility and individual autonomy of common people and social groups.

Final remarks

Closing, I would like to share one general remark: the new reality we live in contains a major tension between states and nations on the one hand, and the community and society on the other. The new international order is expressed through the fact that the existing structures are increasingly supra-state rather than inter-governmental in their nature:

- the difference between foreign policy and internal policy becomes obliterated,
- their constituent international and state structures have the right, if not the duty, to interfere with matters that in the past used to belong among sole competencies and discretionary power of national governments of sovereign states,
- today, states accept the growing scope of jurisdiction of international tribunals, especially in matters concerning human and minority groups rights.

It is necessary, therefore, to look for solutions that reconcile the interests of the community and society with the needs of nations and states.



Part one

C o n f l i c t
- places and sources
T r a n s f o r m a t i o n
for peace - conditions

DEBATE 1

International institutions and tools of mediation.

Supporting the process of building peace

Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, moderator

I would like to welcome experts in our debate: **Jan Kavan**, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, President of the United Nations Assembly in the years 2002-2003; Professor **Michael Daxner**, Principal International Officer for Education and Science of UN Mission in Kosovo, current Advisor to the Minister of Education in Afghanistan, and **Ernest Zienkiewicz**, the coordinator of the human rights protection group of the UN System in Poland.

In this first debate of the series we are to consider international institutions and mediation tools supporting peace reconstruction processes. Professor Adam Rotfeld explained to us the questions related to international institutions. Looking at what is going on in the world, everyone ponders the significance of such international institutions as the United Nations or the Security Council. Is it not so that the world is a stage on which the main role is played by but a single actor, while all the remaining ones are no more than extras and, in most cases, entirely helpless extras? Please, let me quote the words of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: “Humanity expects from us something more than just words of sympathy”. Indeed one may have just such the impression that in the recent years the UN offered only words of sympathy.

Jan Kavan

I am very pleased that I can share briefly my views on the role of United Nations in the process of resolving international conflicts and building peace. It was clear from Professor Rotfeld’s speech that there are many highly sensitive and controversial questions, on which there is no consensus in the international community and I do not suppose that there will be consensus even in this room. I think, though, that this will only help to contribute to an interesting discussion.

Conflict resolution and maintenance of international peace and security are, as you know, the fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter of UN. It was one of the primary missions mandated by the Charter to save succeeding generations from the scorch of war. We can discuss how effectively the UN fulfilled this task or whether the UN failed. Yet, I think that it is beyond any doubt, that what

the United Nations has been and still trying to do, is to stand guard over international peace.

Obviously, the General Assembly, whose president I was for a year, evolved during the past decades and it expanded its membership – to 191 members now – and expanded its role and influence. The concept of security has evolved as well. Today, the maintenance of peace and security is far more closely interlinked to social and economic security, respect for human rights and democratic values. These are the questions that the UN General Assembly has taken upon itself to promote.

The primary role in the maintenance of peace and security life is held by the Security Council. The effectiveness of the General Assembly in fulfilling its security mandate is therefore, I would say, mixed. However, I do believe that the UN is the only international organization with the legitimacy and capacity to bring about a restoration of peace. Of course, this is on the understanding that the parties in the dispute allow it.

Professor Rotfeld has mentioned here the current discussion about the necessity of UN reform. I am very much in favor of UN reform, but UN reform should not be simply reduced to discussion of reform of the Security Council.

A reform is slightly different from a change. I would not like to see any replacement of the United Nations or any major change. The idea just mentioned here has recently been discussed because of the initiative of media in several countries.

I was for one year, like all my predecessors, chairing the Working Committee of the Security Council, which is the most obvious task of any President. I think it to have been the most frustrating task: I chaired around sixteen other committees, and I would say fifteen of them were interesting and fulfilling. The Security Council Working Committee was the only one I could have forgotten. I chaired it on the tenth anniversary of its establishment. So we had ten years of its history. During these ten years the arguments were always the same, the countries presenting those arguments were the same and in some countries even the diplomats who acted on behalf of the countries presenting the arguments were the same. Everybody agreed that the Security Council reflected the 1945 situation and should be changed into what could reflect the world in 2001. No problem! Everybody agreed that we should enlarge the Security Council, to take into account a changed geopolitical situation and the fact that the United Nations does not have 54 members as it used to, but

191. Everybody agreed that the majority now were the developing countries which were not represented in the Security Council. We can go on and on with the number of such questions everyone agreed on.

But then there were points to discuss: how to lead to the conclusion and to implement the changes that were agreed during the talks. There we were with the same arguments. Nobody had any basic disagreement with the idea that might theoretically not been agreed to. Professor Rotfeld agrees and the three other representatives of the Polish government agree, and so do many others.

There is general agreement that former enemies should enter the Security Council. (The UN Charter, which still describes Japan and Germany as enemy nations, should be changed). In Europe everyone agreed, except Italy. What about Japan becoming a member of Security Council? Everybody agrees, except my predecessor who came from South Korea. Let's agree that Brazil should be on the Council as one of the most important countries of Latin America. Everybody would agree – except probably Argentina. Let's try to make India a member of the Council – nobody questions that the most populous democratic state should be on the Security Council, except maybe Pakistan. In Africa, everybody agrees that one of the most important countries is South Africa, and the Ambassador of Egypt agreed with me, but he said he would allow it only over his dead body. It is not on me to risk the life of the esteemed Ambassador, so we stopped that discussion. We can go on and on and on with this.

Thus, there are a number of different models and we can have permanent members, non permanent, semi-permanent members or rotating members in order to accommodate the fact that the problem is not in the UN. The problem is in the capitals of some individual countries. What we need is a political breakthrough: we need to accommodate several regional rivalries in order to break through this deadlock and therefore I do not think we should blame the UN in New York for not achieving any breakthrough.

For me, and I am not as objective as you, unfortunate events like the war in Iraq could have a positive and long-term impact, if they provoked a discussion about the whole philosophy on which the United Nations is based. If they provoked a discussion about how we achieve efficiency. I do not think we would come to any fantastic solution and it is on purpose that we will present it after the US elections. Nevertheless it will provoke an intense and extremely important discussion. The feeling of global insecurity has seldom been greater than it is today.

Seemingly, though, on the other hand, I feel that the desire among peoples and nations for a peace and security framework based firmly on international rule of law, have never been greater. The framework must be capable of responding swiftly and effectively to the challenges of our rapidly changing world.

When the blueprint for the UN was laid down in Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington DC, in 1944 – the date when, of course, the Charter was formulated and approved at the 1945 Conference, the list of formalized disputes over procedures was included: fact finding or inquiry, conciliation or mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, adjudication by international law, operation of regional agencies or arrangements. All those means of dispute are essentially part of the article 33 of the Charter, but we have no time to go further through it.

At the same time, one of the main concerns of the founding member states was a separation of powers between the General Assembly and the Security Council: to give them distinct mandates with respect to peace and security. They wanted to remedy a shortcoming of the League of Nations and its inability to deal with the conflicts impeded by the unclear mandates between the Council and the Assembly. (By the way I think that the weakness of the League of Nations also resulted from the absence of the United States). Consequently it was decided that the primary responsibility would lie on the Security Council with all the consequences as we see today. When signing the Charter in 1944, one could not have foreseen that the Cold War would impede the Security Council in carrying out its mandate. Frequent use of veto by the five Permanent Members causes the Security Council to be paralyzed and ineffective in dealing with threats and breaches of international peace. Let me remind you only of a few cases: the invasion of Hungary, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, the war in Vietnam, the conflict in the Falklands. These cases made it clear that the Security Council is paralyzed by rivalry.

It was the end of the Cold War that gave us a promise that the UN will be able to take the central stage in the international security system. The UN has been increasingly confronted by ethnic and civil violence within states rather than violence between states. The optimism about final deployment of the system of the collective security in the world, was undermined by the authorization of the Desert Storm operation in the Persian Gulf in 1991. However, it soon became apparent that the post-Cold War reality will be far, far more complex. For example, the desire of the international community to protect the victims of internal conflicts collided with the problem to put pressure on the parties responsible for such

suffering in the first place. The operations in Somalia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed the difficulties in providing humanitarian relief under such circumstances.

In July 1992, the first ever summit of the Security Council attended by heads of states and governments asked the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to come up with a plan to strengthen the role of the UN. This resulted in the document called the Agenda for Peace. The Agenda outlined four phases of international action to deal with conflict: firstly – preventive actions which included: preventive diplomacy, fact-finding missions, early warning of potential conflicts, mediation, confidence building measures, and in certain circumstances preventive deployment. Secondly peace-making which differs essentially from the means outlined in the chapter 6 of the Charter, in the sense of peaceful settlement of disputes which can include methods of mediation, conciliation, arbitration, etc. Thirdly, peace-keeping to describe the deployment of the UN presence in the field, with the consent of all bodies concerned, and not excluding the use of military force. Finally, post-conflict peace reconstruction: a form of peace-building that is regarded today as one of the most important.

Let me stress that I regard peace-building in economic and social areas as extremely important, yet requiring fundamental reform. Extreme poverty, social inequality and discrimination are often the causes of conflict and international organizations such as the UN – and the UN should certainly not be reduced to its headquarters in New York but should be seen as a number of specialized, extremely important agencies like: UNDP, UNHCR or UNESCO – can help to address these issues including the problems of land ownership, taxation, pricing policies, health and education services, etc.

This is in fact one of the reasons why during my presidency I tried to concentrate on two issues, out of many others, but these two were crucial. First: to succeed where my predecessors failed, that is to agree on a resolution on prevention of armed conflict. Here the negotiations continued every other day for six months. In fact, just the paperwork included in the minutes resulted in a book, but eventually the resolution was agreed.

The second issue I considered extremely important, was to help to improve the institutional conditions for the implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals of 2000.

I think the Millennium Development Goals are extremely important. Probably the best known here is the reduction of extreme poverty, which is to have been

reduced by half by 2015 – a target that will almost certainly not be achieved due to reluctance of some countries to fulfill the obligation they had promised to. Nevertheless I think that pressure should be maintained and the task should not be abandoned. Other resolutions include the guarantee of access to drinking water – it is surprising how many millions of people do not have drinking water for their disposal, or access to basic healthcare, basic education. I consider them extremely important because I believe that extreme poverty or political conflicts unsolved for many, many years, as for example the one in the Middle East, create tensions. If they are not dealt with, they lead to feelings of powerlessness, frustration, anger on the part of the victims and this creates fertile soil for extreme behavior, radical behavior, even for extreme terrorist behavior.

Therefore, a fight with international terrorism has to include fighting the roots of the conflict, has to include prevention of the conflict, has to include a struggle against extreme poverty, inequality and discrimination. Fulfilling the Millennium Goals is definitely a major step in the right direction.

A few days ago I was pleased to learn about an initiative of the Brazilian president Luiz Inacio 'Lula' da Silva just before the opening the General Assembly, a major move that called for Action Against Hunger and Poverty was launched. It was started almost on a private initiative of the Brazilian President and resulted in support expressed by 110 countries for concrete actions that will hopefully be taken during 2005. I did agree with the Brazilian President's remark that the fact that twenty-four thousand people die everyday from hunger is actually one of the most effective machines of mass destruction. If you want to work against mass destruction, this is a case which we should not ignore. Therefore I agree with Kofi Annan, whom I admire tremendously and with whom I appreciated working closely for a year, when he was talking about peace-building, he said that peace-building is not only post-conflict reconstruction, it is nation building, which is extremely important. He also stressed that peace-building is a preventive instrument which can address the undermined roots and causes of conflicts which could be used before the outbreak of war. I think transforming this vision into reality and practicing preventive peace building more readily, will make peace building a more cost-effective process.

There are very difficult conflicts which the UN cannot deal with efficiently, among them: Cyprus, Somalia, Sudan, Angola just to point at a few.

The Arab problem in the Middle East has been the most intractable. The UN has been trying to solve it from the very beginning. Hopes are in the implementation process of the *Road Map* in which the UN is represented. Only few days ago, on 24th September, the diplomatic quartet: the United States, the European Union, Russia and the General Assembly called on the countries, including Israel, to meet the obligations stipulated in the *Road Map* – the peace blueprint. One can be cautious regarding the results, but I think that the fact that things are difficult, does not mean we should give up trying to pursue them.

Within a period of last decades not only the mediation tools have evolved, but also the concept of security. Today, maintenance of peace and security is far more closely linked to social and economic security and respect for human rights and democratic values. Let me refer here to what Professor Rotfeld has just said. It has been acknowledged that the current international law is still based on Rousseau's principle of sovereignty, the sovereignty of a nation state.

The international law evolves but it evolves slowly: understandably, it is always behind those events which form the conditions which eventually change the international law. But before the international law is codified, there is a time left, if we like it or not. The argument today goes that the international law is outdated, that it does not incorporate the San Francisco principles of individual human rights which were proposed at the UN inauguration, that sovereignty became much more of a responsibility to protect than a right to rule with impunity. Reporters of this view therefore stated: undemocratic states that systematically abuse human rights, open themselves to military intervention by democratic countries in the name of protecting human rights. The removal of illegitimate regimes that perpetrate gross abuses is therefore presented as a kind of logical conclusion of this new international ethic based on humanitarian universalism.

The ideology of human rights has to undergo certain conditions. It is arguably overruled by the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention which means that the current international law, which is still dominated by the inviolability of state sovereignty, has to be either ignored or changed. This is a controversial statement but an understandable one. I spent twenty years as a Czech émigré in London, helping the émigré movement as a dissident, and as a devoted human rights activist in the Human Rights Foundation, and my experience as a human rights activist cannot be questioned. I strongly believe that the world of such dictators as Saddam Hussein is vanishing.

I lived in an undemocratic country for many years and I know how difficult it is to remove those rules solely by democratic means. On the other hand, my experience as the President of the UN Assembly confirmed that international law has to be respected in the form as it exists in a given moment. I remember one of the documents I received as a President: it said that there were forty-three undemocratic countries in the world, and that they covered about a third of the world's population. It also remarked that this one third were among the poorest people in the world, with very few human rights and that was a ground for international intervention. Yet, I am not quite sure what would be the mechanism of such an intervention and who would decide which country is so undemocratic that we would have a right to remove its government by force, by applying an action during which many of these poor people bereft of human rights would actually die.

At the same time, I am absolutely convinced that the human rights should be put center-stage of international law and that they should evolve to incorporate the San Francisco principle, namely the mechanism to remove illegitimate dictatorships due to which people suffer and die. I do believe that it should be done by an institutional mechanism, by a system of international law supported by the international community, rather than by relying on unilateral action. Otherwise, we could face a legal jungle and the result would be instability and conflicts – the very things which we endeavor to prevent.

The best way to avoid disillusion is not to have any illusions. As it was said about the United Nations: it was created to prevent you from going to hell, not to take you to heaven. I strongly agree, we should support the UN's ability to prevent us from going to hell, and not expect it to behave empathically or take us to paradise as it will never do.

I will conclude by stressing that, in my opinion, despite its many shortcomings, despite its bureaucracy (the closer you are to the headquarters in New York, the angrier you become with the bureaucracy), I was and still am a great supporter of the United Nations, both when I was in Prague and in New York.

The UN has to be reformed. Not changed, not replaced but reformed. It is the only organisation that enjoys that unique legitimacy and mandate to the conflicts.

The United Nations is multilateral and intergovernmental organisation. It cannot do things other than the member states would allow. If member states said: no, you could have the best bureaucracy in the world, the best will in the world and the most noble motivations and you would not be able to move. The United Nations

is simply criticized for not preventing one of the worst human tragedies which happened ten years ago in Rwanda as well as more recent cleansings. I think these were worst human tragedies and I know from my personal experience and from my discussions with Kofi Annan, that these were the experiences the UN was responsible for. However, let us remind ourselves that the failure of the UN in Africa – the continent where the UN was least successful – was due to a lack of political will on the part of the international community and superpowers, which resulted in a very narrow and weak mandate to the UN peace keepers and the great reluctance of the Security Council members. In Rwanda, as you know, there was a modest UN peace-keeping force and a very shaky ceasefire. The western world, however, including the United States, decided at the time to ignore the nightmare and refused more attempts to stop the violence.

It is also extremely important to assume that with significant political will on the part of the countries, the UN will be able to do little more than to observe. So it is incumbent on us and on our governments to increase the pressure and use UN as the facilitator of the process. The United Nations may not be a perfect model for resolution-related disputes, but it provides a forum for mediation, for negotiation, for discussion, for deployment of peace-keeping activities and also for development of international law.

What I consider very important when thinking about the role of the UN in consideration of the resolutions, is that its inexhaustible efforts can be translated into successful outcome only by the willingness of the parties of the dispute. The UN can and does help the parties to find common ground and to work out compromises. Yet, it is the member states who can make them work.

Professor Michael Daxner

This conference is organized very timely. It allows all participants to draw conclusions from a very complicated year in international politics and to prepare for more perspectives in post-conflict areas in the future. Meanwhile, some related events have either supported the ideas and criticisms presented at the conference, or have indicated new or different directions. In any case, it would be impossible to simply reproduce what has been said at the conference without commenting on some of these events like the elections in Afghanistan and Kosovo and the upcoming elections in Iraq amidst a wave of violence and insurgency.

REBUILDING PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT COMMUNITIES

The purpose of this brief presentation is to give a comprehensible outline of some ideas, which I have developed during my assignments to Kosovo and Afghanistan.

We are discussing post-conflict zones and what we mean are post-war or even war-at-its-end zones. In an era where wars are no longer armed conflicts between nation-states and their armies, but asymmetrical confrontations between unequal, and often amorphous, adversaries, post-conflict zones are characterized by:

- numerous civilian casualties,
- massive refugee movements and population re-deployment,
- traumatized people,
- ethnically and culturally motivated violence, competing with organized crime.

Most of these zones are under the control of intervention forces. Their impact on all sectors of public and private life, culture, life-world and the perception of reality by the people, shall be a part of our considerations. The rationale of our deliberations is the quest for a peaceful development of civil societies.

Post-war and civil society

All interventions shall be judged by their effect, or, more directly, whether the situation *after* the conflict has improved compared to the situation *before*. This can be easily affirmed in the case of Afghanistan with regard to the ousting of the Taliban. It is less clear with regard to the Mujahedeen and the Soviet occupation, and rather poorly reflected in the world before 1978.

For Kosovo, it is true that the intervention stopped the attempted ethnic purges by the Yugoslav dictator Milosevic, and thus, the Kosovo Albanians were liberated from a yoke and all people in the region had the chance to re-organize themselves. Whether the intervention has already had a groundbreaking positive effect on the people in Kosovo is less certain.

Those who launched the intervention had clear military and legal ideas on the effects of their actions. But the consideration of the following points:

- international law,
- consolidating a society in its post-conflicts traumatized status,
- gaining peace after winning a war,
- giving second thoughts on emergency status, nation building and society building,
- developing a sociology and anthropology of intervention ranged from poor to insufficient.

I am going to deconstruct some of these shortcomings, which, generally speaking, show only few differences between Kosovo and Afghanistan, and Iraq (which is not in my focus).

Both the air war on Serbia and the intervention in Afghanistan had some military consistency. However, in the first case international law was certainly provoked by the poor legitimacy of the intervention, in the second case, the legitimacy of the intervention was given with a side effect: replacing a government. In the case of Kosovo, the *humanitarian intervention* struck a deadly blow to the non-intervention doctrine, which had prevailed for a long time.

In the case of Afghanistan, it was not the prior aim to liberate the people from the Taliban regime, but to attack the Taliban, because they had given shelter to Osama bin Laden, who, by the way, is still at large. In the case of Kosovo, the main target were not the Serbs as a group to be punished, and the Albanian Kosovars as a group to be liberated, but the government and people of Serbia and the whole region: the international community wanted to make it clear that it would not tolerate a flagrant violation of human rights such as ethnic purging.

Some of the aspects in this context have been widely discussed and do not need an in-depth deliberation now, such as the legitimacy under the auspices of international conventions and rules, or the weakness of the humanitarian argument when facing nations to the like of Russia or China.

Let me point out some other aspects, less prominent, but perhaps decisive for creating a sustainable peace in the respective areas:

- **There was little concern about the effects of the intervention on the people and their life-worlds. All operations were decided upon at the ‘system’-level, where global policies, national interests and military considerations prevailed.**

Since neither Kosovo nor Afghanistan had had long traditions in public policies and the republican virtues of the “Agora”, much of the political aspects could never become explained and internalized by the people. Some of the side effects can be shown as examples: in Kosovo, the intervention was not only exaggerated as a liberation, but also as an armed alliance between the guerrilla-forces of the UCK and the intervention armies, mainly US-forces. It is clear that the perception of the international powers in this protectorate (UNMIK for civil affairs, and KFOR for the military and security aspect) almost inevitably must become ambivalent as soon as the hope of the majority of Albanians was disappointed

by UNMIK. This hope had only one focus, independence, and there was no whatsoever cultural bridge between aspirations on the one side, and UN-policies on the other side.

– Intervention forces and international powers (UNMIK) or advisers were poorly prepared for two confrontations: one between non-civil-societies and civil-societies, the other between non-civil-societies and the intervention forces themselves.

Whether very deficient or not, Serbia has been a civil society, and the Kosovo Albanians have never come close to such an organization of society; in a way, they are still a clannish society, which is also true for the tribal system in Afghanistan, though different in appearance. This means that there were or are no *institutions* upon which a societal reconstruction could be based. In a post-war society, these institutions are critical for the basic reorganization of something like a ‘society’. If schools, hospitals, social security, justice etc. do not work, democracy is of no appeal to anyone. If, and only if, the construction of a civil society is one of the main targets of an intervention, the governance of the territory can be shaped accordingly. Otherwise, decisions will be taken on the systems level, which are most likely to be abused on the life-world level or undercut.

But then, civil society should be a priority, together with a clear identification of legitimate power and the rule of law. This should also reflect the role which the agents of intervention, i.e. military and civilian administrators and agencies of the government, NGOs and others will have vis-a-vis the ‘locals’, the people who are there. These people are not ‘normal’ in the sense that they share all attitudes we find in ordinary civil societies. They do not trust in any government and political interest groups, they do not expect fair treatment by executive and security offices, they are starving, traumatized, sick and mostly disillusioned; they are on the move: either refugees or returnees. These people are not ready and certainly not willing to enter a discourse of historical and cultural understanding. International individuals and groups confront them with concepts which are more often than not the product of decisions far away, in Brussels, New York or D.C. In short: there is no “Sociology of Intervention” and no anthropological preparation of either side. In Afghanistan the apprehension regarding NGOs and unprepared good-will aid was most clearly expressed by one of the major warlords, Ismael Khan, and it was rather based on ‘pragmatic’ than on ideological reasons.

– In order to attain progress towards civil society, the soft sectors must be strengthened.

A civil society is characterized by institutions, which relieve people (individuals and groups) from excessive responsibility and public burdens. These institutions should empower them to more self-determination and teach them also respect for the rules they are increasingly entitled to formulate without external force. The political program should be that people learn how to expect something from their institutions, how to meet expectations from these institutions, and how to create mutual trust between them and their institutions. This implies both the development of ownership and the emergence of a republican spirit, in order to understand that there is something like public space and public affairs, as opposite to the private and clan-like interests.

This learning process can be strengthened if the soft sectors are developed as a priority and with high visibility in their reconstruction. Soft sectors are mainly education, public health, social protection, science, environment, and in a special sense, the judiciary and media. The other side of the spectrum is the hard sector domain. It is characterized mainly by security, safety, economy, transport, energy and infrastructure. Most reconstruction policies concentrate almost totally on the hard sectors and forget that you need much support from the soft sectors in order to get sustained success with elements of the rebuilt hard sector. In other words, you need good schools, hospitals and a minimum of social security in order to make people understand why the hard sector elements are being imposed from the outside.

– Soft sector strategies tend towards a change of elite.

Especially schools and universities serve a major aim which should precede the building of democratic institutions. Otherwise, the old elite, even if not ‘ruling’, will usurp the new democratic institutions. The elections in Kosovo and Afghanistan were not only premature, but have stirred new and avoidable ethnic and political conflicts, because the legitimizing of an old elite under democratic coating has little to do with the democratic effects we should expect from elections.

– Robust mandates and weak performance.

There have been numerous varieties of mandates of the United Nations, defined by the Security Council. Certainly, the peacekeeping mandate of UNMIK is one of the strongest, explicitly aiming at what could be called state-building and society-building rather than supporting nation-building in a more traditional sense.

Acting as an administration over the autonomous province of another, sovereign state, which has not ceased to exist as a legal subject, is quite a stark mandate. The aim has not been to 'create' a new state, but to establish substantial autonomy and a multi-cultural environment. This does clearly indicate that a re-defined 'status' for Kosovo should be approached by the mission and its potential successors, i.e. most likely the European Union as bearer of the mandate after June 2005, when the Kosovo mandate will probably be on the agenda of the Security Council.

The Mandate of UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) is evidently much more limited, because the Petersburg Accords established a legitimate government in Afghanistan, whereas the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) in Kosovo are based on a provisional 'Constitution', which allows, at best, a simulation of statehood on a non-sovereign base.

My point is that, under the considerations of what a civil society needs to become established, a strong mandate must be implemented in a very clear and robust way. It has to act as an 'incubator' for exactly the type of civility that a civil society requires, especially when it should begin to act autonomously and, eventually, independently. This had certainly never been the case after an emergency phase, when UNMIK acted rather successfully. But even then, the uncompromising establishment of the rule of law and a clear monopoly of power was not established. The disarmed UCK (National Liberation Army, a guerilla formation of Kosovar Albanians) was changed into an emergency civil 'protection Corps' (KPC), but protection equals 'defense' in Albanian, and exactly this has been the ground for developing a quasi-military body, which just cannot wait until it becomes a regular Army in an independent Kosovo. This could only occur with a kind of hidden support or at least toleration by some powerful intervention allies, mainly the US.

This is just one example of weak execution of the mandate. Other aspects can be seen in inconsequential procedures on sensitive grounds, such as the privatization of former socially owned property, or the introduction of orderly labor relations and social protection. All these fields were planned for with some experience from other missions and certainly with best intentions, but in a way which I call "Model Platonism", that is a method which does not really refer to the real people who should implement and internalize all the rationales and implications of the reforms and changes simultaneously brought to them. The best results were

attained in civil administration, for example in the areas of establishing offices and institutions in which people could trust, and in education, culture, and partially in health and public services. Nevertheless, even there the main impediment was that local co-operation was initiated before a minimal change of elite and before a pool of reliable local experts had been trained. The training of local police was also successful, however, only very late, and in a very costly police academy system, whereas the 800 policemen, who were trained under the previous Serbian regime, were not even used in apolitical assignments at the beginning of the mandate, when they would have been urgently needed. The power vacuum during the first months of UNMIK had also created a sustained inefficiency in the hard sectors, mainly utilities and economic development. (Only telecommunication and private transport had some early success). In the energy sector, the incompetent UNMIK administration and some corruption gave the most negative image of an inept colonial force. In the social sector, the failure to provide a solid pension system created the utmost hopelessness and the lack of 'future' as a perspective and incentive for active involvement of people. These are examples of underrating of the soft-sector-approach. The people were neither prepared nor able to meet the requirements, which came from the logic of a protectorate force, which had some general aims, but no coherent understanding of its mission. Only in civil administration were there substantial discussions on the rationales of the actions and policies to be taken.

The situation in the protectorate of Kosovo is certainly more precarious than in Afghanistan. The majority people in Kosovo, the Albanians, have attained an attitude which overwhelmingly is narrowed to the perspective of 'independence or nothing', when nothing means another war. The Kosovo Serbs, now a minority of under 8% in the territory, are not willing to follow this univocal slogan and fear that, in case of a new state, their minority rights will not be guarded and respected by the Albanians. The Albanians, interestingly enough explicitly through Ramush Haradinaj, the present Prime Minister, have the opinion that only as an independent people can they respect the Serbs as a rightful minority, protected by human rights and rules. This situation is, by itself, not so difficult: it could be disentangled by a sensible policy on the part of UNMIK. But there are some impediments which make a solution almost impossible:

- The provisional constitution has dismembered the willingness and abilities of the political class to act: they are allowed to simulate democracy, they may

even govern the ideologically precarious sectors (education, science, civil service), but the last instance on money remains in the hands of the internationals. This is, why the principle 'Standards before Status', set up by SRSB Steiner, could not work. The Kosovar Albanians had no chance to act responsibly, the more they could claim irresponsibly, because in the end they never had to care for the implementation of standards. The new doctrine of a 'conditioned status with standards' is certainly more realistic.

- The economy has declined since 1999: unemployment rose from over 45% to almost 70%, with some public services (health, education, police) being major employers. The main reason is certainly that no rigid rule of law has allowed a transition from socialist ownership to public-private and private ownership. Privatization also hit hard all adversaries to the previously dominant people, the Serbs, who are still identified with the socialist economy; this is only partially justified;
- No real care has been given to the effects to primary and secondary brain circulation. Many returnees from the west have brought with them not only some savings, but also a clear idea what Europe means to them: affluent consumer attitudes, a certain image of quality of goods and standards of life, which should be the perspective for Kosovo lest they would prefer to leave the country again (secondary brain drain); the relationship between those who had stayed during the war and who have survived the atrocities and those who came back into a post-war constellation, were never taken seriously by the supreme leadership, though there were enough attempts to raise related questions, e.g., who will be able to become peers to groups of young people?, or what will the best methods to disarm false advertising of a national identity be?
- Almost no provisions had been taken to anticipate two kinds of conflicts: the international clash of civilizations, and the clashes of international cultures with local cultures. The first conflict is due to the attempt of the UN to be a model in gender and ethnic balance among its employees. Police from 30 countries, with very different background of training and assignments were flown into Kosovo. UNMIK administrators with little or no understanding of the situation competed with some who were almost experts on the region;

Two problems, though, were most consequential for the entire setting, and, at the same time, they are more difficult to describe and to deconstruct. It shall be considered that there will be some hypotheses with no claim for universal applica-

bility, but with a limited range of validity: One of the problems is the imperative to create a multicultural, multiethnic community. My hypothesis is that multicultural development is a valid end of interventions, but never a tool in situations, where more than two ethnic or cultural communities have never lived together, at best side by side in cold peace. Serbs and Albanians were never deadly enemies, like the Germans and French in the past, but they became antagonists during the 19th century, when both parties became pawns of imperialist domination games after the Crimean war. Their living on the same territory was characterized by idiosyncrasies and increasing Serbian oppression of the cultural authenticity of the Albanians. When their relationship has reached the stage of 'Platonic Hatred' (Avishai Margalith), it was too late for a rational-choice solution. The intervention was probably the only way out of the dilemma, but the way it was carried out deserves much criticism and a search for alternative options. Without going into the details of the confrontation, it is necessary to make clear that almost nothing had been prepared for the effects of an intervention under these circumstances: religion, traditions, customary laws, remnants of serfdom, rebellion, apathy and massive intervention have set a stage where UNMIK, KFOR and many international GOs and NGOs still struggle. There was not and is not a 'Sociology of intervention'. Not only the violent acts of March 2004, with 28 persons killed, numerous buildings burnt, and a wave of apprehension sweeping over the territory, but also their aftermath show the helplessness and hypocrisy of the helpers. (There is hope in the person of the new SRS, Jessen Petersen, and his team; yet it is too early to assess their effectiveness). The other problem is even more controversial and points to a misperception of democracy. There are some views of democracy that prefer elections to any other instrument to reconstruct damaged societies and to rebuild peace and sustainable development. Very early in UNMIK, at a seminar in April 2000, a prominent Kosovar (Albanian) intellectual warned that early elections would just legitimize the old elite, who were corrupt, criminal, and incompetent. He proved so terribly right that there is more than one lesson to be learned, and not only in Kosovo. Generally, elections in intervention areas and post-war societies are 'democratic' by procedure. The effect is what I call a 'metonymic confusion'. The procedure is taken for the status of democracy, the results are interpreted as the proof of a substantial change in the structure of society. However, as Dubravka Ugresic says, the vocabulary has changed, but the grammar is still the same. Democratic procedures are being applied for and by people who,

in a civil society, you would not have as candidates and representatives. This observation is the more important in societies with no real experience in checks and balances and political parties. Thus, by the elections in Kosovo, the old elite has been given the chance to reproduce itself instead of supporting the self-determination of the people (this is a question of age and political aspirations: more than 50% of all people are under 25 years, but almost everywhere the dominance of the traditional clan-chiefs and heads of families is unbroken).

In Afghanistan, the problem is similar: of course, President Hamid Karzai is unchallenged and consequently was elected head of state in the first run; but he had estranged many of his cabinet ministers and previous followers, because only now, the country is divided into parties and factions, more often than not also into ethnic antagonism. Before that, the proto-democratic rules of the Loja Jirga, a kind of tribal round-table, and the international conferences of Petersburg had given sufficient legitimacy to a relatively solid rule. Only for the elections, Karzai had to compromise with some of the most notorious warlords, such as General Dostum. Karzai's reputation has severely suffered since the election and in the process of forming his new government, as the official UN news extensively confirm (20 December 2004).

My general thesis is that democratic elections should signify *the end of a process of democratization, and not its beginning*. In the beginning, there should be capacity building, institution building, and, if necessary by the legitimate power of the intervention forces, the exchange of elite, that is, the creation of a political class. This elite should have a sense of ownership (my country), public responsibility (my public affairs and my liability), and the firm will to abide to the laws that are being made for everyone. In Kosovo, and to a certain degree in Afghanistan, the new ruling classes have first of all succeeded in accumulating riches and status-symbols for themselves and their clans and families (with a few, less powerful exceptions).

Is there hope?

Of course there is. What we can learn from both examples, Kosovo and Afghanistan, is that even an intervention which has not had much time to prepare itself for acting in a foreign territory should respect a few rules:

- A mandate over a foreign territory should never be expanded to an extent which cannot possibly meet the main justification for the intervention itself, for example to rescue people, to act as a powerful peacekeeping force, to

replace an unbearable tyranny. These rules may look innocent and trivial. But in the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan one can clearly see that in Kosovo the mandate has been almost too large for the possible outcome, and in the case of Afghanistan it has been too narrow with regard to an immense country which is now torn between past and present.

– If the mandate allows, and if the intervention leadership is willing to accept lessons learned, then the priority of rules on the system-level should be:

- The establishment of a clear monopoly of power and a rigid physical disarmament of all bearers of weapons; this also points at groups who were ‘allies’ to the intervention forces during the bellicose actions (like the UCK in Kosovo and the Northern Alliance militias in Afghanistan, as far as they are not being really integrated into the new regular Afghan army).
- The rule of law has priority over all institution-building for democracy. The law shall provide for adequate institutions in the soft sectors as to enable the intervention powers and conflict parties to ‘translate’ the ends and instruments of civil society to the people, or into the ‘life-world’.
- A *republican spirit* and the exchange of elite shall precede formal democracy and participation in the political processes. By the first I mean the creation of *public* space and a clear rule on what shall be public and what may remain *private*. The exchange of elite shall enable a generation with no corrupted or criminal past to run for public office and higher positions in administration and judiciary.
- No future without social protection: pension plans and health insurance are among the top priorities in the establishment of civil administration. Health and education are most important elements within the soft sectors, and teacher training within education.
- A thorough interaction between international and local representatives is needed, by which the clashes of cultures shall be anticipated, mediated and regulated. Experts on sociological, psychological and religious settings under the conditions of intervention shall be included into decision making, and not just ‘embedded’ in the system.
- Local corruption and organized crime are normal in many countries. Intervention forces should act as models and never impose norms on the local people which they themselves are never willing to comply with. The

devaluation of the role model is a serious danger to the confident cooperation between protectors and local population.

This short list is rather abstract. In the concrete situation there is a tough task when it comes to the translation of aims and means from the system level to the life-world. Phenomena like defection from the country side, wild squatting and settling in the suburbs of chaotic agglomerations, decrease of religious tradition and increased re-surfacing of older religious traditions under much more radical auspices than before, decay of family structures and social bonds, wild competition of lifestyles and habits, etc., shall get investigated empirically and theoretically. The acquired insights and knowledge shall be included into the deliberations and decision making of the ruling powers. The life-world in post-war societies is not *normal* in the sense that all situations are being guarded and protected by stable institutions, in which the people can trust; it is characterized by the collective traumatic experience, by violence, by insecurity on behalf of individual and collective futures. To deal with a big number of deprived and hopeless persons is no easy task. That means that intervention forces must act in a principled way and, at the same time, flexible. Both rules have been violated in Kosovo and Afghanistan, not to mention Iraq. There is an enormous insecurity about the range and application of human rights, especially when they are being challenged by seemingly emergent structures of self-determination. In many cases, indecisiveness allows brutal violations of human rights, for example the oppression of girls and women under the pretext of customary law and local traditions. Supervision, accompanying research and assessment, and the 'custom-tailored' local checks and balances between systems and life-world shall be the elements of good governance.

The epilogue

This text is quite naturally only 'the torso'. It was cut out from running investigation and research, while the situation in the two countries I use as examples is changing by the day. From my time in Kosovo I know that the dose of social science must be carefully introduced with the local peers, if we do not want them to create a stubborn resistance against any expert input and any extrinsic motivation to change a situation, which seems to have restored 'old times and customs'. Yet, I suggest much less care on the side of the intervening powers: negligence and illpreparedness are no excuse for failure in the creation of peace and stable civility.

The research projects I am referring to deal with some of the most challenging aspects of intervention sociology, for example the concept of intervention

itself: does it really provoke clashes of civilizations like the ones described by Huntington? Or is it the micro-social level, where a variety of cultures clash, and change rapidly? We must consider the leeway for and the limitations to a challenge of local culture by interventionist culture. Not every attack on local irrationalism is neo-colonialist, and not only defense of local identity is *per se* dignified and sacrosanct. The aim is to develop an 'Anthropology and Sociology' of post-war society under the circumstances of a decomposition of the traditional nation state and the emergence of new kinds of political entities, such as the ethnic people's states in South-East Europe. This means that the relation between the state, society at large, and the diverse communities has to be investigated.

Another aspect is the firm conviction that history, however important it may become for future identity-building, is bad turf for emergency situations, and never directly justifies any political action, such as revenge or blockage of negotiations. This research is based on the theories on soft sectors and of a modernized approach towards institutions and the civil society, which also means that we need a concept of *state and administration*, which can meet the civil society as fair and respectable partners. Which, in a rather obvious way, brings me back to my original point about the importance of education. Trust, critical minds, an understanding for complex situations, and the overcoming of trauma and deprivation are never being delivered by those who intervene, for whatever reasons; it must be learned, and can be learned, by the people affected. The improvement of their situation, the better 'after', is the aim of intervention policy, and of intervention sociology.

Ernest Zienkiewicz

My main task in Poland is the protection of refugees, besides this, as everyone working for the UNHCR, I am greatly interested in the protection of human rights. My predecessors spoke of the activity of the United Nations in various parts of the world, while I would like to share with you a handful of short remarks and comments on violence.

In our times, violence is present almost everywhere, and it should be remembered that our effort should focus on the reconstruction of peace. As you know, the UN Charter forbids, in Article 2.4 the use of force in the solution of international problems. This principle should be observed by persons and various communities in the same way as by the states that form the international community.

The use of violence to enforce the opinion becomes a temptation. Violence creates an increasing volume of violence, and such actions have no end. No deci-

sion has been taken to change this direction and head straight for peace that is necessary for individual communities and states, and is the only standard becoming human dignity.

As you probably know, the UNHCR (Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees), which I represent, is present in numerous parts of the world, and participates in a highly unambiguous process of building peace. Peace-building is the only option when refugees seek countries in which to settle. Most usually, they experience violence and generalization of human rights, so when they are looking for a new homeland, they seek protection and physical safety.

The other, and no less important, task we implement in the peace-building process is the organization of free repatriation programs. Examples are numerous and can be quoted from various continents: Indonesia, Afghanistan, East Timor, Asia, Latin America. Free repatriation programs that we conducted there allowed many refugees return to Chile, Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Closer, it happened in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Kosovo. In Africa, free repatriation took place to Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Angola. Each time, we were trying to do all we could to ensure peace for the refugees on their way to other countries, as well as to guarantee peace to refugees returning to their homeland.

Looking from the point of view of the UN, I would like to emphasize the joy of the UN that this international conference takes place in Poland, in Kraków. This country knows – from its own experience – the terrible consequences of violence. Poland should become the touchstone for regaining peace and living in peace. In closing, I would also like to mention that such people as Sergio Vieira de Mello and other colleagues who died in the bomb attack last year will always remain in the memories of their UNHCR colleagues.

DEBATE 2

'Regime' of democracy and the 'pressure' of dialogue

Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, moderator

Experts in the debate are **Sikose Mji**, Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa to Poland, **Róża Thun**, the President of Polish Robert Schuman Foundation, and **Krzysztof Śliwiński**, former Polish Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa and Morocco. The theme of our discussion is the *regime* of democracy and the *pressure* of dialogue. Frankly speaking, the phrase “regime of democracy” itself is slightly perverse and shocking, for it is always that regime and democracy are mutually exclusive. We, in Poland, know perfectly well what regime means, and now we are learning what democracy means. Yet, we also understand what the pressure of dialogue means. I would like to ask Róża Thun to begin.

Róża Thun

Regime of democracy..., well, I took it for a mistake in translation. Yet, it was I who was mistaken. So it goes. Today the head of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights turned my attention to an article in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, where it says that during the meeting of the Presidents of Russia and Poland, President Kwaśniewski admitted that democracy is very good, yet not necessarily everywhere. So reads the headline of the article. In this case, I agree to the word “regime”: democracy must be, and be everywhere. Democracy, however, is continuous discussion and dialogue. Though we complain about what is happening in Poland, that we have too much democracy here: with some guys just jumping out and blocking the rostrum – nearly everyone is allowed to do nearly everything. And I think: it is really fantastic that today they block our rostrum, for quite recently in this part of Poland there were some who sawed others in half. I think about the Szelas and others who block the rostrum today. Democracy advances, and it is getting better, even though – in fact – there is too little talking and dialogue.

Now I would like to focus on international dialogue. Recently, during a conference I heard that the Christian principle in the European Union and in international politics should read “Love thy neighbor as thy lovest thyself; love thy neighboring country as thou lovest thy own homeland”. First – love your homeland so that you could love the neighboring country. And love the neighboring country as you do your own, and then all is going to be well.

When now I consider what has been going on between Poland and Germany in the recent days, I see a classical lack of dialogue. Didn't our dialogue – thanks

to the good will of various fantastic people, many of them from Kraków – continue for decades, despite the iron curtain, despite all those historical obstacles? This, as some call it, miracle of reconciliation required plenty of effort, let me bring to our minds Pszon from Kraków, all the *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Znak* milieu, Turowicz, Stomma, Mazowiecki, Bartoszewski, and all the others. We thought that the case was settled: we are two democratic countries, partners in the European Union, and everything was perfect. What happens now? That if this dialogue is not continuously maintained at the same level of attention, with the same involvement, then one Steinbach with her idea for a Centre against Expulsions or Centre on the Expellees is sufficient to start such a fracas that jeopardizes the whole magnificent body of work conducted for decades.

We were trying to make the Germans aware of that, saying *be careful with the centre that Steinbach wants to make, for it will turn into an enormous fracas. It is unacceptable to us.* To which they would answer *Stop that hysteria. This is but a marginal phenomenon. Those few compatriots, those few expellees.* Moreover, tongues began to wag in Poland: *They, the Germans, want to forge and misrepresent history; they want to make this centre of theirs.*

We discussed too little with people in the like of Rita Süsmud or Markus Meikel who were building a very sharp opposition against the idea and suggested another solution: *Let us build a European Centre, together with Poles, Ukrainians and with Czechs, let us discuss together the shared past so as to build good, shared future.* Somehow, there was little reaction from the Polish side to this *Let's do something together.*

Germans want the National Centre in Berlin, and we do not agree to this. We want true history, and not falsified history. A monument to the expellees next to the Holocaust monument: is it not a scandal! We failed to notice another group of Germans, much greater in numbers, who want no Centre. In the stead of a serious debate, serious dialogue, there was only an exchange of opinions. Poles said: *Germans falsify History*, and Germans answered: *Poles are clearly overreacting.*

Even the presidents of Germany and Poland wrote a joint declaration on the need of dialogue, the need to speak together about history. It was printed in a few papers and forgotten: the end. Hundreds of private and inter-party talks were conducted; the CDU was appealed to: *Distance yourselves clearly from that Steinbach woman. This is going to become a real fracas.* To which Germans answered *We can*

do some joint projects or programs. Listen, stop making such a fuss. For we have the right to tell our story.

Finally, there appeared Pawełka or Pawelka with the Prussian Claims Society, and the atmosphere in Poland became deadly serious, as Pawelka really wants people previously expelled from those territories to regain the Polish lands. Germans said: *There are a thousand of them; these are private claims.* Politicians said: *We shall not support it, we shall not separate ourselves from it.* Tension in the Polish lower house of parliament (Sejm) was unbearable until the now famous resolution originated: *We claim reparations for war damages. We require Germans to take a stance towards the Prussian Claims Society.* Some newspapers called it shooting cannons at mosquitoes. Add on top of that the “ejaculations” of Jarosław Kaczyński, who said that *Poland’s policy towards Germany was for years conducted by journalists and politicians bribed by Germans and a band of idiots of beggarly character* – I am quoting him verbatim. All this resulted in a terrible row: the Prime Minister goes to the Chancellor, they are trying to reassure each other *Taken together, all is not so tragic, Steinbach and Pawelka are not so significant, and the Sejm has said something, and May we eventually come to an understanding?*

What are yet the conclusions from all that? First, there is no serious, honest, and involved dialogue between Poland and Germany in this matter, a most generalized image is built. Secondly, with the absence of dialogue, we are beginning to see each other as national standpoints. Thirdly, in many cases, the divisions in Europe, which the question of claims and reparations perfectly proves, do not follow national divides but go across societies. If we want to continue maintaining serious dialogue with them, we will always, in every nation, find a serious social group who would want to talk with us, and these are the people this dialogue must be conducted with.

Similarly, on the Polish side, there are plenty of people who distance themselves from the resolution of the Sejm, just as on the German side there are plenty of people who distance themselves from Steinbach and Pawelka.

We cannot say, *Poles are clearly overreacting.* Nor can we say *Germans want to falsify history.* This is face-slapping and not dialogue.

Today, when Germans ask *Why do you use such a big gun to shoot at such a Mr Nobody as that Pawelka?*, I answer *What big gun? Who would care about the Sejm in Poland? Significant for us are Steinbach and Pawelka.* So they continue *What are*

you saying? Steinbach and Pawelka? But they mean nothing with us! Nobody knows anything about them!

To start dialogue, we must look at ourselves from another perspective. Let us jump into those people's shoes. Let us see how they perceive us and how they receive the signals we make.

I do not want to return to the fact that our acquaintance with Germans is far poorer than we believed. Only recently did I realize the difference between the post-war generations of Poles and Germans. For Germans of my age, war was a terribly long time ago; moreover, those people were growing up in a normal democratic system: in a free and rich country – in Western Germany. We, in turn, living beyond the Iron Curtain, in poverty and under dictatorship, we continued to live in direct result of the war. The war and its impact, for me personally, ended on 1st May 2004.

They imagine that we can already talk of those horrendous expulsions; we can finally tell the story of the war for it was so long ago. Our wounds are very fresh, and this subject must be handled with kid gloves, which is not understood by everyone.

To open a dialogue, we must get to know each other, look at ourselves through the eyes of the other and expect the same from the others, to make it easier for them to look from our perspective and be looking from another perspective ourselves. This is exactly how it is with loving thy neighbor. The neighbors must be understood to be loved – and one must love oneself and treat oneself seriously, so as to be able to treat the other person in the same way. Let us treat ourselves in Poland seriously, let us treat Poland seriously, and let us treat our neighbors in the same way, and dialogue will then be successful.

Sikose Mji

When I was asking Director Glondys what she would like me to talk about, she kept repeating: just share your personal experience. I have listened to all the speakers this morning, they did share some personal experience, but it was not the core of their presentations. This is why, I am neither going to try to be very personal nor very general. I will speak perhaps limiting myself to my experience as a South African.

Everybody knows what we went through, hopefully. Ten years ago, we had a difficult situation of conflict which imposed a problem to be internationalized because it was at the time of the Cold War when the South Africa regime

(the apartheid) applied what they called ‘preventative military conflicts’ in the region. Then they went to Botswana, to Swaziland looking for the terrorists and those terrorists were people like myself and many others who opposed apartheid.

This, of course, brings us to the difficulty even today, as “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter”. Mandela was the greatest terrorist, and today – as we all know – he is the greatest most admired human rights campaigner. Thus, times do change, concepts do change, and people have to take things differently depending on the time they live in.

I want to emphasize the importance of dialogue and I am very happy that Róża Thun spoke about the same thing. Dialogue has been in South African politics a corner stone of the resolution of our conflict in our country. A conflict that some Polish friends of mine were surprised to learn began in 1652. They thought it began in 1948, when the apartheid regime seized power. No! It began in 1652 and we had a very long conflict – for 300 years

A conflict I would say always arises because of difference: color, creed, culture or all other things. We have been fortunate in South Africa to have had a consistent leadership that always assumed as its premise higher moral grounds. That is very, very important in conflict situations to have strong leadership that assumes high moral grounds, because when it happens so, people come with all kinds of perspectives but the high moral grounds can never be challenged. Through such a foundation, the African Congress was able to harness villages of various ethnic groups in South Africa into supporting its idea that South Africa will belong to all who live in it: the black and the white. From the day of my birth I learnt that, with all the conflicts in the country, the solution of the conflict has rather to be inclusive than exclusive.

We were the last African country to be decolonized and therefore we were fortunate to see every other African country obtain its independence, and we were fortunate to learn lessons from all other countries acquiring independence, and most of the lessons we learnt were what they have done wrong. This is what I would call “the prepared intervention”.

Believe me when I was exiled in Zambia as early as 1987, we already had what was called a post-apartheid department in the ENC working with me in the Scandinavian countries, as we were trying to dodge the Cold War alliances – if you like, we were supported by both the sides. The Soviet Union backed us especially militarily, and I went to schools mostly in Soviet block countries: Poland, Czech

Republic, the Soviet Union, and so on. None of the western governments actually supported the ENC, except for the Scandinavian governments, and this was the middle-of-the-road line that the ENC leadership chose to follow later. To win our freedom, we did not belong to this or that party, and we could navigate our democracy and our independence.

A part of the prepared intervention was the discussion of whether or not we will have a new looking-back style of post-apartheid, as you know, witch-hunts would not guarantee the peace. So we decided we would rather choose the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where everybody can come and is invited to confess – and if you confess and reveal everything, then you are guaranteed a place in the society and are allowed to walk freely. We have among us in the society people from both sides who really committed the most atrocious human rights abuses. They talked to us, and we would twitch sometimes or get scared when we encountered such a past, we would not know whether to escape through the door or just to watch and talk to each other. I am saying it because people are saying it has been done: reconciliation is always an ongoing process.

I recently watched on BBC some communities in the townships, because at national level we have truth and reconciliation between blacks and whites. At the local level it is not reported in the media that we have peace and reconciliation within the communities, because there are some communities where the killings were especially atrocious, and now those communities are coming into terms with each other. Local communities apologize to one to another and try as much as they can to obtain the understanding with the support from the state whenever necessary. That is what we did in my country.

Then we added to the discussion the question whether or not to have reparations. Once again, our leadership took the moral high ground: President Mbeki following in the footsteps of Nelson Mandela said: if we start the process of reparations we may not have the peace we are looking for. Rather we should look for other ways of redressing not just the victims but the societies – the so-called ‘previously disadvantaged communities and individuals’ by having what is called informative actions where the government took the decision to promote training skills and even jobs, especially in government. When there were two competitors: one previously advantaged and one previously disadvantaged, they would actually promote the one who was previously advantaged. Of course, the society will talk whether it is the right thing to do, and there are some complaints from the part of

those previously disadvantaged. Some of us draw a lot of satisfaction from the fact that we have never taken advantage in the past and see that this is an opportunity for us to play our rightful place in the society.

I want to talk also about the UN. Prior to my coming here as Ambassador, perhaps in 2000, I was involved in the organization of a world conference on racism which the United Nations decided to hold in South Africa. Naturally, we were very honored, because we saw ourselves as a country that had had a problem of a racism for a long time and that was actually approaching its resolution in an acceptable manner. Yet, the President decided that before that conference we should have a national conference on racism, and here once again I am referring to the dialogue that Róża Thun referred to. At that national conference against racism there were plenty of media – the media which are usually dominated by the whites – and there was much discussion about this conference: why do we have to open the old wounds, why did we have to talk about what had happened, and we naturally realized that, even though the truth and reconciliation process was happening at one level and many people came and said what they wanted to say, this process did not actually embrace everybody and we did not have such commissions as we now have in the UN, such as the Human Rights Commission. We need to have a human rights commission in South Africa to give us a validation of what they have seen on the ground and either acknowledge or refuse what they have seen. It was very, very good to see how we had come that far as a nation and I remember the title, the theme of that national conference against racism: it was dialogue, national dialogue. At that conference we made a decision that the very people who had said that they were against it, saw how important it could be for us to come together and speak about our problems.

Krzysztof Śliwiński

Dialogue is a word or notion so broad that it covers a variety of forms of communication and intercommunication between people. Why not let us start from an ascertainment that the first thing for us to be able to speak about anything more serious is to talk as partners: as people who deeply understand each other.

I would like to say that it is of immense significance how we address one another, what formula we use, such as, for example, Lady Róża of Woźniakowski. I can address her 'my princess' or 'your highness'. It happened so that when I was paying local taxes in Warsaw, one used to say 'citizen of the city of Warsaw' using the Polish masculine or feminine form, as appropriate. Thus, I could say 'citizen'

or ‘citizenship’. Since I arrived in Poland, the form I am addressed most frequently is ‘Panie Krzysiu’ [lit. Mister Chrissie]. Please, let me tell the younger, that for the first time I really came across this form in 1968 when talking to the so-called ‘organs’, and the usual phrase was “Panie Krzysiu, what have you got in common with all those Jews?” I had been used to the formal ‘Proszę pana’ [equiv. of ‘Sir’], as at the university, we did not address one another using our scientific degrees. I understand that that gentleman wanted to remove me from that Zionist-what-ever group, wherever I might stray and addressed me ‘Panie Krzysiu’.

The ruling elites of the country I arrived from, the country represented by Ambassador Mji, find the word ‘comrade’ to be the most natural and frequent manner of addressing one another. It was a major challenge for me to translate it into another tradition. This is why I teach young diplomats and the youth that if we do not know how to address the other, we are committing elementary mistakes.

I would like to turn your attention to other questions as well: there used to be merchants who had their dignity, honor, whichever nation they would have hailed from. Soldiers are a similar case. My father was an officer, and during the war, he spent five or six years captive, and when I was a little boy, I used to be sent to German soldiers, to give them bread when they were sent eastwards – to Siberia. During the five years of war and imprisonment in a camp, officer solidarity developed between the soldiers of *Wehrmacht* and the Polish army. I am not claiming that if the officers act like this or that, the world changes. It is not what we imagine: Arab culture forbids the killing of women, children, and the innocent. Only when all becomes tangled, and it is said that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter, will we never leave the tangle.

At present, we witness a certain tendency to turn no attention to the form. After a few years, our protocol is becoming entirely artificial, yet outside it, there is no canon of language, or gestures, or signs which we could use to communicate. You cannot translate everything in a mechanical way. Diplomatic protocol became formalized long ago, so that the language of gestures become understandable, and it was known how to express respect to the head of state or a person representing a country. It is natural that after some time certain gestures become old-fashioned and may be replaced by new ones. Yet, truly, we cannot simply say that once we start addressing each other ‘Pani Róziu’ or ‘Panie Krzysiu’ – just always and with everyone, we will communicate to one another all the important things.

Let me turn to the cuisine. In no culture there is anything that would be a sign of equality and proximity equal to eating together at the same table: from the symbolism

of the Eucharist to just an ordinary meal. This is why diplomats arrive at dinners and eat. Therefore something must be known also about this tradition, and one must know how to use it. Once a Brahman (and Brahmans eat no meat) explained to me that he did understand that people from other countries ate meat but it for him was difficult. Entering a dialogue with other cultures, countries, such signs must be heeded. Failing to eat what has been served is an offence. What would you do, however, if you go to Congo, on the equator, where anything that moves is found palatable? I do not tell them that I find something revolting, I only explain that my tribe does not eat this, that this is the *alimentary taboo*. When they do not know what tribe I come from, I say *dugu-ja papa* – a brother of the Pope, for we speak the same dialect, and in this sense, the Pope is my brother. Then they will never take offence if I do not eat something they find edible.

What does democracy mean? Let us assume that I perceive democracy to be a manner – the best and most understandable for me – of choosing the values that I would like to exist in every community; human community.

Sometimes I regret that the plurality of the world, plurality of cultures and in a sense the courtly ceremonial makes communication between people easier and not more difficult. Before one embarks on an attempt of negotiating and dialogue, one should turn a little bit of attention to this other language that is not so strongly theoretical. There are groups that must be talked to. Because for me the most unfortunate is the psychological division into stereotypes and easy categories such as Arabs – Muslims, Europe – Christians, Poland at the moment – problems in conducting dialogue with the neighbors, our eastern border, the Mediterranean ... We are enlisted into this first line of politicians, therefore, we can talk to people who may tell us: *I know two Arab merchants who will be eager to give us some money so as to organize at the Villa Decius a conference of Jews, Arabs, and Christians*. A different world from the erection of ever higher walls – higher and higher – and later the signing of some more or less efficient treaties. For the Poles present here, I will say that it is very difficult to find good and short material discussing what the great Truth and Reconciliation Commission was and is. For I know of no literary text in the world literature, and I have made much effort, that would be better than Wojciech Lipiński's story printed in *Gazeta Wyborcza* in one of August's Sunday editions. There is no writer who would talk about it so vividly in a piece of fiction. Do, please, read it – not only for its South African context but because it was written for us.

DEBATE 3

International experiences in terminating conflicts. Possibilities of cooperation between the international community, local administration and media

Professor Andrzej Kapiszewski, moderator

It is our honor to host during this panel a most exceptional team of people who had to use both own practical experience and intensified reflections to solve problems we are going to discuss today here.

Please let me introduce the participants of this panel in a slightly greater detail. We host today the first Prime Minister in truly independent Poland, **Tadeusz Mazowiecki**. General **Mieczysław Bieniek** has just returned from Iraq. He is Poland's first officer to assume such a high post in NATO. The third person in our panel, who we would like to welcome very warmly, is General **William Nash**. His outstanding military and civilian career developed within former Yugoslavia and in many other places, also during the Desert Storm operation. Currently, he is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Director of the Center for Preventive Action. We are honored to have many eminent and experienced persons in the audience. For that reason, I believe that there will be very lively discussions after the presentations from the panelists. We know that their points of view are not necessarily identical when it comes to the questions of interest concerning the methods of solving key conflicts that exist in the contemporary world.

Let us then proceed to the presentations, beginning with General Mieczysław Bieniek. Once again, in brief: the General served in numerous peace-keeping and stabilization missions, as the UN mission to Syria and later to Western Sahara, he was a high-ranking officer at the headquarters to become the first Polish officer to assume a very high post in NATO forces in Turkey, and subsequently be sent to Iraq – possibly his most difficult military mission so far. Having been the commander of the international division there, as you know, General Bieniek returned to Poland two months ago and assumed the command of the 2nd Mechanized Corps in Kraków.

Lieutenant General Mieczysław Bieniek

I am so glad and privileged to be with you at this place this afternoon, and to be sharing this panel with such distinguished guests as Prime Minister Mazowiecki and my brother in arms – General William Nash, with who we served in Bosnia in the same division. It is a major challenge: it is even bigger than the challenge

I experienced in Iraq, where I spent seven months in Operation Iraqi Freedom Two. So, allow me now to share my experience and some thoughts.

As a representative of the armed forces and a professional soldier with experience gained in UN and NATO peace-keeping operations conducted in Syria, Israel, the Balkans, in Western Sahara, and recently also in Iraq, I would like to share my experience and reflections on cooperation between the army and international and local community during stabilization missions that do not necessarily stabilize.

In certain situations, especially at the initial stage, they turn into combat missions. Staying in the so-called stable and safe environment, we suddenly realize that we are in a combat zone. Our stabilization forces have often found themselves in such a position. In the latter part of my presentation, I would like to touch upon a few subjects related to cooperation with the media. Though they will be discussed later, it is imperative during this presentation to embark on this subject, paying special attention to our most recent mission in Iraq. One cannot discuss the involvement of Poland and Polish soldiers in peace-keeping missions without a prior brief analysis of our participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which we have been a member of for five years. For us, NATO is more than a guarantor of security: it remains the basic platform for cooperation in the matters of defense and at the same time the pillar of political and military stability of Europe. Of the world, one could say. As we see, the most recent activity of this Alliance has gone far beyond the area traditionally demarcated by the presence of NATO forces. As you may know, I spent a few years of my service in NATO's command structures, practically – five years, and two of these in the headquarters of the rapid-reaction forces in Turkey. This is why I dare present these remarks to you. NATO's involvement in the termination of conflicts and restoration of stabilization in crisis areas has been the greatest and the most visible change in the operation of NATO since the end of the Cold War.

Minister Rotfeld was kind to have said that when we operated within the previous security agreements, our situation was much easier, as we had the threat of total war, and this threat has receded and will for sure be a threat no more. The situation was easier, as we had an enemy, we knew where to deploy the cannons, which direction the planes should fly, and which route to show to tanks. Now the situation is far more complicated.

The threat is asymmetrical. What does this mean? I now know for sure that this is a front with no frontlines, with open lines of supplies, with cities that have been controlled by bandits and terrorists, terrorizing the locals, with attacks conducted in a non-conventional manner, against the rule of logics, against the humanitarian principles, keeping no rules of waging wars. We, in turn, as soldiers of stabilization missions, must keep to these rules of war. We are bound by the Geneva Convention, the Tribunal in the Hague, therefore we know we must, and we must do everything to respect the laws of this war and treat the people we have gone there for with all the due respect. This is the challenge we are facing at the threshold of the 21st century.

Currently, NATO is conducting three difficult and complex peace-operations in areas of conflicts that threaten Europe and the world. Two in the Balkans: in Bosnia and in Kosovo, and the third in Afghanistan. In case of Bosnia, we can speak of success. Although, as we may remember, the Dayton Treaty was signed in 1995, even long after it there was no peace in the region. Today, it has been nearly ten years since that date, and we can say that, in fact, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 'yielding' to stabilization, and the administration is fairly efficient. Kosovo continues to be the "never-ending story": a fact to bear in mind. Another, very important operation recently conducted by NATO takes place in Afghanistan. Soon, this involvement will be expanded to also cover Iraq. So far, NATO has engaged very limited resources and used them only to the training of new Iraqi security forces. This involvement, however, has already become visible. Returning to the beginning of NATO's involvement in the stabilization process in the Balkans, it is worth noting that war – and especially the war in the Balkans – demonstrated the impotence as well as the lack of preparation on behalf of the European community to combat the crisis. We all remember the helplessness of the organization established, the lack of a clearly-defined mandate, the lack of rules of engagement, the lack of rules governing the use of firearms. We still remember the fact that the towns that were to remain safe havens witnessed massacres of people, be they Muslim, Serbian or Croatian. In 1995, when we entered the country with our forces together with General William Nash, who was the commander of a division, I claimed that there were no good or bad boys. It seemed to us that they were all bad. Nevertheless, someone had started all that, and I would like to offer no judgments on this.

It was the 1995 summer NATO air operation in Bosnia that became the turning point in the solution of the conflict and led to the signing of the peace treaty a few months later. As a result of this treaty, 60 000 NATO soldiers entered Bosnia and Herzegovina, shouldering co-responsibility for the implementation of the provisions of the Dayton Treaty. Still, the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina, human rights, and observing them is perfectly well known to our prime minister who spent a few months of his life there. His personal involvement also helped to avoid many, many disasters at that time.

Another NATO operation, the one in Kosovo, helped to develop the whole doctrine of civil cooperation, which I would like to dwell upon in more detail here. This was the so-called CIMIK (Civil Military Corporation in Kosovo), a field called by our American allies Civil Affairs. Yet, whatever we call it, the functions remain the same. The NATO intervention in Kosovo, the air operation lasting 78 days, made it possible to stop the humanitarian disaster at the edge of which we found ourselves. The military victory was only the first step on the road to the construction of a lasting multiethnic community in the free conflict zone. The process is still continuing, and the most recent events, what happened three months ago in Mitrovic, proved that we are far from completing this process. From its earliest days, KFOR enjoyed very good and flexible relations with civil and international administration of Kosovo, in the form of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and countless non-governmental organizations, whose activity for the stabilization and restoration of the region has been in line with the goals of the military mission. Currently, the situation in Kosovo is stable yet not yet free of tensions.

Another major success of NATO was the involvement in Macedonia. The Essential Harvest and Amber Fox operations conducted in 2001 allowed quick stabilization of the region and did not allow the tensions to escalate. It must be remarked here that these operations were conducted in close cooperation with the European Union and OSCE. It was as if the first arrow had been shot by the politicians of the European Union, which is an organization that remains capable of conducting military operations in close cooperation with political and non-governmental organizations. Within but thirty days, the 4,000-person-strong contingent of NATO forces collected 404,000 firearms, disarming an army that opposed the peace-building process. The same force was efficient in supervising the ceasefire between the sides of the conflict. In April 2003, the European Union took over from NATO entire responsibility for the operation.

Similarly, in December, the EU will take over the mission in Bosnia from NATO's SFOR. I believe, and here I am turning to General Nash, that it is you, William, who will go there to end this war.

This difficult period of transformation of the defense strategy of NATO is best summarized in the presentations by successive politicians of the Alliance, including George Robertson who claims that NATO has been and will remain the international instrument for countering crises. Why NATO? For it is the largest and most durable alliance in the world, which it has proved during the decades of its existence. It is decidedly the most effective and efficient military organization, and its efficiency will grow even further. Despite certain tensions that are present within the military-political apparatus itself, despite the increase in the number of members of NATO to twenty-six, consensus is always reached. Moreover, recent years have proved to be an important test for the efficiency of the alliance.

While until now NATO's peace-supporting operations have taken place in Europe, it soon turned out that the question of security and stabilization are a global matter. A result of this way of thinking is the involvement of NATO in Afghanistan: a country that is theoretically fallen. The alliance reached another milestone, for the first time deploying its forces beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The mission to Afghanistan is currently the most important project in NATO. The ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission started its operation in August 2003 on the basis of a UN mandate. The fact of sending international forces is of great significance. Strongly democratic states avoid the involvement of their forces without legitimacy of their operation. This was mentioned today in the morning by Minister Rotfeld. The UN mission assures security in Kabul and its vicinity and provides training for local security and police forces in cooperation with numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations, conducts numerous projects aimed at the restoration of the political-economic structures and infrastructure destroyed during the many years of conflicts in the country. For these activities, the so-called PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) teams are used; they reconstruct the destroyed Afghanistan, not only the city of Kabul itself but also its neighborhood. This reconstruction has a number of pillars: administration, police, organizations, economy, infrastructure. One leading state is responsible for each of these. As far as I remember, the United States is involved in the armed forces, the United Kingdom in the fight against drugs and crime, Japan is involved in administration, Germans are responsible for the police. This is

a highly orderly plan, and very efficiently conducted. We are all awaiting the results of the elections in Afghanistan. We hope that the country will rise from the fallen state and become a normal, civilized and well-managed state that will no longer be a cradle and haven for terrorists of various shades. NATO begins to play an increasing role in Iraq. NATO's aid in intelligence, logistic expertise, and communication helped Poland in taking over the responsibility for the central-southern sector I commanded and which I am going to discuss in a minute.

Speaking of the role of NATO in the process of constructing a safe international environment, it would be impossible to overlook the involvement of Polish soldiers in peace and stabilization missions. This lies close to my heart, as I myself have participated in seven such missions. These medals are not a testimony to me going there to get a tan but to us having succeeded in achieving something. The permanent and active participation of the Polish army in international effort for the restoration and maintenance of peace in various parts of the world has nearly half-a-century-long tradition. It has continued uninterruptedly since mid-1953, beginning with Polish contingents in international control and supervision committees in Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia, through participation in peace-building missions of the UN, including those to Lebanon and Syria, and ending with the participation in all the NATO missions mentioned above: in the Balkans, in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Macedonia, and in Afghanistan. Involvement in the stabilization mission in Iraq is another, most difficult, and most complex challenge for the Polish army. It is complex for a number of reasons. Personally, as a soldier, I can only say that the professional means of approaching the subject, related to the traditional way of conducting operations is out of question here. The Mandate that we received as our country, and I as the commander, from the twenty-three states that formed the division let me conduct the fourth phase of the operation: "Stability and Security". It was assumed that during this time, the so-called Combat Zone would cease to exist. Unfortunately, as I said in the beginning, we found ourselves, against our will, against our wish, and against the mandate that we received in a state of war, in some regions, as for example Karbala, Najaf or Al-Kut – provinces I was responsible for as the military governor. These provinces were divided among my subordinates: the Ukrainian brigade, the Polish brigade, and the Spanish brigade. Unfortunately, due to this reason, the situation called for the deployment of so-called "combat power", which, thanks to the cooperation of

our allies we received from the Americans. I do not want to discuss here in detail: I will be focusing on the civil and military cooperation.

Time does not allow for enumeration of all the missions that have been conducted during the last fifty years with the participation of Polish soldiers. It would, however, be worth mentioning that the participation of Polish armed forces in various missions took so far 46,000 soldiers to over fifty various missions and peace-keeping operations. For a medium-sized country, this is an enormous scale of participation. We cannot compare to the United States or other countries yet beyond doubt, this has been a vast participation and a testimony to the fact that the defense policy of our country, both the external and internal policy are non-egoist. We think about the international community: we are a part of this community, and we are responsible for international security.

The experience of the last decades for countering conflict escalation shows the great role of international cooperation. Not only in the aspect of military cooperation. This is a proper place to remark that the influence of non-military institutions on the condition of security is increasing. In this way, the need for the forces and resources that, within the peace-keeping mission, will facilitate and increase efficiency of cooperation between the military and the civilian appeared in military structures involved in stabilization operations. The experience acquired during the mission in the Balkans and in other places has proved that besides military structures, a highly developed international civil community, composed of tens of humanitarian organizations, UN agendas and other non-governmental organizations operates within the region of the mission. The goal behind the operation of all these institutions and organizations is bringing assistance and stabilization. This is all done parallel to the structures of local power being reborn, which are the main subject of our cooperation. This is how everything should be. Lack of cooperation and coordination of military structures with such a broad spectrum of organizations and coordination of civilian structures, as well as the lack of convergent goals would be a serious error and omission. Unfortunately, from the perspective of my mission, I must say that such cases were rather frequent, yet luckily it is common sense, and the very human eagerness to be involved in dialogue and finding common planes that always win. The military's answer to this is CIMIK, which I have mentioned earlier: a structure that provides a link between the army and the civilian spheres. A structure that allows practical, well-coordinated, and efficient cooperation in bringing aid and the restoration of a safe environment within the region covered by

the mission. CIMIK means cooperation over the divisions and differences. In the manner of operation, our military environment greatly differs from civilian organizations. The army means the respect of hierarchical structure, unconditional execution of orders, discipline, specific methods and great speed and precision in working out decisions. Most civilian organizations, and especially non-governmental organizations, on the other hand, prefer independence, decentralization in decision-making and long-term dialogue or search for consensus. In emergency situations, there is no time to talk too extensively; it is time to act – otherwise, an emergency may develop into a situation with no way out.

The task of CIMIK is the mediation in these differences and allowing effective cooperation for the military with all the organizations involved in the process of stabilization and building peace.

Cooperation is all the more important when we consider the fact that, as the practical experience from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq has shown, during the initial stage of peace-supporting operation, while the situation in the region is still rather unstable and too dangerous, the structures of CIMIK may in numerous cases be the only, let me repeat: the only units capable of initiating and organizing cooperation with the local community for bringing humanitarian aid, restoration of infrastructure, and other stabilizing activities.

When I was leaving Iraq two months ago, it had been a year since the end of the war. Within the five provinces I was responsible for, we did not have a single non-governmental organization besides the American USAID. What does this mean? That the level of security still did not allow their introduction. Only the civilian-military (or civil affair) structures or CIMIK were capable of organizing such matters. It would be impossible to enumerate here all the aspects of operation of this organization. It is a vast effort by thousands of soldiers and civil employers contracted by the army, specialists in law, administration, prison services, health service, and education professionals who, dressed in military uniforms, conduct professional activity for these communities. The operation of CIMIK has left a lasting trace in the hearts of residents of the Balkans, Afghanistan, and recently Iraq. CIMIK has also earned gratitude and appreciation of numerous civil organizations cooperating with it. We implement our operation along the so-called lines of operation, whose foundations are security, administration, economy, infrastructure, and health service. All that is crucial for the restoration of the state. A handful of data to illustrate the achievements of this organization operating

within the structures of the multinational division in Iraq under my command. Although this was not always visible in the media, our mission in Iraq was primarily the strife for normal life of Iraqi citizens and cooperation with people who desired stabilization and peace.

Within the territory of my provinces there were 5.2 million people, the province covered 90,000 sq. km, i.e. a fourth of the territory of Poland. There these 5.2 million were terrorized by, let us say, 10 thousand. They were terrorized very efficiently. You must realize the scale of the threat for the normal, average citizen that was present there. The achievement of the CIMIK was the restoration and furnishing of over 170 kindergartens, orphanages, and schools, two universities in the city of Hillah and in Karbala. Not theological universities but secular ones, as the model of Iraqi democracy does not assume theocracy, as some religious extremists would like to see it, nor does it assume the model of democracy we know from Europe or the United States. It assumes a model of something in between. What is it? Maybe Professor Kapiszewski, as a specialist in this area, will answer this question.

CIMIK cooperated with seventeen humanitarian organizations from Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. Kuwait was the centre where the HOC (Humanitarian Organization Centre) was situated. Led by the former head of the Kuwaiti army, General Ali Abdullah, who organized aid through the embassies of the countries enumerated here. The number of Polish relief and humanitarian organizations included the Polish Medical Action and the Polish Humanitarian Organization (PAH). In cooperation, plastic surgery was conducted on Iraqi children, holidays in Poland were organized for a group of 20 children from Iraqi orphanages, and medications and pharmaceuticals were provided for Iraq. The medical services of the division served over 20,000 patients – mostly inhabitants of small towns, villages, and hamlets with no medical assistance before the arrival of the allied forces. The regions I am speaking about are the regions that have long been neglected by Saddam: the Shi'ite regions of Karbala and Najaf, where after the first war with Iraq, in 1991, Shi'ites organized an uprising, and Saddam Hussein and the Fedayeen from the Republican Guard murdered 30,000 people in two nights. Could you imagine this? 30,000 innocent people dragged out of their houses by night and murdered. To this day, their bodies are found by our soldiers – they lie in shallow graves under houses, hotels, in the gardens. It was horrible.

Over 60 CIMIK projects concerned infrastructure: overhauls and construction of water installations, overhauls of wastewater treatment plants, and water purification facilities. Altogether, the CIMIK support in the Polish zone in Iraq consisted of 300 various projects to the total sum of over USD 51 million only during the first six months of this year. Money from the stabilization funds, money from the so-called Commander Emergency Project Money, composed of funds from three different sources: those approved by the US Congress, those seized at the accounts of Saddam Hussein, the international assistance, and aid pool being the result of the Madrid Conference. This is an important piece of information, for it proves that it was not the Polish State, Hungary, or any other state, but the international community that donated the money which reached the residents of Iraq. Thanks to this operation, the soldiers earned the respect and kindness of local people. The local communities understood perfectly well that the soldiers in our division were not and are not occupants. The countless talks, meetings, and the daily activity of the Polish and allied soldiers made the average, honest resident of Karbala, an average citizen of Najaf or other, countless towns and villages associate the uniforms not with occupation, brutality, and violence but with security, restoration, medical aid, and the hope that I saw in the eyes of the children. I saw the eyes of those women and despairing children. I saw eyes blind with fear. I also saw the eyes of people looking with hope into the future, and this reinforced my conviction that the mission is pure and noble, and that it was worth becoming involved in. Once, during a seminar in which I participated, a question about the limits to the dialogue when it comes to security of people of various denominations, cultures, and religions was asked. There is no limit for dialogue. If people want to speak and find consensus, they must talk. Being a Catholic, I was not disturbed to make efforts to meet with the great Ayatollah, al-Khatim – we were speaking a day before the religious holiday of Ashura about ensuring security among the thousands of pilgrims. Karbala is a city of 800,000 inhabitants, and at the time of Ashura, there were 2.5 million people (as in our Częstochowa). With experience of earlier religious gatherings, where during one day 130 lost their lives and 300 were wounded in an extremist bomb raid, we wanted to provide security. We received the assistance of the Great Ayatollah, who involved also his services. Let them even be the largest, illegal structure, yet it prevented – thanks to our dialogue – major bloodshed. We were also making efforts to meet with religious leaders who were not too eager to speak to allies: religious leaders like al-Sistani as well as tribal leaders. There is no

border to dialogue. When it comes to tolerance, culture, and religion, I believe that one must try and talk everywhere. Dialogue may fail, but attempts must be made.

I believe that the arguments and facts presented in the part of my speech you have just listened to, clearly prove that only a careful and well-planned joint action of civil and military means may provide conditions for long-term, self-sufficient peace stabilization in conflict regions.

Military operations and the media. Speaking of cooperation for the restoration, it would be impossible to gloss over cooperation with the media. Media are a power in the contemporary world. I have repeated many a time that the media have a greater power of impact than two armored divisions. This is why for us people in uniforms one of the basic goals is performing tasks for the stabilization of trouble regions, the number of the basic goals here includes obtaining social acceptance for our activities. You are the payers of what we spend, in each of your countries. Therefore we are bound to inform you honestly and reliably. This can be achieved by their maintenance of open, regular, and planned contacts with the representatives of the media. The Polish armed forces have a policy of openness towards the media. Our common goal – of both journalists and the military – is the honest, reliable, complete and quick notification of the society about all the aspects of our operation. This is what happens at the time of peace; the question looks different during military actions or stabilization operations.

The army is frequently accused of using the media of disinformation. True. We must admit that manipulation of information during the military operations conducted is an essential part of those operations. This you all know. Yet, this manipulation does not lie within the tasks implemented by the spokesman or the commander. In contacts with the media, they, not unlike the commander of the military operation, preach univocally: never lie to the media, yet do not tell them everything either. Naturally, there have been exceptions to this rule, such as the untrue statement of the NATO spokesman who, in April 1999, informed the press about saving the American pilot of the F-17 during operations in Yugoslavia, though the rescue action was still continuing. At the same time, we are aware that a contemporary war is also a war of information. Whether we use the media for noble goals or not, our enemies will do it for us: they will use the media to destroy us and to damage our image even though our goals were just and noble. This is the reason why no journalist may be turned away from the front, nor find the frontlines beyond reach. Cooperation between the media and the military in the area of the

operations conducted – not only during the armed struggle but also during the stabilization works – has long been the subject of commanders' special care. As I have said, in my case, I worked out the principles of this cooperation, which is a part of the operating plan. This cooperation, however, requires mutual concessions and respect for jointly agreed principles. A certain media analyst claimed that the television reports during the first 48 hours of the invasion in Iraq were like salted peanuts: tasty but of no nutritional value. None of the five hundred reporters included in the operation broke the conditions imposed in the accreditation. Naturally, the work of a contemporary journalist becomes more and more frequently the pursuit of news and the sensation of the day that people like so very much. Traveling to the problem regions of our globe, reporters frequently concentrate solely on the search for sensational images that explain nothing to the spectator or that lead to simplifications, as they perceive everything only from the black-and-white perspective. At the same time, the military party conducting the operation is keen on having the information on their mission passed to the public to be complete, honest, reliable, and objective. The marriage of these two interests, finding the golden mean, is frequently the key condition for both successful information and mission of both the parties. Such a consensus we have frequently managed to find. I will not be dwelling extensively upon this. I will only say that there have been ten Polish journalists, representing TVP, TVN, PAP and Polish Radio, permanently accredited by the divisional command. Besides them, journalists from international media, such as CNN, Fox News, and BBC are with us in their and our daily work. I must say that in Karbala there were also media ill-disposed to the alliance: Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia transmitting dishonest or unreliable information that was frequently listened to by our enemies; yet, as I have said before – war continues to be news, and we must learn to live with it somehow. Thanks to the work of the media, the Polish public – or, rather, not only Polish – was honestly and reliably informed about the situation of soldiers and events in Iraq. Their presence in our bases resulted from the fact that as the commander of the division I never questioned the need to inform the public about the developments in the region I was responsible for. On the contrary: I insisted on their accreditation in accordance with the principles of security. I am very sorry that we did not manage to ensure security for the late Waldemar Milewicz, who unfortunately was killed at the border of my zone and the American zone. We did not know about his presence in the area, our friend, General Dempsey was organizing an evacuation, and

we provided the rapid-reaction forces. The bodies of the heroic journalists who died for the good of honest and reliable information, while being war correspondents, returned to the country. Maximum openness, minimum delay: that was my attitude to the needs of the media, while at the same time I was protecting the information whose disclosure might influence the security of the operation conducted.

There is another question I would like to share: after the period of the cold war, a fact turned up in the democratic system, namely, that the issue of defense, much like social and economic problems, is subject to the free market. In this game, all the institutions, as well as the army, must justify the sense of their very existence. Thus what the armed forces, and not only Polish armed forces, are doing in the world to maintain peace and security of multinational formations and organizations provides this very sense of existence. Efficient involvement of soldiers, returning stabilization and peace, wherever they are indispensable, is what I believe to be among the best ways for justification of this sense. In this regard, we feel necessary: we are in demand. We feel the support of our society, of the public, we feel the support of international communities: we have never been left to ourselves, not even in allied operations, which are very difficult, as I mentioned earlier. I am here as the commander of the multinational division, and with all responsibility, I can state that neither my allies nor my commanders, such as General Sanches, have ever left me in dire straits with no way out, when I had no suitable mandate – during the operation – to conduct combat operation or when my forces were insufficient. Moreover, whenever I demanded such forces, I received them with the full right to command them and conduct the operation. I have never had a case of OPCONT. It stands for “operation control”, or in Polish, *kontrole operacyjnej*. Was it not heard during some activities of the allies that “I cannot do it, as my government won’t allow me for it.” There has never been anything like that with us. I am sorry for my presentation being possibly too emotional, yet I still have it all in my heart and memory.

Professor Andrzej Kapiszewski

When generals are optimists, people cannot but live easier and sleep more peacefully. The general’s opinions on various fronts – Afghanistan or Iraq – though possibly controversial and not unanimously followed – allow an optimistic look into the future. Our next panelist, who has just arrived from the US, is General William Nash. He is a veteran of the Vietnam War, and of Operation

Desert Storm. Later, the general served in a variety of missions in former Yugoslavia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was the civil administrator of Kosovo. A solution that is as interesting as increasingly common today is making the generals who were there first play slightly different roles while still in military uniforms, become civil administrators and governors of provinces thanks to the competencies they acquire. Similarly, General Bieniek played civil functions as the governor of a province. Thus the links between the military and civilian administration in today's world turn out to be even more important than they might have seemed just a few years ago. Today, General Nash is the director of the crisis prevention centre in New York.

Major General William Nash

I was in civil administration for the United Nations in Kosovo, where Mieczysław and I served peace together. Most days when I woke up, the Serbs and the Albanians were the least of my problems, because as a UN civil administrator I was overwhelmed with the task of bringing together the international community in the largest sense of the word, trying to focus on work in the northern portion of Kosovo

There were the United Nations, there was always the European Community, there was UNHCR, there were NATO soldiers I had to deal with, and they would do to me the same I had done to such people in Bosnia. I was in a very difficult situation indeed, with the hundreds of NGOs and the media and... a life. At that time, I was due to enter into cooperation, really cohesion, of the desperate body of very dedicated very sincere people who were trying to do good, but not necessarily in the same direction all the time. The reason that why it was crucial to do this was the fact that in this post-conflict environment the political, social, economic and security factors were so powerfully intermingled. Rule number one is that everything is related to everything, and everything is always political, and there are so many factors that so strongly interlock with each other that you may not understand these things unless you build cooperation, cohesion. If you look at the history of the accomplishments of the international community, beginning with Somalia, and you go to Iraq to work in hard times, which is what I did myself, you are looking at Somalia you are looking at Bosnia, the Kosovo example, Iraq, East Timor and the like – and you see we have been learning a lot. Sometimes we would forget what we had learnt, and we kept coming back to the fact that we had to build international cooperation.

REBUILDING PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT COMMUNITIES

I would like to discuss several factors. I will be glad to have a discussion concerning some views on Iraq or Afghanistan. I would like to discuss some of these factors.

One of the most difficult issues we faced in Bosnia and we certainly see in Iraq and other places is the conversion of the issues of military security, that is force against force confrontation taking place between relatively well-organized military forces against each other. To the issue of public security, welfare of citizens is the cause of much security consideration. The difficulty we had is not understanding that this shift of focus takes place as the war comes to its end. Be it through peace negotiations like in Bosnia, or through victory, like in Iraq. The measurement of how well the public is secured becomes the decisive factor for the success or failure of the mission. The development of the government is a political aspect. Many people like to talk about ethnic divisions, of issues that might bring about war but without any doubt they look for the issues of power and greed. Power and greed influence the course of the war but also difficulties in post-war involvement. If not prepared to deal with governmental issues, bringing civil society into the process of appointing their government, and the government's understanding are the major responsibilities for the protection and the provision of basic services to the population. These goods and services can be roads, they can be education, they can be healthcare. The responsibility of the government is to provide these. This is what is the most difficult: to change the mindset of why a political entity exists.

In my view we spent too much time on the past, looking at the top-down government issue. We were very quick to find a president or a prime minister, and I would be much more interested in finding a city council. I would argue that it is much easier to grow a democracy than to impose a democracy. That is one of the major issues but related directly to that is the environment that allows people to begin recovery from the ravages of war: return the basic services, the opportunities of employment, and in some degree, public prosperity.

In 1996, as the commander of Task Force "Eagle" in Bosnia, my problem, my biggest single problem was the Serbian army, the Croatian army, the Bosnian army – my biggest problem were 200,000 demobilized soldiers. I had a jobs problem, for 200,000 demobilized soldiers sitting around drinking *rakiya* pose a big problem. It is a security issue, it is a welfare issue, it is a political issue.

At that time one of other lessons we learnt, partially in Bosnia but over time it started to grow and really comes to an issue now, is the rule of law. The rule of

law is more than the civilian police or a good police force, whether international or local. The rule of law has to deal with police, has to do with laws, it has to do with courts, it even has to do with jails. It has to do with laws of civilian nature as well as criminal laws.

Because if you do not have civil laws in place, how can contracts be enforced, and if you cannot ensure a contract will be enforced, how can I expect any economic development to take place? Why would anybody invest in a business when he cannot be sure of the ownership, relationship that is establishing the property is upgrading on and a heavy expectation of tax basis, he is about to submit himself, the tax regime he is to submit himself, too? So, I just keep going around in a very difficult circle that requires players from a wide variety of agencies to be involved.

I discussed some social variety issues that involved some of my colleagues, I had put education at the very top of the list, others might put health and medical care, others would put social security, social services for the population, the safety net that is required. How many nights we spent in Kosovo trying to figure out the pensions system! It was absolutely amazing what difficulties were encountered in that safety net in Kosovo. When we talked about possibilities of international cooperation I would argue it could be no possibility: it had to be reality. Now, from my current position in the council I am directly involved in a project with two former presidential security advisors: Sandy Berger and Brent Scowcroft. People who advised the first president Bush in a holistic fashion. Now they advise on all issues of post-conflict capacity, and we make the argument that such challenges will face us in a foreseeable future, dealing with the consequences of failing or failed states or defeated states, and we need to develop a capacity to deal with it. This capacity is to help us prevent failure as well as deal with the consequences of failure.

We are also addressing these issues, we are trying to move the scenario of this capacity out of the Department of Defense, and move it to the State Department and the US Agency for International Development. At the same time, the Defense Department has to transform itself to deal with issues of public security, demobilization and remigration of former armies, at the same time being able to assist the military as an overwhelming capacity both to construct and to destroy. This is very important, and we feel strongly that the Department of State and Department of Treasury and Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, the US trade representative – all these players have a very important role to play in building of capacity in the post-conflict environment. I think if

we develop this capacity as we work on these issues, we need to understand from the beginning that there is a window of opportunity in the early days of an operation to make a great progress. The better you are prepared at the beginning, the more you can accomplish before the enemy has time to reorganize and attack you.

Second comes the automatic objective, and it is not about us, it is about them whoever the 'them' is. In other words, it is not to be a good system for the UN, it is not to be a good system for Kosovo: it is to be a good system for the people of Kosovo, and it has to work along that line. Thus, everything that is done has to be done with a focus that you are working yourself out of a job. I am looking at the Ambassador of South Africa, I did not discuss reconciliation issues and transitional justice issues – the past, but they are directly integrated with the aspects of establishing the rule of law and dealing with past in the same time you are looking forward. I am sure you did.

Finally, a word about the media, I agree with everything the General said. I would add to this the public information aspects, making sure that the community in which the efforts are taking place fully understands what is going on: good, bad and other, either will be negative, but there is a learning process in exposing them to the controversy of good governance and responsibility. So it is painful to witness some of your efforts, but it is also a part of a learning experience. I think that when we talk about the media, there are obviously media back at home, and they are concerned with the politicians in Washington and Warsaw, but the people in the target country, the country you deal with, they also have to be major benefactors of a free and open media process, so that they can understand that with this set of elements of democratic society, we help them to build.

Professor Andrzej Kapiszewski

The panelists' opinions are different indeed. It is striking how many problems there are for the military to solve. What responsibility is borne by generals and their staffs not only in the scope of maintaining peace and participation in military operations but also concerning the solution of problems of pensions, education, health and many others. I would like to know if at present the *gens de guerre* are prepared to take on such tasks. Though we might have an opportunity to discuss this problem later.

Independent of the function Tadeusz Mazowiecki played in Poland including the preparation of the whole system transformation and the extremely difficult role of the country's first democratic prime minister, he was later the Special

Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights within Yugoslavia in the years 1992-1995. Following the utter lack of reaction of the international community to the problem he presented in his reports, and not being able to shake the consciousness of the world, which – as it soon occurred led to a powerful reinforcement of the conflict in the area – Tadeusz Mazowiecki resigned from the mission. I believe that he is a man who can present the things we discuss here from his point of view, namely from “the other side” – not from the side of military solutions but from the point of view of a person looking at the continuing conflicts as if from an external standpoint.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki

I believe it is good that you succumbed to my suggestion, Professor, and that the generals spoke before me, as they have had far more to say. They have their fresh experiences, while my experience is rather distant. It has been nine years since I resigned from the function mentioned, and eleven since I assumed it. Certain matters, however, became etched in my mind, and I will eagerly share them. I was a representative of the UN, or to be more precise, as you said, Professor, of the UN Commission on Human Rights. First let me share a few thoughts about my attitude – also after the experience I had – to the UN. The UN is an organization that definitely calls for a reform, and which cannot definitely cope with the tasks it assumes in its present condition. On the other hand, liquidation of the UN would be a disaster. Just because, even in this limited scope in which UN can actually cope with various tasks, its operation is highly significant. With all my critical approach to the UN and its operation, I would like to emphasize that one cannot just blame it so much. I used to dispute at the level of the Secretary General – at that time it was Boutros-Ghali, who would always answer that “the UN could do as much as is decided by the states that the UN is composed of. What they approve, and what they agree to finance”. I thought – and this would be my second remark – that in the conflict that I experienced directly, that is the one in Yugoslavia, and especially the one concerning Bosnia, the so-called international community (which was not only the UN but also the great powers who had a major voice here), committed what I believe to be the original sin, which later continued to rebound all the time. The international community treated a state recognized by the UN, the State of Bosnia, as one of the parties to the conflict. From this came far-reaching consequences. I was to assess the violations of human rights, and at the same time there were the negotiators. We had highly divergent

points of view and insufficient degree of cooperation between them and me. I was the *enfant terrible* among the United Nations rapporteurs: a body of twenty-plus people who dealt with a variety of questions. I was the *enfant terrible*, accused of dabbling with politics, and not human rights. To which I would retort: how could one, during a war, an armed conflict, separate politics from human rights? I did deal with politics just because, from the very beginning, when I assumed that function, I decided that I would not only be writing reports that would fit nicely among the stacks of papers written in the UN, I decided I wanted to make an impact on the situation. I had the right to present the assessment of violations of human rights and to present recommendations. Yet, I was not to try to learn what happens to these recommendations, and I was not to demand answers, and I did demand them – and in this sense I was the *enfant terrible*. I believed that assessing the degree of violation of human rights, I should discontinue those violations. To discontinue them to the maximum extent and not to allow their escalation. In this place a series of conflicts arose; they concerned the differences in opinions between Vance and Owen, who were the negotiators, and myself. If there were eventually any contacts between us at all, they were my initiative. They were not at all interested what that delegate investigating human rights was doing. They dealt with politics and I dealt with human rights, following the accepted procedures. While performing my mission I knew I outmatched them. For I knew that I knew how to talk to communists. There, history is used to kindle conflicts. Histories are complicated everywhere, yet within those lands they are especially entangled: the stories concerning the Second War World are especially complex. For this story was used by both the parties to incite the conflict. There were also huge conflicts between local press and the international press. The international press played a major role in all this.

I became the Rapporteur more or less at the time when the press, I think especially the American press, unearthed the matter of concentration camps. All over the world, photographs from concentration camps were shown: camps we all believed would never exist after the Second World War. This especially was disclosed by the press.

I knew that when articles and news from the Balkans hit front pages in America, one would have to assume political pressure. With the interest passing, passes also the interest of politicians. Here, the press played an enormous role, both notifying the world and exerting direct political pressure, and a very positive

role on the global scale it was. The local press, on the other hand – except a handful of very brave people attacked by the locals and doing what they did with jeopardy of their lives – played an extremely bad role. Finally, the Dayton Treaty was mentioned here. Dayton, in its military part was excellent. Military, not political, which was disastrous. Disastrous as it developed structures that could not be maintained. A number of people, as for example, myself and Hans Kosnik, who was in Mostar as an administrator on behalf of the European Union... Do you remember the moment – I watched it on TV and wondered what his wife was thinking at the moment: whether they would kill him? He saved his life, true, yet if he had just peered from behind the door, he would have been lynched on the spot. Thus, some time ago, together with Kosnik and a whole range of celebrities, we wrote and published an appeal to commemorate the 10th anniversary of Dayton, coming next year, by establishing a new international conference that will lead to the revision of the political decisions. For the situation in the Balkans is as follows: naturally, they are not shooting, but the young are leaving as they see no opportunities in their lives. The economy continues to be maintained artificially, and the central government holds no power. I was so cruelly cheated in Srebrenica, and later I discovered a most unique phenomenon: a Serb and a Bosnian Muslim leading the community cooperating perfectly well. Yet, Srebrenica is subject to the political authorities in Banja Luka. What could that headman and the president of the council do, despite their perfect cooperation in the case of Banja Luka and local Mafiosi prevent restoration in Srebrenica both in material terms and in the terms of interpersonal contacts. Thus both Karadzic and Mladic should find themselves in the Hague, and I do not know why they are not there yet, for who could imagine that if Milosevic found his way to the Hague, Karadzic and Mladic would remain at large. These people must be told that those who are still dreaming of returning to the previous situation are already lost. These two should be arrested so that the people who want to be involved would fear no more. This is the first reason, the second is the need to develop a true judiciary. There are three ombudsmen representing three nationalities and they work with one another exceedingly well. Despite their perfect cooperation, they will not do everything by themselves. A Muslim living in Serbia will not go to a Serbian court, nor will a Serb living in Sarajevo go to the local court. Therefore the establishment of independent courts and their operation is necessary; even more necessary than that, however, is empowering the central government with real power. There is one more

aspect of this: during this conflict, the Bosnian Muslims had a premonition of Holocaust. That if they were not Muslims, Europe would treat them differently. Today, it is so that they are greatly aided by Saudi Arabia and other Muslim states. This is aid that is aimed at restoration, so large Mosques are built, etc. Bosnia was an example of Islam being incorporated into Europe. Europe cannot understand that the solution of this problem in the heart of Europe should be exemplary. At the moment, it is more important than the solution of the Turkish problem. Our appeal concerning Bosnia, for a Dayton II conference has remained unheeded. This is a case for the European Union. Today, only the EU can undertake such an initiative, for the Union assumes responsibility for the Yugoslavian affair. If Polish public opinion is convinced that everything has been settled there, they are mistaken. Brewing deep under, there is a very major and serious conflict – and this is something we should be aware of.



Introducing the exhibition

INTRODUCING THE EXHIBITION

Poland for protection of cultural heritage of Iraq

Colonel Krzysztof Salaciński

I would like to congratulate very cordially the organizers of this magnificent enterprise, namely, the preparation and organization of the Rebuilding Peace in Post-Conflict Communities – Role of Media and Civil Organizations conference.

As representatives of the Ministry of Culture and the Museum of Archaeology in Poznań, we are especially satisfied by the fact that we were able to make our modest contribution to the content and organization of this important event. It is an exhibition prepared especially for you, for this occasion. It presents Poland's activity for the protection of cultural heritage in post-war Iraq.

Let me say a few words of introduction to accompany the opening of the exhibition. It shows only some of the things that we have so far managed to achieve as well as those works that were initiated and are continued as a part of the stabilizing mission in Iraq. We are already considering further presentations that will document the entirety of our actions related to the protection of the Iraqi culture heritage. The exhibition consists of two sections and shows two discrete courses of action: programs undertaken in Poland, and in the zone of Polish responsibility within the territory of Iraq.

Parallel to the decision to involve Poland in the implementation of the stabilizing mission in Iraq, a decision to safeguard and protect cultural heritage was undertaken: an activity that is frequently equally significant as military action. A joint initiative concerning the actions that are to be implemented in culture heritage protection was formed by the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of National Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some of those, as I have mentioned, were conducted directly in Poland, with the participation of a number of sectors, with the leading one being the Ministry of Culture. They formed the conditions for the reconstruction of cultural cooperation with the Iraqi side, and coordinated the work of our experts in the Polish Military Contingent. In the context of what is presented at the exhibition, it is worth turning our attention to the meeting between the Minister of Culture, Waldemar Dąbrowski, with the Minister of Culture of the Interim Government in Iraq, Mufid al-Jazairi, during his visit to Poland, and of the Under-Secretary of State, General Heritage Preservation Officer, Ryszard Mikliński with the Director for Antiquities of Iraq, Dr. Abdul-Aziz Hameed Salih. Moreover, the Polish Minister of Culture funded six-month internships at the

Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts for three Iraqi graduates of the Academy of Fine Arts in Baghdad. The Iraqis are currently benefiting from those, learning about heritage preservation from eminent Polish specialists in the field.

The main and crucial parts of the exhibition presented are the Polish operations, conducted by Polish soldiers and Polish civilian experts in protection of heritage and archaeology as a part of the stabilization mission in Iraq. We believed that, together with the military presence, we must strongly emphasize the civilian presence, especially when it comes to the question of the protection of cultural heritage. Hence, the first staff of the Multinational Division included Marek Lemiesz, one of the authors of this presentation. On the second staff of the Polish Military Contingent, the tasks related to heritage protection were conducted by three specialists: Agnieszka Dolatowska, Łukasz Ołędzki, and Grzegorz Galbierczyk.

The plates present one more aspect of our presence in Iraq, namely the examples of how a military presence is naturally related to certain damages or destruction of heritage. Yet, the main Polish assumption and intention is to do as much as possible to save the especially precious heritage as a part of our mission. We had to undertake especially significant activities related to the results of the withdrawal of the Multinational Division and the obligation to leave the intact heritage of Babylon by the appropriate preparation of the archaeological service, providing them with equipment, and introduction of permanent archaeological monitoring. With the military presence being salutary, we did not want the withdrawal of the army to help to liquidate many centuries of heritage.

These are the reasons why the exhibition is unfinished – it presents but a part of presentations and achievements in both Poland and Iraq. Nevertheless, I would like to emphasize that this is the part is a specific “Polish Program”. The presence of the military does not need to be associated only with destruction, and especially with the destruction of cultural heritage of a given country.

It was our intention to show that, being a nation especially affected by the Second World War when it comes to the destruction of our cultural heritage, we can, despite the military presence, also show care for the cultural heritage of another state. Hence the Director General of UNESCO was notified of all activities undertaken both in the country and in the Multinational Division in Iraq.

As I said, one of the authors of the exhibition is Marek Lemiesz of the Archaeological Museum in Poznań who was putting it together even last night, and

was to open it together with me. Unfortunately, personal reasons have forced him to return to Poznań immediately on completing the exhibition. The designer is Magdalena Wiśniowata.

I would also like to thank very warmly the officers present here: Colonel Miłaszewski and Colonel Żarkowski for the assistance they provided to the specialists performing tasks related to cultural heritage protection within the Polish Military Contingent in Iraq. I would like to extend special thanks to the Commander of the Multinational Division, General Mieczysław Bieniek, who initiated numerous projects that we successfully completed. From their funds, the Command of the Division transferred 220,000 dollars for the implementation of the projects prepared by our specialists, and aimed at the protection of Iraqi culture heritage.



Part two

**Media and international
organizations**

**- terminating conflicts and
restoration of a state**

DEBATE 4

Reporting and analyzing conflicts – limits of freedom of speech

Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, moderator

The subject we will begin with is reporting and analyzing conflicts – the limits to freedom of speech. Our panel is composed of eminent guests: Milica Pesic, the director of the Media Diversity Institute in London, Krystyna Kurczab-Redlich, an independent journalist and documentary film director, Dariusz Bohatkiewicz, a war correspondent for Polish Television, Marcin Mamoń, director and documentary film director, and Adam Szostkiewicz, columnist for the *Polityka* weekly magazine. We will be discussing the way that the media report about conflicts: Are their reports true to the facts, do these reports constitute a true image of the world? Ryszard Kapuściński has recently said that there are only five places on our globe where wars are being waged, but it still seems to everyone that the whole world is engulfed in war. Is it our fault that such an image of the world comes from our dispatches? We are also going to discuss freedom of speech and consider whether our reports on wars and conflicts are indeed reliable, or are they subject to forms of censorship.

Milica Pesic

I will start with something I brought with me and I am going to read to you two quotations. This is “Press Gazette,” a magazine for British journalists: If I come across Bin Laden first “I’ll kick his head in, then bring it home and bronze it”. That is one quotation. The other one: “Go find the Al-Qaeda and kill them! We’re going to eliminate them. Get Bin Laden, find him. I want his head in a box”. The second quotation is from CIA counterterror chief Cofer Black, from his instructions and the first quotation comes from a journalist, my colleague. It is Geraldo Rivera from Fox TV.

Being myself a TV broadcaster for almost 20 years, doing that job and more as a journalist, unfortunately, and working on Television Serbia, I am sure that all of you know that TV Serbia was bombed during what I would politically correctly call “the NATO action” in Serbia. So, there was NATO action not only in Kosovo but also in Serbia, to correct one of the speakers. Serbia TV was bombed for being used as a military tool. We can discuss that, whether it is proper or not, but it is what another television network, not public, national television, which covers almost whole America, said. That is how it reports, how my colleagues, report on others. I report a couple of terms used by two television stations: Fox TV: “terror

guns”, “psycho Arabs”, “rats”. Of course, on the other side, Television Serbia talks about Bosnian Muslims: “mujahedeen.” For Serbian TV, ‘mujahedeen’ is the worst adjective you could stick on anyone. [Worse than] “wanton whores”, “throat-cutters”, “bloody Ustashes” – for those who do not know, the Ustashes were Croatian nationalists fighting during the Second World War. Again, during the war in South-East Europe ten years ago that we started in 1990 as you know, that was one of the insults from the other side. By the way, my colleague Geraldo Rivera carries a gun, and as you all know, journalists are not supposed to be armed, at least after the Second World War, according to Geneva convention and the other internationally recognized documents.

Someone in this room mentioned local and international journalists and media. I deeply agree with him when he says that the local media are usually pro-government and usually take sides. That is the case everywhere, unfortunately. With some exceptions. Such is the B92 Radio, whose name Tadeusz Mazowiecki tried to recall. There is also “Osvobodzenie in Bosnia”. Speaking of the international media, I would disagree with Mazowiecki for a simple reason. You are an international medium when you are covering someone else’s conflict, but when you are covering your own conflict you become very emotional in your choice of words. My theory is: the closer the conflict is to your home, the harder it is for you to be a professional journalist, particularly if you are working for a prominent medium, whatever that is in your society.

Diplomacy and propaganda will be the topic of another session. I just want to mention one thing: journalism is very often confused with propaganda. Propaganda, as you know, can be fantastic, brilliant, good or bad, but it is not journalism. Similarly, journalism could be bad, fantastic, brilliant, but it has nothing to do and should not have anything to do with propaganda. What we as journalists need to practice is what I call a responsible journalism not only in peace. I have heard many people saying that when the war is on the agenda, you should forget about professional journalism.

We all are in need of “our side”, whatever our side is, because I have never learned what our national interest really is. Who is the one who decides and defines our national interest at the time of a conflict within your own country, with the people you grow up with? So, who is the one who decides? Why is responsible journalism very important in both peaceful and conflict time? Because it costs you if you do not practice responsible journalism, and particularly in conflicts, it costs

lives. If you are ready to take that responsibility, then you should think about it twice.

We have discussed the elements of responsible journalism. We have mentioned a couple of elements and I would repeat a very important and respectful one: cultural differences. Again, cultural differences, meaning culture in the broadest possible sense, really. Not to mention such things as in Bosnia, where “Moslem” with capital “M” means nationality, “moslem” with the small letter “m” means religion. So, yes, there are parts of the world where Moslems could be agnostics. What we, moreover, forget is respect for the people who are in a region of a particular conflict. And not just to respect communities, in the way that communities are different from each other, but the individuals within communities because as the experience from the South European conflict shows, in one community you can have so many different options, and so many different cultures, and so many different histories. Every community has their own interpretation of history or of their own history. Very important, unfortunately, I see it at this conference, when we are talking about tolerance, when we are talking about building peace and respect for diversity we very often think in stereotypes. Previously, I mentioned prejudice, but stereotypes as well and we judge people, we judge individuals, based on our stereotypes picked up somewhere. This is very, very irresponsible, particularly for us, journalists.

It is very important again for responsible journalism to offer the broadest views: whenever we report, there is always more than one history, as I mentioned. More than one interpretation of what is happening or more than one explanation.

The Financial Times published the other day the results of research done by a Chicago survey institute (whose name I forget) and the results showed that two thirds of ordinary Americans are not much in favor of intervention in foreign countries and are very much into America joining the International War Tribunal. The same survey shows that two thirds of politicians and experts in America think the opposite. Who do these politicians represent? And not only in America. Generally, that is why journalists have their views also. We say that the *vox populi* is boring: you go to the street, you pick up a couple of people. Well, you have to find a way to know what the public thinks, because this public decided once upon a time that you should become a president or a prime minister or whatever – an MP. They have changed their mind according to what you have done, or what you have not done, what you lied about, or what you have promised. So, we the jour-

nalists have to report the worst views. “What bleeds, leads” is a very popular saying in Britain. That is why we have so many conflicts on TV. There, they are visually attractive, the photos are attractive. So, one of the ways to practice responsible journalism is going beyond this and reporting on what looks boring: the grey suits, usually grey hats, gentlemen shaking hands, but what is said behind those is what changes things. What is “bad journalism” then? I think it is just an expression. I have always been in bad journalism. In the Second World War it was acceptable because we were all fighting Nazism. I personally believe that it is not good for anyone: both for those who mislead us because you are now in a position to mislead us and here I am on your side. But your time will go away and you will not be able then to assume that your messages will be reported because we are misled by someone else. So, the best is to keep a physical distance, a psychological distance and that will give us professional distance as well. I do not think it is very difficult. There are so many journalists who have been practicing professional journalism.

Krystyna Kurczab-Redlich

First, I would like to say who an “independent journalist” is. I first became an independent journalist by chance, and only later made a fully conscious decision, and now I know that I want to remain an independent journalist for ever. An independent journalist is someone that no one watches over: no publisher, no editor; no-one supports them, no-one keeps them on the payroll or sends them anywhere. It is all about what the individual journalist wants to do: to disseminate that truth which he or she believes is the most important at the given moment.

I am not a war correspondent. During the first Chechen War I left that field to others, who were more professional and better prepared. Why? Just because the first Chechen War, which began in December 1991, took place in front of our very eyes. There was hardly anything to hide there. Journalists were free to enter, as the war was referred to as the “introduction of Constitutional order”. In fact, it was known to be a war conducted by the State against a small nation.

The second Chechen War was something completely different. I arrived in Chechnya for the first time in the autumn of 1996, just after the previous war had finished. In 1997, I stayed there relatively long: over two months, and, later, I would go to Chechnya as frequently as was possible, especially in 2002 and 2003. The last time I was there was this March.

Why did I decide to be a witness to what has been going on there? Because, although this may sound immodest, at a certain moment I asked myself who would

be a witness, if it were not to be me... There were no volunteers to go to Chechnya when nearly everything that goes on there happens as if it were in an illegal gambling den.

Chechnya is a place that has not been appearing on TV since 1999, and is disappearing from human conscience. It is a place where a horrible game is being played in that gambling den, a clandestine den, where one player is hopelessly trying to play with an open hand of unmarked cards, while the other player repeatedly draws cards that are marked and pre-prepared. The trump card of the Kremlin is terrorism, Chechen terrorism. It is the ace of spades that was set aside at the very beginning of the game. Another card is stabilization (or normalization) in Chechnya. Everything is stable and normal there! "Hands off! What do you want from us? See, there is the president, there is the constitution, and there will soon be a parliament," they say. This is why Chechnya since the second war, the post-1999 Chechnya, should not be considered here as one of our subjects, because it is simply not a post-conflict subject. There is no 'conflict' there: what continues in Chechnya is a horrible war hidden from your eyes.

How can there be a thorough and honest report on the events taking place on the "Russian steppes"? All those who deal with Russia know perfectly well that in October 1999, a time when there was no official conflict yet, the Kremlin administration introduced restrictive steps towards journalists. At that time, the following procedure was introduced: only a journalist who had been accredited in Russia, which meant the presentation of a whole sheaf of documents that had gone through all the 'sanctioned' organizations and approval, could reach Chechnya. Only having been approved once could one apply again, this time for being accredited in Chechnya, which meant another sheaf of papers, including insurance. Until recently, all this took place in the street, in front of the administration building: we were not even allowed inside. All the documents we had to submit in the street – at five sharp on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. We received them back also in the street, regardless of rain or whatever. Once, after I heard "Here's your accreditation to Chechnya, but you are not allowed to go to Chechnya unaccompanied", I asked "So why am I given the accreditation?" Both the answer and the policy were simple: "Well, you asked for it, first of all, and secondly, if there is a group visit, you are allowed to join in, so why not?"

Naturally, there have been journalists, mostly from western countries, who only go for the group visits, but there have also been those who would go without taking

notice of the actual accreditation that was given to them or not. It was not about making yourself a hero. Moving around Chechnya is a very dangerous matter, but this is not the lack of safety you find in Iraq. No one would be shooting at the car I drive. First, they do not know I am a correspondent, because I am trying as hard as I can to make myself look like a Chechen woman. Secondly, any intelligence about a correspondent traveling somewhere could only come from informers. None of us can stay in Chechnya for more than two or three days. Then, we return to Ingushetia, so that we can return soon. Preparing our reports for the West, we are there as if 'in transit', so that we can be as inconspicuous in Chechnya as possible.

When it comes to the internal (i.e. Russian) reporting, in 2001 the only de facto independent broadcasting corporation, NTV, was liquidated. Although it had earlier antagonized the president, it was closed only after broadcasting a program which clearly proved that the terrorist attacks that triggered all the later acts of terror, such as blowing houses up in Omsk, etc. were done with the participation of Russian special services. The program carefully analyzed in-depth the unsuccessful terrorist attack in Ryazan'. It so happened that the security services guys from Moscow forgot to notify their colleagues in Ryazan' about the action they were planning. So those from Ryazan', who had been alerted by the inhabitants of the house who had noticed that there was something fishy going on, arrived immediately at the spot and rounded up the guys who were planting sacks with hexagen, a powerful explosive, mixed with sugar. In the very last moment, an order came from Moscow: "Stop, these are our guys." The order was heard by an operator in Ryazan', and later by Russian journalists who immediately put this information to good use. By the way, once the case became public, Moscow announced that the action was just a security services training session; a version that has been maintained until this day. After a very detailed investigation shown to TV viewers, NTV ceased to exist. Soon, TV6, financed by Boris Berezovsky, was established but in a few months it was liquidated too.

One could ask how society reacted to this. In 2001, one could still have a little bit of hope and there was still a tiny bit of freedom to act. During the liquidation of the NTV, 200,000 people answered the journalists' appeals. They arrived at the foot of the NTV building despite the torrents of rain, police cordons, etc. During the closing of TV6, there was an agony of general silence.

Later, newspapers were liquidated: *Segodnya* and *Obschaya Gazeta*, led by a famous dissident, Yakovlev. To this day only the *Novaya Gazeta* has survived, and

it cannot have its head chopped off only because of the backing of the Gorbachev Foundation and other major world foundations. Its journalists strive for the truth. The famous Anna Politkovska goes to Chechnya incessantly, she is a witness of what is going on there and tells the truth, the whole truth, in her documentaries.

Let me make a reference to the responsibility for what you say here. Anna Politkovska does something I completely disagree with, and maybe this is the reason why I do not find her entirely convincing. In her reports, she uses the actual names of people she visited and their addresses. After one of her reports, ten people disappeared without a trace, though their bodies were found some time later. Nevertheless, Anna says "I must show all these so as to be reliable". Maybe, and maybe not.

Anna Politkovska lives in an unguarded house, one you can simply enter without any problems. She just does not look for cover, she has no time for that. All of her trips to London, frequently related to Zakayev, always looked the same: she was detained until the very last moment, literally to the departure of her plane, and then she was taken for a body search, they were trying to plant things on her. Sometimes she was taken out of a plane that was already about to start taxiing for takeoff and she had to take the next flight. Recently, when she was flying to Beslan, there was an attempt at poisoning. It was in the tea served to her in an airplane of Indian Karat Airlines. The physicians at the airport were barely able to save her life, all the more so because Anna had survived earlier attempted poisonings. The first time that she was served poisoned tea was when she was kidnapped and found herself in Khankala, which is the general military headquarters in Chechnya. She was recently given poisoned tea by Ramzan Kadyrov himself, the son of president Kadyrov, when she was trying to interview him.

I am not going to dwell too long on the story of Andrei Babitsky, for you know that he was kidnapped and transported to a concentration camp. I used to meet Chechens who had heard him being beaten. Then he was released as a warning for all those journalists who were to follow in Babitsky's footsteps, that is stubbornly report the truth from Grozny. Still, I must also mention Yury Shchekochikhin, a leading journalist, a flawless journalist, who for years worked for truth and freedom in Russia who carefully watched not only the events in Chechnya, but also the questions of corruption at the highest echelons of power. Shchekochikhin was poisoned with radioactive thallium. He died in unbelievable torment, with his skin peeling off his body in chunks. He died at a Kremlin hospital, and no results of

the tests conducted (exactly as in the case of Politkovska) were disclosed to his family. They have remained a secret of the Russian State to this day.

This is what it is like to tell the truth and strive for freedom of speech in Russia. It would be hard to speak of any freedom of speech there. I am asking about the limits to outlawing or taking away your freedom of speech. The circulation of *Novaya Gazeta* is a mere 125,000, and it is in great demand in Moscow and in Petersburg. It may also reach a few places here or there, I saw it in Nazran in Ingushetia. Yet, throughout the entire country, no-one is aware that such a paper is being published, of the existence of Anna Politovska, and of a truth which is different from the one served up on the screens of Russian TV.

Analysis of the facts is hopeless. Everywhere, in each official ‘truth’ we have to suspect a mass of manipulation and deceit: all the cards that are played are marked. An honest journalist is frequently accused of being a conspiracy theorist, and that he or she sees Russian secret services everywhere. I have frequently come across this argument and, to tell you the truth, I really do not know what to do.

Ruslan Labazanov, whose presence at the Federal Security Service (FSB) in Lubianka was proved by former FSB officers who fled to the West, this same Ruslan Labazanov is rumored to be the initiator of the anti-Dudayev opposition. He led to the outbreak of the first war in Chechnya, he initiated the blowing up of houses and buses, and is responsible for the action in the Moscow underground. We keep seeing Ruslan Labazanov everywhere, even though he died a tragic death, poisoned in Cyprus.

The whole question of terrorism looks as follows: Russian society is presented with a *terrorist*, which is accompanied by the following commentary “we have just caught a terrorist guilty of blowing up an electric train in 1999; students going to school were killed ... people commuting to work were killed”. It so happened that I was a witness to the incident three weeks earlier. I was in Ingushetia, when a man was arrested, he was going somewhere with his wife and child. Suspected of participation in the resistance movement, of being a guerrilla fighter, he was put in a Russian jail. Then, after the train was blown up, they show the same man on the screen: black-and-blue, he is presented as the man behind that terrorist act. An act he could not possibly have committed, as at the time that it happened, he was in prison! Who knows this? Who knows that the fighters shown as terrorists are people who were captured earlier, imprisoned, and terribly tortured? No-one, or hardly anyone, knows this. All of Russia is convinced that the truth is what the media show.

Horrendous acts of terrorism: the performance of *Nord-Ost* at the Dubrovka Theater, the tragedy in Beslan. Both after the first and the second time, Shamil Basayev admits to it. We are all asking ourselves the question of why he is doing this. To what degree this action is purely Chechen, and to what degree this is the activity of the Russian special forces. When I asked Zakayev, the former prime minister of the Chechen government how to treat Basayev, he answered that Basayev was a great patriot. No more. I have always believed Zakayev and I still do.

Every time information is circulated that Chechen guerrillas want to do something, there is always someone to 'lend them a hand'. It looks as if both the sides played on the same pitch, even though they are against each other, each comes out the winner. Chechens win, as their voice is heard in the world, and Russian propaganda wins, saying "how could we sit down to the negotiating table with such terrorists?"

I would like to reconfirm the participation of Russian special services in acts of terror. In the first, the *Nord-Ost*, two people, Terkibayev and Abubakar, fled the place of the event. Both are agents of secret services, a fact confirmed by officers in the special forces. Terkibayev was killed this February: he died in an accident. He did not conceal the fact that he had lent a hand to the act of terrorism during the performance of *Nord-Ost*. The same scenario was repeated in Beslan: there were terrorists who managed to escape.

How does it happen that some terrorists actually manage to escape? Why were all the terrorists but these two knocked out during the action in the theatre? Why are open and official court proceedings not allowed? Why were all the proceedings related to Chechen terrorists conducted between barbed-wire fences? Why is a book on this terror confiscated on crossing the Russian border? Why has no film on terror conveying a grain of truth been shown on Russian TV? Even more, each attempt to show this terror ends in beatings, or – as happened in Petersburg – in the killing of a man, a member of the Yabloko Party who assisted in putting the show on air?

In Russia and Chechnya, we the journalists are the investigators and not Chechen advocates. We are the investigators of facts, fighting for the right to publicize our documents. We do not want to report on acts of terrorism, yet as I have frequently heard, Chechnya is no longer a headline. A heartache it may be, but no longer a headline.

Dariusz Bohatkiewicz

My experience is not as rich as Krystyna Kurczab-Redlich's. For the past five months I have been in a country called Iraq. A few days ago I returned together with two colleagues from the Kraków section of TVP.

Those five months were divided into two periods: January-March, and August-September. These were two extremely different experiences. I came to know, as it were, two different Iraqs. The first visit was a true stabilization: we drove practically all over the country, and the "press" sticker opened nearly every door. Not only to the green zone, not only to the Polish and American zone, but also to others, all military bases included. Thanks to the press sticker, as one of very few Western TVs, we were allowed inside the Imam al-Hussein mosque where we could show the other side of the conflict. At that time, Moqtada al-Sadr, a man of twenty-eight, who had never completed a Koranic school, was trying to make himself a great theologian and was on hunger strike in Najaf.

We, the journalists, were able to learn all the pros and cons of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and we were allowed to transmit virtually everything. There was no pressure from the military. Maybe this was because we happened upon a great leader, General Mieczysław Bieniek, one of the few who understand that wherever an army goes, wherever something is going on, wherever a war rages on, there should also be a camera. Then, we had access to everything and, then, we could be speaking of independent journalism, of showing both the sides of the conflict. No problems were made, when a Polish soldier died, if it was not always in combat. One could die in a traffic accident. We were allowed to show prisons, and in case of the Polish army, the rooms with the detained, the rooms where terrorists were. We could enter the homes of average Iraqis, show how they live, present the problems they face. We also met with journalists from the new Iraqi media. We could also talk about terrorism.

We reached the places where terrorism was practically born. Please, imagine that to a building that is... something like the building of our city council, but with all the barbed wires, with the Iraqi national guard and police standing guard... to a building protected by American, Polish and Latvian soldiers, a crying man comes entirely unnoticed. He is equipped with over ten kilos of explosives strapped to his body. He approaches our soldiers and pleads: "I do not want to die, help me". The reaction? He was disarmed and taken to Baghdad. In the meantime, he explained to us how he came there. Two men whom he did not know came into his

house, took out 5,000 dollars and said: “Unless you wreck the City Hall, your closest family dies”, and for Iraqis, closest family means 20-30 persons.

We would also meet with the Iraqi media, also in controversial situations. For example, after the famous attack on the Al-Hillah base, when two suicide bombers tried to break through the perimeter in vehicles loaded with explosives. There was an explosion, but luckily no one was killed. At that time, the Iraqi Babylon TV was more than certain, and even presented proof, that that attack was initiated by the Americans; that someone saw an American helicopter shoot a rocket at the base. Later, we asked them where the information came from, and they replied that that was what was being repeated in the mosques.

Despite all these issues, it was a pleasant period, when one could travel all over Iraq, present the various sides of the conflict: from the point of view of Shiites, Sunnis – practically everyone’s.

Our second visit, on the other hand, was going into a real war. A few days after our return to Iraq, the second al-Sadr rising began. We could no longer go – for reasons that are only too well known – to Najaf or anywhere else to show the other side of the events. We were practically locked in the base, for our own security. In the course of two months I managed to leave the base 17 times, patrolling with the soldiers or by myself. This means nothing to you, and yet we managed to do it. We saw the whole horror of war. It is obvious that, in this case, it would be hard to speak of objectivism understood as presenting both sides of the conflict. There was simply no such possibility. What went on there was not only a hunt for journalists, and the best proof of that are our colleagues from TVP, Waldek Milewicz and Mundi, but also a hunt for hostages. For none of us wanted to be shown on TV with a scimitar over their head. The talking to people was over. I remember reaching Karbala in a private car, and the same people who had invited us home and served us tea in their homes, where we could peek freely into everything, failed to recognize us this time. We were treated as enemies and occupiers: dangerous and a hazard to their lives.

Today, we are talking a lot about freedom of speech. In my case, and in the case of my absent friends from other stations: Maciek Boroch of TVN and Tomek Sajewicz of Polish Radio, freedom of speech was limited by concerns for the security of other people: soldiers, civilians, Poles and people of other nationalities in the anti-terror alliance. There was no specific pressure exerted, though it is a well-known fact that everyone has different expectations concerning journalists reporting a con-

flict. A web portal, the press bureau of the multinational division, the Polish Ministry of Defence, the families of the soldiers serving in Iraq, and the dissidents against Polish activity in Iraq – they all have differing expectations. We were trying to balance everything and report what we saw: just what was truly there.

It was obvious that we would be strongly criticized for presenting live the information that 21 Poles were besieged in a police station in the city of Hillah on the opening day of the Olympic Games, when the main news was all allocated to the Olympic news block. And the storm did break out. We just wanted to learn from the commander of the multinational division when those people would receive reinforcements, that is, additional equipment, ammo, etc. The story went like this: from 2pm to 1am, 21 Polish soldiers together with 20 soldiers from the Iraqi National Guard defended the station from about 300 attackers and we did not know when the soldiers would be relieved. The storm that broke out was a major one. We were accused of scaring Polish society, of catering to sensation.

We were trying not to escalate the threat. We did not say that the Camp Babylon base was under accurate mortar fire, or that a rocket had exploded within a kilometer from us.

On the one hand, we realize what profession we are in. On the other, there was also some responsibility to the people staying here, in Poland. We were in touch with the families of our soldiers, and we knew what everything looked like. Moreover, we knew that every piece of news about a rocket exploding near the base would make several thousand people in Poland cease their daily routine activities, listen to the radio, watch television, and try to learn what is going on. Unfortunately, a journalist cannot inform about who was wounded and where. Unfortunately, this is the truth. There are things that are sacrosanct, such as when soldiers die, be they Polish or allied, we do not give out their names until the Ministry of Defence has notified their families back home. What if this notification takes six hours? – allow me the rhetorical question.

I am sorry for the chaos in what I am saying, but I am still very emotional after all that. Staying for two and a half months at the base with the soldiers blurs, to a degree, the objective independence, the outlook of a person standing off to the side. Yet, on the other hand, it is hard to imagine how difficult it is to remain independent, when you meet a person day in day out for three weeks, we travel by the same Honker, the guy talks to me, he lives no more than a block away from me in Kraków, and this twenty-something-year-old guy gives me a parcel for his mum

and says over a beer or a coffee that when we meet again we will go to see Wisła, one of our local teams, playing, and a day later the guy is dead.

I mentioned expectations earlier: everybody's are different. No Pole expected that we would get involved in a full-fledged war; this was to be a stabilization mission. At the moment everyone, President Kwaśniewski and the Minister of Defence included, knows that for the first time since the end of the Second World War, our country is involved in a military action that is, in fact, a war. In such a situation, reporting information is difficult. On the one hand, we want to show what the stay of our soldiers there is like, how they work together with the civilians, and even when a school is opened in a tiny town near Karbala, we go there with a Polish general and a Ukrainian general. We greet the children and their teachers, knowing that it is all partially just "for show" – the school was rebuilt for 300,000 dollars paid by the United States. Just imagine that there are about 30 snipers standing on the roofs, ready to shoot at any moment. The situation is complex indeed: on the one hand, the beginning of the school year and children, on the other: guns, grenades, armored vehicles. This is what help looks like at the moment. All this not to manifest our power in the eyes of these kids, these people, these locals, but because a short while ago a mortar attack on this very school was launched.

We encounter such situations there daily, and for this reason, let me return once again to what I said before, that in this case, in the case of Iraq, for me, freedom of speech ends with the assumption of responsibility for what is going on there.

Marcin Mamoń

We live in a world we know less and less about, and we will know even less about it in the future. What I mean here is in the nature of the context of conflicts and in the context of conflicting civilizations, regardless of how we define what is going on at the interconnection between our civilization and Islam, East and West, the poor and the rich.

For many years, when going places and meeting people who are fighting in the name of an ideal or for freedom, for religion or for other things that they find significant but we find incomprehensible, I have had the impression that I am racing against someone who is liquidating them one after another. This was true of the Chechen troop commanders, Iraqi and Afghani politicians... I meet someone and immediately afterward I learn that he is dead. I frequently find myself taking similar shots, in a similar context, or in a similar shooting site. In the moment in which

I meet another person I have the impression that this is our last meeting. Why do I have it? Is it because we will not learn anything more about this world because this world wants to inform us about nothing more? Or is it so because this world – for the people of Afghanistan, Iraq or Chechnya – is the civilization of death?

Honestly, the last open person I talked to, the person who was for me was a chance to learn the truth about the world of terror and the world of fighting against Russia, fighting the West, was Kadyev, former president of Chechnya, who I saw this year, towards the end of January. Two weeks later, he died, assassinated in his car while going to prayers. I'll be frank: he was the last person with whom I was talking honestly, the last person who was open. It may have been for this openness, or being able to be meeting journalists, for I was not the only one with whom he used to meet, maybe for this openness, he paid the highest price.

In Iraq, I met al-Hatim. He is dead now. People who are open and want to talk, die. Thus, the consequences may be following: the information in the media will be downright false: made-up to a greater extent than it is reported. It will be conclusions rather than the communication of facts.

It seemed to me that I was closest to the truth about two months ago. It all took place in the territory of the free tribes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the area where both the locals and the western journalists believe that the number one terrorist, namely Bin Laden, is hiding or the Taliban leader to be living. The border runs along the bottom of the valley: this is the supposed border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On one of the slopes, there is a small base of American marines: 150 soldiers in total. It is reachable only by helicopter, as otherwise to get there, one would have to drive quite a long way through an area that, according to rumor, is dangerous. The border runs along the bottom, and on the opposite hill, there are Al-Qaeda troops. It looks like this: one day, the Americans are shelling the other slope from helicopters or planes, and the next day the Al-Qaeda soldiers or fighters are shooting at the American base, and the situation continues for months.

Now, there you are, between all that, sitting at the bottom of the valley, with the local Vazirs, members of the tribe, drinking green tea, and discussing how life is so hard.

I reached that place thanks to a Chechen, even though everyone in Afghanistan keeps repeating after the media, that Al-Qaeda are Chechens and Uzbeks. He was a man who used to meet with the Taliban and I can only trust his

version, for the truth cannot be learnt fully. He claimed that all the Chechens who fought for Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan have gone through his hands, and that there were six of them, of which, four are already dead.

I would like to mention just one more myth: when we go to Chechnya, we learn that these are Arabs who are fighting in Afghanistan; when I go to Afghanistan, I learn from the papers or directly from people that Al-Qaeda are Uzbeks and Chechens; and when I go to Iraq, I learn that it is the more-or-less genuine Zarkavi who are fighting the Americans. I may tell you one thing: if it were so, these wars would simply be nonexistent.

Krystyna Kurczab-Redlich

I only wanted to add one thing to what my friend has said. Two years ago, the Chechens wanted to talk to us, as they trusted us and believed that we would do something for them. Now, they do not, as they claim we have done nothing for them. The world has turned its back on them, and we only feed on their blood. Moreover, they suspect us of making money on all of it.

Adam Szostkiewicz

I speak from the perspective of a reporter, that is someone who has been involved in the observation of a single, specific conflict. I shall try to look at it from another angle, as I too have such a “favourite haunt” that as a journalist I have kept watch on for years. It is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I would like to share a few theses. The first may be fairly perverse, but if we are to address the topic of our meeting, namely what the media can do for the restoration of peace in post-conflict communities, in a serious manner, I would say – nothing. This is not the role of the media, and many misunderstandings related to this problem result from that fairly general expectation that this is the role the media are to play. In the film *No Man’s Land*, illustrating the tragic Bosnian conflict, there is a scene where one of the locals is looking at a foreign TV crew and says: “So what will you vultures be filming now?”

To be able to make sense while talking about the limits of freedom of speech and the role of the media in post-conflict societies, and especially during the conflict, one must share a piece of a very bitter truth: nobody wants the truth. The sides of the conflict want no truth. The sides of the conflict – if they want anything – then it is for their truth to make its way into the public awareness and also through the media. If they feel that this is not so, then in a natural, emotional, and instinctive way – which has a psychological explanation but does not serve us jour-

nalists well – their attitude turns into aggression, distrust, and reluctance. During my visits to Israel, I attempted many times to talk to the Israeli or to the Palestinians. There was a much greater readiness to speak about the conflict among the Israeli than among the Palestinians. When I asked Palestinians: “Well, but if there were such a chance, and we could invite you to the studio to discuss what can be done for peace – would you come?”, they answered: “Why? To them?”

If they themselves do not want to go and talk, someone must take their place. So their place is taken by representatives of the – let us simplify it – Israeli left wing, who are trying to take into consideration the rights of the Palestinians in the conflict. It is a good thing, but they are no Palestinians. And Palestinians won’t go, because they are afraid that they would be accused of collaboration, just because they took part in an Israeli program, or worse: that they will say something wrong and will be met with another type of punishment – a fact that is daily routine in the Palestinian community.

There was a period in this conflict when only Israeli TV operated, and I did not see Palestinian TV, and had never heard of it. In the period between the intifadas, they organized such meetings, and Palestinians really did turn up there. Once the conflict entered a phase as hot as the present one, when we are in the so-called second intifada, such contacts were severed.

Another thesis of mine is that it is not the role of the media to build peace. This is a task for politicians, for civil society. It is a question of the organization of society, including churches, religious associations, etc. – and not of the media.

Nobody wants the truth about the conflict. Please, let us remember that in the case of an open, hot conflict, where the media has become a part of a broader whole, they are under certain legal constrictions. For example, the Polish public media, if a war were to break out and the Polish side were attacked, would switch into an entirely different mode of operation, for this is how the political system in which we operate works. It is understandable: the media becomes a side in the conflict. It would be hard to imagine that in the first days of September 1939, the Polish press might have published broad analyses of Hitler’s coming to power, what happened, and why. In frontline conditions, the role of the media is entirely different. They must simply serve the basic goal, that is, fighting the enemy.

Coming to a close, if we are to make sense of the question of freedom of speech in a conflict situation, we must first enumerate a minimum of four basic

reasons that make its limits liquid and shaky. Or in other words, that these limits are simply marked out by:

1. The nature of the conflict – You report on a conflict in an entirely different manner when you are an Iraqi involved in a conflict in your own country. The case looks different when you are more like a UFO, flying saucer that suddenly lands somewhere, no one knows where from, in a territory engulfed in a conflict. This is the usual role of foreign journalists and foreign media, when they suddenly arrive, knowing nothing. Let us be honest and not to turn this role of ours into a mythology. In most cases, we are undereducated and know little about the conflict that we are ordered to report on. We touch down like a UFO, knowing nothing and being expected to report objective information from the conflict. This is the context in which I understand this brutal question from *No Man's Land*: “So what will you vultures be filming now?” They feel we know nothing, and we will be proving we do not. Then millions of people – I am speaking about the electronic media – will consider it the truth about the conflict. There is no truth about the conflict.
2. The nature of the medium – This is the second element that marks this limit in the media. Everyone who has worked for television, radio or press knows how big the differences are and how strict the time constraints are. If one is to make a three-minute piece on something as emotional and complicated as a conflict, and an open conflict at that, one cannot do it in any other way than in terms of the most basic simplifications, and the simplifications most eagerly resorted to are the black-and-white ways of presenting the good guys and the bad guys in the conflict.

I have recently talked to the current President of Iraq, and I asked him how he perceived the question of reporting on the situation in Iraq by world media. Everyone knows that we are daily snowed under with images from Basra, Baghdad, etc. Everyone knows that these are always the same images: another explosion, another massacre, another dose of emotions and the feeling that no one is in control of anything, that the spiral of nonsense is escalating. Naturally, the President is a state official and looks at matters from a different angle than journalists do. His answer, however, is worth remembering: “I am highly dissatisfied. I feel that some of the world’s media draw satisfaction from the fact that there’s been another failure, that there was another explosion, that there was another massacre in the queue in front of the recruitment cen-

ter for the national guard or the Iraqi army.” To which he added that he had never seen a report that showed Baghdad with a few thousand weddings held daily, and where 10,000 children are born every day.

Then we become defensive and say: “Well, if we began showing such images from Iraq, we would be accused of an absolute distortion of the reality and of being the dogs of Bush’s, Blair’s, Kwaśniewski’s or Marek Belka’s propaganda.” These are the realities of our work. Thus, secondly, the nature of the medium, delimits in a technical manner the limits to the freedom of speech, and, at the least, it limits the truth we want to show in a manner that is sometimes quite painful.

3. The third element that demarcates the limits of the freedom of speech is simply a combination of entirely accidental factors at the place from which we want to report on the conflict. A journalist was late, overslept, the guest failed to arrive at the appointed time and place, the route was changed, something technical failed, lost his notebook or mobile with the important contacts, or had it stolen. Then instead of the plan about how to present the material, everything falls into pieces and you grab a more or less accidental man as your protagonist, a man who expresses an opinion to show the reaction of the public. This combination of chance is highly un-romantic. I am speaking about it to show that there is little truth in what the media are accused of: some assume conspiracies, that others set the rules for reporting on conflicts, etc. The element of chance is highly crucial in limiting the truth and freedom.
4. The last of the elements here, which is to be admitted honestly, is the economic or political interest of the given medium. Let us not hide this: it is present as well. The media – let me return here to the Middle East I know best – Muslim media, and especially Arab, Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian, and Egyptian – generally present the conflict in the Middle East in a light entirely different than the one shed by western media. It is not only their manner of perception that is different and results from the cultural situation, etc, but they also have a different political interest, a different economic interest. Here, unfortunately, I am returning for the third time to the “So what will you vultures be filming now?” question. In the end, we are vultures: we, the journalists; we, the reporters. We stand so as to get the most dramatic background for ourselves. Our milieu has known cases of people – journalists, reporters – arranging situations to make the information more dramatic. people who pay people to

shoot, so that the actual shooting could be shown in the shot: bullets are whistling by while the brave reporter makes his statement. These people are well-known, everyone knows they do it – they simply pay.

I am sorry, but what mission are we then talking about? What construction of peace? The aim is just to create a piece of news, and that my piece of news wins as many viewers or readers as possible for my broadcaster or my press agency.

Looking from a longer perspective, it is a shame, but it must be said that this is how one may earn a prize for being a courageous correspondent. Best of all would be to get wounded during such a report!

Closing, I would like to emphasize once again that in this way I am not discrediting either the efforts undertaken by the media, nor the efforts undertaken by individual reporters. I know many of them, and some of them are extremely brave people, involved in a positive way, people who want to find the truth, and who really want to pass it on. I only wanted to show how hard a task it is, and how unrealistic is the expectation that everything can be conveyed completely and quickly.

Once, I talked to such a really decent war correspondent. He was not Polish; he was English. He had worked many years in this profession, he was everywhere – he was in the Africa we still speak too little about. Even at this moment, as we are talking here, how many thousands of people will die there today of hunger? Or as a result of other tragic circumstances? What could the media do about it? The media went there and made their reports, thanks to which I can mention it here and now. On the other hand, these relations change nothing in the drama.

It is, as I say, not that I would like to shun this responsibility, but this is the role of politicians. So we were talking with that correspondent, and I asked him: “You know so much about this, you have experienced so much and have been through so much professionally, tell me – is there any point to it, any moral lesson for the profession?” To which he answered that if those years as a war correspondent had taught him anything, it was the fact that there are no justifiable and unjustifiable dead bodies. There are no leftist and rightist dead bodies: there are only dead bodies and there is death. Let death be called death, and the dead bodies are dead bodies. Since I am speaking with pathos, I could also add that if the media must take sides with someone or something when we are speaking about conflicts, then let the media take sides with life, and not death. It is all I have learnt during all my years of work in this profession.

DEBATE 5

Diplomacy or propaganda

– towards ‘terminating conflicts’ in the media

Arne Ruth, moderator

The participants in the debate are Tomasz Bielecki from *Gazeta Wyborcza*, who for the past three months has been in Iraq as a war correspondent; Mariusz Pilis, a professional producer of documentary films; and Marek Nowakowski, columnist and commentator from the *Wprost* national weekly magazine, a man of solid political position, a former Undersecretary of State in the Office of the Prime Minister and an advisor in foreign politics. This double experience, in politics and journalism, lets him comment on political issues in the capacities of both a participant and an observer.

I would like to underline a certain aspect of the subject we are going to discuss. During our discussion of “diplomacy or propaganda” it is necessary to turn our attention to the tools determining conflict in the media. It seems to me, that at present, despite our journalistic intentions, the media have become an important part of the conflict. They are used by political parties and they are close to taking their places. This situation, beyond any doubt, increases the risks of practicing journalism in such a conflict area as Iraq. This problem refers to the questions we have previously discussed: the issue that we should report the facts, assume a non-partisan attitude, and look for the truth, independently from the interests of any given political grouping.

What happens in the situation described by Adam Rotfeld, when conflicts cease to be conflicts, and even in spite of that, there are groups that remain unpredictable, groups that we know hardly anything about, groups that, nonetheless, operate on an international scale and definitely know how to draw the attention of the media to themselves.

Tony Blair, from the Labour Party, from the Constituency of Brighton, is faced with a dual problem. As the head of the Labour Party he would eagerly block discussion of involvement in Iraq, and he could, in this way, stop the crisis caused by the kidnapping of Ken Bigly, a British engineer, and whose son organizes his own television programs attacking Blair for doing nothing. This is a media case. Whatever Blair declares to do, if it comes to the contact between him and the kidnapers, his final answer will be the statement that he plans no negotiations.

What is the difference between reacting and negotiating? I do not know if we can make sense of it. A great deal points to us being witnesses of a television game. In this situation how should journalists behave? Show the 'performances' by the hostages or the kidnappers? We are dealing here with a great drama, and on top of that is the element of concern for these people who are, after all, threatened with death. We know that two Americans had earlier been killed by the same kidnappers. Unless something is done, Mr Bigly is in for a very grisly end.

Or, maybe we should have a look at what is going on backstage? There is a proof that two Italian volunteers were released thanks to the ransom of a million dollars. This is information given today on the BBC World Service, while the reporter responsible for the transfer was a Kuwaiti journalist who credibly reports the events from the inside of the conflict.

I would now like to wrap up this subject. I do not intend to organize our discussion by suggesting to the participants what they are to say. My only intention was to bring to the fore some aspects that might increase the temperature of our debate.

Tomasz Bielecki

I am a journalist in the foreign department of the *Gazeta Wyborcza* national daily. I deal primarily with the Middle East, and I am responsible for reporting on the conflict in Iraq.

For me, a reflection on the role of the media in the termination of conflicts is closely linked to the question concerning the obligations of a 'news' journalist, responsible for daily reporting on what is happening in conflict-stricken regions and for providing the most significant facts. From the point of view of journalistic technique, it would seem that my role – which is the pure transfer of information and, if this is possible, to let both sides of the conflict speak their minds – leaves no opportunity to 'terminate' the conflict for me.

As a user of the media, including electronic ones, that deal with Iraqi matters and questions, I may, however, claim that the facts and motivations of both sides may be quoted in extremely different manners. It is enough to take a closer look what the Qatari television station Al-Jazeera does, and how the BBC reports, and how CNN reports. None of these can be accused of hiding facts. None of these stations can be accused of open manipulation of the facts. They all quote the most important sources and show what is really going on. However, the manner of reporting this information results in extremely different impacts of the communi-

cated content. I am not here to criticize Al-Jazeera, but it was their programs showing the bombings and American operations in Fallujah in April 2004 that made hundreds of armed Iraqis go into the streets of Baghdad and start a march on the city. I do not want to assess the justification behind the operation of American forces in Fallujah at this time, but the manner these were reported by Al-Jazeera definitely did not contribute to the termination of the conflict.

This is why first of all, we must ask ourselves a question about the manner that we could employ to avoid additional provoking of conflicts.

While I was considering this, three guidelines came to mind. The first, which may possibly sound perverse, relates to the conviction that a journalist whose intentions are good and who does not want to instigate and deepen the conflict, should expect to fail to meet certain expectations of his or her editors-in-chief. Secondly, he or she should fail to meet certain expectations of his or her readers. Thirdly, he or she needs to surrender some his or her own hopes and urges to idealize some parties to the conflict.

The first guideline is related to the bosses' expectations. I believe that these are especially dominant in the case of the electronic media, yet it is also true in the case of the print media, which I represent. A good text or a good piece of material that comes first in TV news or that is published on page one in the dailies should overflow with emotions. If it does not meet this requirement, you will hear an objection that it is close to an agency release. The task of a journalist is to dress your material in emotions to make it more palatable for a reader, to make it more attractive. This is a good principle. Exaggeration, however, results in everything ending just like in the programs on Al-Jazeera I have mentioned and the Iraqis who started their march towards Fallujah. I believe that, as a journalist, I should sometimes agree to a text or material, despite a drop in its attractiveness, that is devoid of emotions, and that we should impose on ourselves maybe not this type of censorship, but of limitation.

These are the American feelings that make a report from Iraq look one way on CNN, while the emotions of an Iraqi or Arab journalist from the Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabia are decisive in creating the entirely different shape of the broadcasts from these stations. This is still not disadvantageous. However, when they reach the point where these emotions are so strong that the informative function of the communiqué yields to the impressive function, as was in the case of the images Al-Jazeera showed in April, and which rallied people to stand up against the

Americans – in such a case, the media may be quite rightly accused of inciting conflict and giving up on the improvement of the situation.

Coming to the question of hostages: I believe that the removal of the emotional layer from certain texts and images would mean that Al-Jazeera, Polish Television, and *Gazeta Wyborcza* would just inform about the beheading of the hostages. Yet, the tendency to make the material highly attractive by showing the execution itself, or the last moment before it, when the hostage appeals for his life, or the despairing family when they learn of the hostage's death, means trespassing on the other side of this border.

The second question: the expectations of the media consumers. In the previous panel, Adam Szostkiewicz spoke of the black-and-white image that is sold by the media. Yes, this is how it works. But the problem on the TV is not only the time limitation. It is not just that we only have two minutes and five seconds in which to broadcast our correspondence, it is that it must be brief. In the press, we only have so many lines for correspondence from the conflict area. It is also true that many our clients – be they viewers or readers – expect a black-and-white picture. I come across this when I talk to my friends, my family, those who are close to me as well. They want me to tell them what is really going on in the Middle East, but simply and in the fewest words possible.

Many of our spectators and readers simply hate the phrase 'it depends'. Is Moqtada al-Sadr right or is he not? Is he the bad guy? How should he end the occupation of the mosque in Najaf? When a journalist answers "it depends," I suspect that the majority of our readers become disheartened and read no further. The black-and-white picture is simpler for the journalist to present. It is easier to construct tension in the text, it is easier to construct tension in the TV program. The text is easier to read: easier to understand and to accept, easier to remember for our reader. I believe that, for fear that we might incite conflicts, we should not meet these expectations. The best example here is Moqtada al-Sadr. This is an example that emphasizes the danger behind the 'war on terror' rhetoric which has been overused in this case. It is the fault of the black-and-white pictures transmitted from Iraq, I mean what is written and said about al-Sadr, who has already started two uprisings in Iraq.

It is this black-and-white picture that has caused Moqtada al-Sadr to be called a terrorist by many media. In such a case the situation can be drawn very clearly: there are the good guys, the Iraqi government. In the government, there may be

opponents to the prime minister, to the president of Iraq, but they are involved in a peaceful dialogue within the provisional parliament, etc. On the other hand, there is Moqtada al-Sadr, who has his own fighters and who wants to implement what he believes by force. Immediately, he acquired the name of a terrorist, which renders peace negotiations in Iraq harder. It obstructs the peace-building process. To tell you the truth, the Polish media, unlike the ones operating in the English language, cannot influence this situation. The peace-building process is hampered just because Moqtada al-Sadr is no terrorist. Many Iraqi politicians believe that he should be assimilated by the Iraqi political system. He should be negotiated with. Yet, is it not hard to negotiate with, to sit at the same table with, a negotiation partner that the media have branded a terrorist? The blame for such an obstacle should be laid on the media's doorstep. This is the fault of the stories written to suit the demands of the readers who need a black-and-white picture.

Another example is Algeria. After many years of civil war with Islamists, Algeria is in a much better condition, since this rhetoric was abandoned. The Islamists ceased to be perceived as a single block that one should fight against, as it is a terrorist block. All the shades of grey began to be perceived between terrorism and armed opposition. The government began to pick the groups that could be negotiated with, the ones that a compromise could be reached with. The black-and-white picture was dropped, and it helped to terminate the conflict.

The third question I mentioned, is to get rid of the idealization of the sides in a conflict by journalists whose attitudes may be strongly pro-peace, journalists who may want the conflict to be solved as soon as possible. In the media, especially in the European media – let me return to Iraq – there is a marked tendency to show the challengers to the peace-building process in Iraq and opponents of the state's stabilization as marginal fanatics.

The dominant view is that the decided majority of the Iraqi are 'for' the stabilization. They crave for peace and have no major objections to the current policy or the Iraqi provisional government. There are also the approximately 2% of fanatics who are 'against'. Justification is found in the Koran, which says nothing about kidnapping hostages, and in the Muslim religion strongly favouring peace, etc. Here, we speak of Islam, but the same could refer to Christianity in other conflict areas of the world. A journalist who does this, is not showing the truth, although he should do so. A journalist reporting on what is going on in Iraq should speak about the great majority of Iraqis perceiving the people from the West cur-

rently in Iraq as contemporary Crusaders. A large part of the people in Iraq perceive us as enemies, and journalists must pass on this information. They must not be idealized. The journalists must show with whom we can reach a compromise with, with whom to negotiate with, and with whom to make peace with. Should we yield to the need to idealise one of the sides of the conflict, we would misrepresent the overall picture, which can only obstruct the peace-building process and actually increase the disillusionment of the other side. It would result in an aggressive reaction later on.

I will also return to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Idealisation has also come up in this context. When in 1993, intensive Israeli–Palestinian negotiations were conducted, one of the most influential Israeli dailies, the liberal-left-wing *Ha'aretz* desired peace so much, that it went beyond the informative function and began to idealize the Palestinians. Enough so that the Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, a laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize, ostentatiously discontinued his subscription of the paper. He announced it publicly, protesting with good intentions against the adulteration of the image of one side of the conflict.

If we oppose the aggravation of disputes, what is the way in which we should promote peace? There are two temptations in this. The first is through focusing on peace initiatives and the promotion of this form of activity, resulting in exaggerating their importance beyond what is realistic. I believe that, up to a certain limit, this choice is justified. Nonetheless, we need to avoid becoming ridiculous, a fact worth illustrating with the Israeli example. Last December, the Geneva Accord turned up. Independent representatives of the Israeli and Palestinian sides concluded a ‘quasi-peace agreement in Geneva.’ It was a proposal submitted for consideration to the government of Ariel Sharon and the authorities under Yasser Arafat. In the Middle East itself, the event was, in fact, of marginal importance.

I was in Jerusalem at that time. Both the Palestinians and Israelis perceived what was going on in Geneva as an amusing event. Possibly a good event, but a marginal one. For the media in Europe, on the other hand, this was news item number one. Not to criticize other media, but it was reported as the headline in the foreign news pages of *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Thus, we added importance to something that did not have it. To a certain extent, such a step is allowable, as in a sense, it promotes peace-building propositions. Yet, one must also fear it, lest it becomes propaganda. It is not only about ethical questions but also about purely practical questions. If we, as journalist slang calls it, ‘inflate’ such peace-building initiatives

that have no significance, the readers will no longer find us credible. They will discover that we are not representing reality. We must be more careful here.

The second temptation is the concealment of certain facts. Such a step is not to be allowed, yet we must be aware of the fact that a journalist who desires the termination of a conflict is vulnerable to such a temptation. Last autumn, *Gazeta Wyborcza* organized an Iraqi–Polish conference, to which Iraqi journalists came. There, I talked to an employee of the new Iraqi media that had been established after the fall of Saddam Hussein. He had, which is understandable, much good and much bad to say about Paul Bremer, the head of administration for the occupation (or stabilization) forces in Iraq. When asked whether his paper reports on the bad things and whether they criticize the American administration, which is standard behaviour in America or Europe, he answered not yet, not at this stage. At this stage, it would be tantamount to providing an incentive to conflict. I admit that I was terrified to hear this answer, as what we are talking about here of is a breach of the canons of journalism. On the other hand, Iraq being in the heart of a conflict, certain matters may seem proper to be passed over in silence. This, however, is a short-term solution. Within a few months, that journalist’s paper had obtained in Iraq a ‘propagandist’ tag, lost its readership and, as an effect of a desire to strive actively for peace, they lost any potential for impact.

The last question still remains. The unstable situation in Iraq has led to a practical absence of Western media in the country. Their representatives either spend time in military bases or are confined to two hotels in Baghdad. Some reports in the Italian press begin with the statement that, from above, Baghdad seems to be a fairly peaceful city. Indeed, one of these two hotels has a large terrace for journalists on the 35th floor and they can write their correspondence from there. They do not go out into the city, because they are afraid, and this makes sense. For the past three or four months we have witnessed a new stage in reporting on the events in the Middle East, as this territory has nearly entirely been surrendered to the Arab media. Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia and Iraqi newspapers can let themselves publish rather one-sided reports on certain questions, knowing that there is no counterbalance in the form of Arab-speaking western stations. We shall see what is going to happen now that there are only those who represent one side left.

Mariusz Pilis

I would like to tell you about Afghanistan. More or less two months ago, I returned after about a month’s stay. It must be said at the beginning, that this

conflict does not exist. Why? Because it does not exist in the media. Despite its being extreme, and intensifying on a day-to-day basis, and covers ever broader areas of the country, many of you probably do not know anything at all about it or know very little.

During my month's stay there, nearly 50 people died. Out of that number, approximately 40 were people from the West: members of humanitarian organizations or various non-governmental agencies that are trying to help and introduce some order in Afghanistan. From the media, on the other hand, this war is absent. It is definitely not due to the lack of journalists, as they are there. This war ceased to exist because it is no longer a good commodity, a good media product. It has stopped selling. We finished that war at the moment when the media stopped writing about it. Are we, the people of the media, capable of influencing such a situation? Definitely yes, if these are the direct activities that are concerned, that is, going to the hotspots and creating objective, non-partisan reports.

I believe that the problem begins in a slightly different place. My friend said that you should look for solutions that promote positive symptoms of the situation becoming normal in regions that are affected by conflicts or in post-conflict areas. The problem is that it does not sell. It is not a commodity. What are the sources of such a situation? We know exactly what is going in conflict areas and have the potential to monitor them continuously, and showing their true image.

While reporting on a matter lying beyond the scope of this discussion, namely 'Rywingate,' the *Gazeta Wyborcza* daily ran a column where they updated people on what was going on with the affair, what comments there were, and who the participants were. Maybe it was just because the daily was directly affected by the problem? Most probably, this was the first reason for the existence of the column, although on top of this one could possibly suggest a fair number of more lofty reasons, such as the slogan that one should report information. A solution was introduced here that made it possible to show the problem from the moment of the scandal being unleashed to its completion.

Yet, unfortunately, such a solution may only take place in papers or other non-electronic media. In the electronic media, time and money count in an entirely different manner, and information is a commodity. I am afraid that conflict termination will never happen in the electronic media. Although journalists like us – the ones who go, seek, check, and in many cases put their lives and health in jeopardy to transmit the truth – would probably like that to happen. You cannot trans-

mit a truth that is not listened to in its entirety because it is not attractive at the given moment. You cannot convert truth into commercial airtime which keeps the business running.

Arne Ruth, moderator

Marek, the journalism that we have discussed so far boils down to the presentation of information. As a commentator, you represent a different type of journalism. I would not like to jump ahead of the discussion, but I would find it highly interesting to learn what you think the potential differences between these two types of journalism are when we speak about conflicts.

Marek Nowakowski

I have already been announced as a person of dual experience and dual outlook, as a former politician, diplomat and, at the same time, a journalist. The task for me has thus been set at a very high level. To start with, however, I would like to present an image, thus moving into another profession. The title of this panel is 'Diplomacy or propaganda – towards terminating conflicts in the media.' Please, imagine, Bohatkiewicz, who normally operates in a typical reporter's vest, and then, imagine that on top of this, he puts on a tuxedo and top-hat. He would look slightly ridiculous. This image is a metaphor for the usurpation of the role of the diplomat by the journalist. Giving him the role of creating a solution to the conflict, seems unjustified. If you put into the pocket of this journalist's vest the bull-horn of a political activist, it will become even more conspicuous. Propaganda is highly inefficient. Expecting that the media could terminate conflicts is as efficient and sensible as expecting to quench fires with gasoline.

Let me first turn your attention to the fact that we are not speaking here about post-conflict communities, but communities in the most heated phase of the conflict. To be honest, it is Poland and not Iraq that is a post-conflict society. In the case of Poland, we can speak of the phenomenon known as "conflict termination". In Iraq there is still no termination, the best that can occur there at the moment is trying not to escalate the conflict. Let us, therefore, be precise here. The task of the media in post-conflict communities is exactly the same as in any free democratic society: to inform and – if we are to speak of the positive aspects only – to develop a space for social dialogue. No more and no less: because any involved journalism leads to results opposite from the results intended.

Once I commissioned a group of translators who, for a few weeks, fairly intensively prepared translations of Arabic press and television broadcasts at the brink

of the Iraqi conflict. Frankly speaking, after having read those, one could see the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* as a work of clear objectivism. In Europe or the United States, a racism that wild would get every other person in the Arab TV and press packed off to jail. Let us then be aware that, speaking of the informative function, the dialogue function is not very prevalent in the contemporary world but is a muffled voice from the margins, squeaking in the reality of the contemporary world.

I fully agree with what Adam Szostkiewicz has said, and I would be even more cynical than he is: the media feeds on conflicts, the media feeds on death, and the media feeds on blood. The media is like a vulture. That is the democratic media – they need to be like that. My junior colleague from *Gazeta Wyborcza* displayed noble intentions, saying that one does not need to meet the expectations of the bosses or even the readers. All right, then, let us not meet the expectations of our readers for a few weeks. Then we will not have them any longer and we might as well print a newsletter for our colleagues on a photocopier: with a smaller circulation and zero impact.

The reader is in most cases in a hurry: a person not waiting for the presentation of various sides of the conflict but for an answer that is short and clear. Should we wish to present so many sides of the conflict, we must do it in quarterlies, in media with a high level of specialization, or on television programs with the lowest viewership, shown after 11pm. When it comes to the suggestion that the way of describing ‘Rywingate’ in *Gazeta Wyborcza* could be used to write about Afghanistan, it cannot be done because after day four, the column will have a readership of six. Better to send it to them by email – a cheaper solution.

Should our message be extremely complex, it will not reach the so-called ‘average reader.’ The average reader needs to receive information, must be presented information, in a way that will make him reach for it and read it. This is the question of the art of journalism: to tell a primitive tale about a complex matter. I believe that when we are discussing the task of the media in terminating conflicts, this is the key: the translation of a difficult and complex case into the language of the people who have five minutes spare time.

Another problem is the question of objectivism of presentation, which is interfered with by a number of factors. It is not that it is violated by nationalist formulas of thinking, as in the Arab case, or by attitudes similar to the ones presented by Oriana Fallaci, who in a very astute, yet artistically perfect, form preaches war and

has been praised by many for stirring up the anthill with her stick. Objectivism suffers also from our failure to read the language of the other side's discourse. What the press can do for the termination of conflicts boils down to the creation of a space for dialog. It is all about letting the other party speak, at the same time having a friendly editor guaranteeing those "other" reasons being expressed in a language legible to the consumer, so as to avoid their immediate rejection. In fact, the press and the media can go not much further beyond the listening and developing a chance for dialogue.

When journalists put on the diplomatic disguise, more often than not, they lose. What shall be done in case of propagandist media, such as the latest movie by Michael Moore, *Fahrenheit 9/11*? We have a sequence of images here: Iraqi children playing ball, president Bush saying how Saddam Hussein oppresses the Iraqis terribly, another cut and we are looking at the Iraq of ruins, burning houses, and shooting. A reversal of this sequence would be equally good, if not more justified: showing first the mass graves of Saddam's victims, then Bush's speech, and finally the children who three month ago played at the school courtyard in a peace greater than today's. All these images would be true in the sense of the truth of transmission, while the message would be exactly the opposite.

What the media can do is make an impact in preventing conflict escalation. So that, for example, it does not form the basis for racist attitudes, a case whose clinical example is present in the contemporary Russian media. I believe that the Russian media is building hatred in an entirely conscious and guided manner – characteristic of the restoration of a totalitarian state. Not so much hatred against Chechens, but against the so-called 'blacks'. The black is evil, the black is an assassin, the black is a bandit. Here lies the crucial answer to the question about the role of the media in post-conflict societies.

Americans used to tell that old joke about a dog almost biting a child to death in New York. In Central Park, a huge Rottweiler jumps at the kid. The mother is horrified, and there are a couple of policemen standing much too far away to help. Suddenly a man on a bench puts down his paper, sees what is going on, grabs the Rottweiler and breaks his neck. The police come running up delighted and impressed. "Tell us your name: tomorrow it will be in every paper in New York: American saves child from the maw of certain death." "But I am not American!" the man protests. "Oh, it doesn't matter, tell us who you are." – "I am a Pales-

tinian.” The next morning, the papers inform that a Palestinian terrorist has murdered an American dog.

This was how America joked, but – despite September 11 – the American press has never wound up in such spirals of hatred as Russia has. After Bieslan, they turned to forms of hysteria.

It is our own fault, the fault of the Polish press, that we did not hear about a number of pogroms against ‘blacks’ that took place in Russia, even in Moscow. By the way, everyone is black, whether Georgian, Tadjik or Chechen. The press, as with all the media, can be used in the conscious creation of hatred, a hatred that does not stop at hatred itself, but is the force driving successive phases of the development of dictatorship. This has been perceived by the Polish side – a fact for which president Kwaśniewski publicly repented at the Kremlin – and this recognition plays the role of a certain safety valve.

There is also a positive example from recent weeks: who of you has heard of Radio 102 from Uganda? At the borderland between Uganda and Rwanda, there are guerrilla skirmishes, rapes, massacres – actions cynically called “social entertainment”. The authorities have announced amnesty for the guerrilla fighters, but aside from a few score of them who laid down their arms, nobody believed in the honest intentions of the authorities, as contact with the authorities in Africa are fairly uniform: short and unpleasant. Those who were granted amnesty went to the local radio station operating in the borderland, thus proving they are alive. By now, the number of fighters has been reduced from 50,000 to 20,000, as the remaining ones began to lay down their weapons thanks to a single small radio station trying to be honest about the facts. Honestly, quoting this information, a medium may thus play the role of a conflict moderator, even on a large scale. The condition required here, however, is honesty.

The last question that I am asking myself is actually far from being banal: how, if at all, should we speak about the terrorists’ hostages? The fact that terrorism is a phenomenon that can continue only thanks to the media is dramatic. Therefore, should the media lie about terrorism – keeping silent would probably weaken its impact – or should it show successive severed heads? I, myself, do not know the answer to this question, which is an ethical reflection.

The problem of journalistic ethics comes up very frequently in the truly post-conflict society of Poland. We have had an attempt at building this dialogue and the mitigation of the conflict – an attempt that is sometimes slightly forced, an

attempt that *Gazeta Wyborcza* continued to undertake for many years. In the end, this soothing of all that is inflamed, this evading controversial subjects and preaching that it is not worth our attention has led to a decrease in the paper's credibility rather than to the reconciliation of rifts.

The final example is a humorous one, seeing as I am going to quote myself. A friend of mine phoned me a few days ago. Her daughter, referring to historical and literary works, was to write an essay titled. When enticed to attack his enemy by night, Alexander the Great told his captains: I do not want a stolen victory. Argue for or against. I told the young lady to start from the claim that if contemporary journalists were to question Alexander the Great for his reasons for such a decision, they would definitely ask him first why he sacrificed the lives of thousands of his soldiers in the name of his honour, not seizing the opportunity for attacking by night. This question reflects the image of the contemporary press as well as relations between media and politics, a question which is hard to judge unambiguously in moral terms.

In conclusion, the only role of the media in a post-conflict society is telling the truth even when it hurts, as it provides catharsis. Contemporary Polish-German relations are the best example of how painful understatements can become at a later date. Secondly, the media should unfortunately be cruel in representing conflict in the world so as – to parody the words of the poet-prophet – not to allow the national and international scars to grow over with the film of indifference.

Arne Ruth, moderator

I would like to suggest a certain question. It is about the statement from Prime Minister Mazowiecki, which I found extremely interesting. He defined the conflicts in the Balkans, conflicts that are considered solved, as hidden from the eye of the international community. According to Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the situation there is far from normal, and it would be impossible to foresee what may take place there in future. As the Prime Minister believes, if I understood him properly, the manner of solving that conflict raises new problems. I see that the media are interested in the case only to a minimal extent.

I have also noticed that journalists are dominated by a pessimistic attitude towards what can be achieved by journalism. It is astonishing to me, as you live in the country of Kapuściński, a most brilliant journalist, able to foresee the future. I do not have to remind you that he began to deal with the issues of Africa long before that vast continent became popular and eagerly discussed in the media.

Kapuściński did it already in the 1960s, from inside the Communist system. Besides this, reading his book was crucial for everyone interested in Iran, as he saw the coming fall of the Mullahs.

My personal conclusion boils down to the conviction that despite the structure of the media being capable of warping journalists' ambitions, the most enthusiastic still have much to do here.

In the Balkan question, for example, we can speak of the involvement of ethics. Two journalists, Roy Gutman and Ed Vuilliamy, my close friend, decided to write counter to the convention prevalent in journalists' reports from the Balkans, which made all the sides equally evil. When they heard the rumours about the existence of mass graves, they decided to take an interest in this question. Gutman was writing for *News Day* and Vuilliamy for *The Observer* and *The Guardian*. When the trial related to this case began in the United Kingdom, the question came up of whether the journalists who examined the case should testify on how they examined it. The American journalist refused to testify, explaining that, in this way, he might lose his so-called objectivism. Ed Vuilliamy faced the court, as he believed it was his moral duty. Being a journalist, one is never entirely neutral, and when people are killed – something must be done about it. Showing blood may become the essence of journalism, yet there is a far more crucial problem, that being whose blood is shed. It is not only the question of pointing to the perpetrators but also pointing to the victims. Here, also, there is space for objectivism. However, it is an objectivism understood only in a certain, defined manner: that the duty of the journalist is the pursuit of the truth. This is why a journalist must make a decision about what type of subjects to tackle himself or herself.

Returning to what Tadeusz Mazowiecki said, my question is whether it is disadvantageous to speak about what is going on in the Balkans when there is such unrest? The question results from this: what sources of information may we trust so that, in our capacity as citizens, we could halt, counteract, and change such a situation? Can journalism be limited to the description of what has already happened? Or may it also be the analysis of the potential and may it, through this analysis, influence actions? From the point of view of journalism, does a conflict come to its close when the blood ceases to flow, even though we know that much may yet flow in the future? These questions are highly significant.

DEBATE 6

Tasks of international institutions and organizations in transformation of a post-conflict state. Necessity of democratization?

Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, moderator

We are now moving to the *Tasks of international institutions and organizations in transformation of post-conflict states. Necessity of democratization?* We have already discussed what the role of such organizations as the UN should be, and we have been pondering over the sense of their existence. Now is the time to discuss the organizations that work in conflict regions, even though they have no such tools as the UN, and yet they probably do more than UN. Let us consider how to help: only materially or also by healing the emotional scars on the nations that, though they have gone out of military conflicts, still remain in internal conflicts. We begin with Janina Ochojska, President of the Polish Humanitarian Organization (PAH) foundation, and later we will listen to Agnieszka Kosowicz, External Relations Officer of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Antonio Tarelli, Minister Plenipotentiary and former Ambassador of Italy to Macedonia.

Janina Ochojska

For obvious reasons, during my presentation, I will be speaking of the role of non-governmental organization using the Polish Humanitarian Organization (PAH) experience during work in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Our experience of bringing aid to others we have learnt what is the most important: the basis of all aid. First, aid is an expression of solidarity with those in need and it builds the civic community on both sides: the aiding and the aided. Secondly, aiding should unite people and mean sharing and not parted with something we no longer need. Thirdly and finally, it must respect human dignity and support it, rather than destroy. Aid given with no recourse to these conditions may humble people.

The basis for the efficient operation of all elements for peace building in post-conflict zones, that is education, healthcare, social aid, and understanding of the direction of changes, is the presence of civic society.

The role of the NGOs is the restoration of this society through the initiation and support of social activity, and – going further – by supporting local non-governmental organizations. This is especially important in the countries where the

sense of responsibility and social activity has been destroyed by a totalitarian system or where such traditions have never existed.

While reconstructing the system of education, social aid and healthcare, it is important to learn what the system was before the conflict. Why it was what it was and not something else, how it was organized, and what people thought about it. Was it mainly based on the state or on social ties. Whether it was imposed or “custom-tailored” to the local people. Did it develop addiction, did it develop the potential to make decisions for itself, or self-organization. Did it deteriorate? The understanding of reasons, as well as of social, historical, and cultural conditions is the first important element of the reconstruction process.

The reinforcement of the structures that form the bases for the efficient operation of social services should in future begin already at the stage of emergency aid. I believe that all of us gathered here share the conviction of the need to grant the beneficiaries their independence already at the emergency stage; involving them in the planning and implementation of certain tasks. When it comes to another crisis situation, we yield to the temptation of “technocratic” behaviors: a subconscious conviction that we ourselves can do it more efficiently and quicker. Replacing the recipients of aid in the activities they can perform themselves, excessive use of foreign employees or volunteers kills the local initiative and voluntary activity.

In Albania, where over 400,000 refugees from Kosovo took shelter, we witnessed the import of foreign volunteers to perform simple works during the establishment of the camp. Volunteers dug little trenches around the tents and sprinkled gravel on the paths; in the meantime the unproductive refugees were standing beside. The same happened in Ingushetia reached by over 250,000 refugees from Chechnya. Camps for them were organized and managed without any participation of the party interested. Among those refugees there were lawyers, physicians, teachers, educators, engineers. Getting them at the earliest stage to manage the camp, keep order, and organize medical and educational procedures will in future allow for their easier empowerment with independent tasks. What is more, it will make it possible to teach them new methods of work, help them trust those who organized the aid, and allow kindling of own incentive.

Another element that allows efficient operation of reconstructed social infrastructure is cooperation with local authorities and state administration. It is true that in post-conflict countries, these structures frequently remain ineffective.

Nevertheless, this cooperation is the basis for mutual learning and strengthens the sense of responsibility of local authorities towards the community they serve.

In the municipality of Kacanik in Kosovo, where our Mission operated, I saw the results of the lack of cooperation between the United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and local administration: the latter were so much used to being helped out that they could not even decide on removal of waste. I am certain that the UNMIK administrators do everything better, yet let us imagine what will happen after their departure. The situation being what it was, PAH volunteers organized a joint “let’s clean the world” action with the local schools: a stimulus for local initiatives.

For the locals, cooperation between NGOs and local administration is testimony to the fact that creative cooperation with the authorities and execution of democracy through procedures makes sense. This cooperation should begin at the moment of the NGOs arriving at the post-conflict area. The local administration must be informed and persuaded into joint action. Lack of such cooperation results in misunderstandings (administration does not know what is going on within its territory) and increases the chaos, delaying the return to normal.

The same is true about cooperation with local NGOs. Each organization that operates within a conflict or post-conflict zone, should treat the local NGOs not only as partners but also as a valuable investment. We must remember that once we have left, these organizations will stay there and continue the work we began. Awareness that this cooperation is limited by time, that at any moment they will have to ‘take over’ the tasks, mobilizes the locals, thus preventing them from becoming addicted to aid. Cooperation with us should mean continuous exchange of know-how and learning from each other (we always learn the local specificity from locals).

Initially, the coordinators of our water and sanitary programs in Chechnya filled in the forms reporting the volumes of distributed water or removed waste per individual employee without conviction. They believed it to be unnecessary “bureaucracy”. After some time, having seen how very important the reporting system is for management, they started to improve it themselves. We develop the budgets of successive projects together, while they assume an increasing responsibility. If it happens that there are no local NGOs in a given country, it is a good start to encourage the locals to do voluntary work. In post-Communist countries, there is no social behavior; there is no sense of responsibility related to the volun-

tary service staff. In Grozny, we conduct a potable water production and distribution program. Giving people a water cushion, we want them to become organized around it, to monitor the pouring of water and its drawing themselves. These cushions are the beginning of the social initiative and voluntary work.

People become very quickly accustomed to having things done in their stead. Think about the refugees who have recently gone through the loss of their homes and relatives. The recipients of aid should, from the very beginning learn responsibility and cooperation, while the organization bringing the aid should kindle in them the spirit of initiative: let us do it together, let us help each other.

Another, extremely important element is the construction of solid foundations for peace and social trust. both at the emergency stage and the stage of development program implementation in the regions where ethnic conflict occurred. At the same time, it is necessary to provide support to civilian victims of all the parties of the conflict as well as apolitical and independent operation of NGOs. It is not always easy to observe this principle, especially when you deal with both perpetrators and victims. The experiences of Bosnia and Kosovo show, however, that these roles can easily be reverted. After the return of refugees from Albania to Kosovo, NGOs' actions for the Serbs were not persistent enough to break through the conviction that the international community supports solely the interests of the Albanians. This resulted in the distrust of the Serbs living in Kosovo enclaves towards the NGOs. Our first visits and declarations of assistance in the Serbian enclave in Strpce in Kosovo initially aroused plenty of distrust. However, after two years of our work for both the communities, Albanians and Serbs could play a game of basketball. I will not say who won, as this is insignificant.

Another factor supporting efficient reconstruction of the social infrastructure is the established understanding and proximity between the aiding and the beneficiaries. A major barrier for the NGOs working in post-conflict zones is the different cultural reality: lack of understanding of the local language and customs. It is important that in our work we do not follow our image of the needs of the community but its actual needs. The templates brought from other countries must not be copied – the manner of aiding and style of work are to be adjusted to the local conditions. Competencies of NGOs do not result from the experience of working in another country but from the opening to local conditions. Our work should first attempt to build lasting foundations for normality and development of local voluntary staff and local NGOs as well as their support through sharing experience.

The convergence of the historical experience with the Balkan states and the countries of the former USSR, geographic and cultural proximity, and knowledge of the beneficiaries' language are a major asset in PAH's activity in the area. They make it easy to overcome mental barriers, helping us to select the most proper forms of assistance and local approach.

A significant element that stimulates the development in the given country is caring not to develop too great a distance between the aided and the aiding. Sometimes, the presence of NGOs may be the contradiction of aid, as it may result in the incapacitation of the country's natural development mechanism. Especially in cases where the only reason for the presence is the 'fashion' for such actions. After the Kosovo conflict, in 1999, there were over 400 organizations in Kosovo in 1999; most of them were gathered in Pristina (the capital) and the beautiful, old city of Prizren. With such a crowd it is the short-term activity in itself that is becoming important, and not the people and their future. As a result, faced with the possibility of continuing their walk of life for little money, well-educated people, for example teachers, lawyers or officers, undertake ancillary work, becoming drivers, assistants, interpreters, and body guards for international organizations in return for much better remuneration. Partner cooperation reduces the distance between the aid and the beneficiaries. Our organization is small, yet our size allows us for a more personal contact with those in need. Very large organizations are also needed, yet their role is entirely different. They work well as donors and coordinators for small organizations actively involved in the field. Much is said about the wasting of assets, about overdeveloped bureaucracy, and excess equipment that consumes large amounts of money. What might be a solution is the introduction of a clear-cut division between the highly mobile operating organizations working in the field, and donor and coordination organizations.

Wealth as well as remuneration and social standards in international humanitarian organizations are far from the conditions in post-conflict states; and this is where the distance originates. These differences are easy to understand: it would be hard to expect a Western professional to be able – in the long-term perspective – to give up (what he finds) normal conditions of work. This distance makes the large organizations treated rather like a good uncle who is going to give away, and not as a partner for whom you must mature. As a consequence, the arrogant attitudes of beneficiaries are reinforced and development of the local voluntary staff becomes nearly entirely out of question.

I remember the camps for Chechen refugees in Ingushetia; they were established towards the end of 1999, and in April 2000 we were opening kindergartens there. It might have seemed that refugees should be enthusiastic about such an initiative that served their children and mothers. Yet, they all demanded payment for picking up tents, making floors, or cleaning the ground. Their basic argument for was that “they all pay”. We managed to persuade them using the argument that we were not “them all” but a small Polish organization that until recently lived in the same system, but even so we had to promise to put up a ping-pong table.

With all determinedness, I can say that the local community, local authorities, and NGOs may become responsible and prepared to independent shaping of the system for social care, naturally, with the assistance of external funds and expertise. People know what is best for them. This is why it is important from the earliest days to incite them to action and responsibility through respect, understanding and partnership. Our role is to support the construction of solid foundations for peace and social trust. We, the people working for humanitarian organization must remember that we are in those places for no more than just a moment.

Antonio Tarelli

Taking into account that, together with many other issues, the Bosnia war has been discussed here at length, I shall limit my intervention, to two major events that happened in the Balkans. Particularly in Macedonia which is internationally known as FYRoM – Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, where I served for four years, from 1998 to 2002.

I will refer first to the consequences and repercussions on FYRoM, on Macedonia, on the Kosovo crisis in 1999 that led to the internal conflict in Macedonia, which I witnessed and where I was involved as a representative of my country, which was at the same time NATO and UN vacate. They were, indeed, very turbulent years. I will not recall the well-known circumstances of the crisis, nor the reasons and motivations for the NATO intervention. After the failure of the last effort to find a diplomatic settlement, to dispute methods in Paris and not only, it became a fact that 210 thousands Albano-Kosovo refugees, had crossed the Macedonian border, only 50 km from Pristina, but 25 from Skopje, by 25th March, the day when the NATO air intervention began.

The flow of refugees from Kosovo increased rapidly and took the form of a biblical exodus. One month later, In April, the number amounted at 200,000, and in May – 300,000. I will not expand or elaborate on that difficult situation in win-

tertime which lasts down there until April. The fact is that these thousands, and thousands and thousands of people moved seeking a safe heaven, out of the fear, of the threats, and arbitrary treatments by the YNA (Yugoslovianska Narodna Armia) but also out of fear to get involved in the clashes between Kosovo Liberation Fighters (UChEKA) and YNA.

It is also an established fact that in many areas a wide operation of the ethnic cleansing was conducted in Kosovo, in line with destruction and demolition conducted by Milosevic regime's under the cover of displacing civil population, to allow the military to prepare for battle.

Yet, the point I want to make is the commendable and costly action undertaken by UNHCR to shelter and feed, the masses of refugees, that entered Macedonia, as well as those, even more important in figures, who entered north Albania. The international – Mediterranean Need was supported by many donor-countries who delivered huge financial and material aid, but I also have to pay tribute to NGOs which endeavored to relieve the miserable conditions of refugees who usually arrived there without any documents, with only a few personal things.

An effective diplomatic action was carried out to convince the Macedonian government to keep the border with Kosovo open, or to reopen it after it was closed. While dispelling the fears of the Skopje leadership about a dramatic change in the ethnic balance, that would result from the inflow of some ethnical groups (setting ethnic unbalance) from Kosovo amounting up to 50% of the total population of Macedonia. In order to make clear that these refugees would not remain indefinitely in Macedonia, many Western countries including the US and Canada as well as most EU countries and Turkey devised and carried out a coordinated plan to host a half of the refugees, sheltered in the UNHCR camps in Macedonia.

A gentlemen's agreement, based of course on a confidential unwritten foundation was worked out between the Albanian part of leaders and these Slav Macedonian leaders, I mean I know the Macedonians do not enjoy this kind of definition but to distinguish the Macedonian Albanian from the non-Macedonian, non-Albanian Macedonians I have to use this form. Initially, this government under of course the leadership of this Slav Macedonian majority had a very little confidence and trust in their Albanian partners, because the situation was so complicated that it was the Albanian party that participated in the government, but it was very little trusted.

The compromise was to accept that no weapon smuggling would be tolerated and Ucheka fighters might be sheltered and received medical care if needed under the condition that they would not deploy any political propaganda for recruiting young people among the Albanian population.

Since summer 1999, throughout the end of 90s and after the retreat of the YNA soldiers the refugees began to return to their homes and the counter-flow grew bigger in the following months. As many houses and farms had been destroyed during the war, UNHCR was obliged to resettle lots of refugees into new camps in Kosovo waiting for reconstruction.

Of course, I am sorry to say, the feeling of revenge led to the burning and occupation of Serbian houses. Those who suffered most were the Romany, accused of collaboration with the Serbs. So that new exodus of Romany refugees crossed the boarder into FYRoM.

This last event compels me to draw a very sad conclusion that someway is connected with question that we discussed after the intervention of Sikose Mji, the Ambassador of South Africa to Poland – there is something very specific in the Balkan crisis and wars from Bosnia to Kosovo and that is a deeply rooted mistrust prevailing among different ethnic groups and nations based on an arbitrary hierarchy that each nation has in its mind, more or less consciously. I will not mention names as everybody here knows the traditional rivalry in former Yugoslavia, and in particular those dividing Christians from Muslim and in particular from Albanian in the region bordering with the northern and northeastern part of the Republic of Albania. At the lowest level of this social and ethnic scale are the dramas, and the consequences of this mentality are before our eyes. It is a fact that no effective reconciliations among Balkan nations will be possible without the large long-lasting effort, at the educational and media level to defuse tension and to fight against such deeply rooted prejudices.

Let me come now to the sick and dramatic event that threatened not only the stability but also even the existence, the very existence of Macedonia. I mean of FYRoM – the Republic of Macedonia. You may possibly remember that in the neutralized zone bordering Kosovo and Macedonia, there is the so-called “*Presevo Valley*” where another Albanian liberation movement organized itself in the years 1999-2001, waging war on part of Ucheka against forces in the southern Serbia. These forces were not allowed to enter that 5-kilometre-broad and about 25 to 30-kilometre-long area. When NATO succeeded in brokering, by end of the year

2000, the compromise including the disbanding of forces and a political arrangement so that Serbia could be reestablished in that area, most of the Albanian fighters did not remain in the valley.

I have to mention also that in the meantime these fighters either went back to Kosovo or to Macedonia, and joined in the mountain border area the most self-governing villages of the Valley – which, by the way, is completely isolated during the winter season. Thus, in January 2001, a new reaction started from that part of the country and rapidly spread all over the border region of Western Macedonia, recruiting and increasing a large number of young Albanians who also called themselves Ucheka, yet the K did not stand for Kosovo but for “national” – in Albanian “kombutar”.

More and more Slav Macedonians soldiers and policemen were overtaken by ambitions; violent riots spread among the Slav orthodox population, particularly in the townships where the victims came from. The riots were marked by the destruction of mosques and Albanian property. The risk of civil war was real and very serious. This is why NATO and EU representatives took measures in order to create a new coherent composition of the Macedonian government where all political party leaders, Slavs and Albanians alike, were invited to participate. Special envoys from the US and from the EU arrived at Skopje and very complex negotiations started with a view to reaching a compromise solution which excluded the partition of the country along ethnic divide-lines but contemplated a new executions of the set of agreed measures to accommodate the legitimate and repeated requests of the Albanian minority such as the use of the language, the participation of Albanians – national Albanians – in the police forces and so on. By mid-August 2001 a framework agreement was signed in Ohrid by all political leaders and by the representatives of the US and the EU, who were then called facilitators. NATO provided for the security guarantee with the military contingent whose mission was first to defuse this essential unrest – just to harvest and destroy weaponry. In the meantime, the political work started to implement the agreement at legislative and political level. At the end of the story, the NATO troops were replaced by the limited (very limited in fact) EU police force and great results were obtained by international cooperation to rebuild churches and mosques as well as houses and public buildings, either destroyed or badly damaged during the conflict. OSCE worked hard to organize, together with the US advisor, a Police Academy in order to

define and control the number of Albanian Policemen who were later to take charge for maintaining public order in Albanian areas.

Now, let us come to conclusions. Of course, this conclusion has no ambition to be objective and valid for everybody – it is my opinion. The lesson of this partial success story in Macedonia is that an ethnic conflict can be stopped at an early stage and peaceful condition reestablished if a very strong effort is made by the international community, and in particular by open and effective cooperation between the EU and the US, who are undoubtedly the main actors in South Eastern Europe. Yet, as this Macedonian story teaches, in my opinion the intervention must always be very timely, well-coordinated and fair in implementation. Moreover, it should focus first on the political level before deploying the military instruments that are needed to secure peace. In rebuilding peace and reestablishing the rule of law in post-conflict area, democracy is for sure a paramount goal. But to develop it, nobody has – in my view – a miraculous solution. It has to be carried out with great patience from the bottom up rather than a top down approach. It has to take into account the human, social, and economic realities which differ greatly, not only among countries and continents but also within a given country according to the different stage of its national history. Related to that are major human tragedies, yet the process of rebuilding peace may also represent an opportunity for establishing or reestablishing democracy. The international community, which means a universal, regional organization and specialized agencies, plays a decisive role in this noble task, provided that the reform starts first with the change of mentality based on the mutual acceptance and solidarity which so wisely Ambassador Mji discussed.

Agnieszka Kosowicz

I have a few fairly general reflections about the operation of non-governmental organizations.

I must admit that as a UN employee, I fairly often encounter various accusations against my organization, and most of them are justified.

It must be, on the other hand, remembered that the high expectations towards NGOs are directed towards a very broad and frequently greatly varied group of people. I believe that evaluating the work of non-governmental organization, we must always consider what they can realistically do and what role they can actually play. As a rule, the rule that these organizations play they are able to play. Hence the positive title of my comments today: “It works!” I was right to believe that most

of our discussions today would be concentrated on problems that are extremely hard to solve; problems that call for superhuman effort.

I would like to tell you briefly about a few cases that ended in success, about international actions that brought peace and which helped to improve the conditions of people's lives. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees deals on a major scale with the current problem: that is, the enforced outflow of people from conflict countries. Currently, all over the world, UNHCR helps around 17,000,000 people, most of whom are victims of armed conflicts. The task of the organization is looking for lasting solutions for the refugee phenomenon, which means granting long-term aid to these people. There are three possible solutions; they are formulated in fairly general terms:

- To lead to the spontaneous return of the refugees to their homeland at the moment of closing the conflict. In our jargon, this process is called repatriation,
- To receive and integrate refugees in the country where they found shelter. Poland is a perfect example of such activity, as currently from 7,000 to 8,000 persons come here seeking refuge every year,
- Resettle the refugees to a third country when their country of first asylum cannot guarantee them security. Mongolia is an example of a country that did not accede to the UN resolutions concerning refugees, and everyone who asks for refugee status in Mongolia is transported by UNHCR to another country.

How do we imagine this return as an ideal solution of conflict situations from the point of view of the refugees? First of all, the decision to return must be made of the refugee's own free will. This word causes more than many controversies. Quite recently camps for refugees were closed in Ingushetia, and it would be hard to call "their own free will" a case when people are forced to leave the place where they have no access to water, electricity, or food – where they simply have access to nothing. My organization believes these returns to be indirectly enforced. The second condition is the question of security of the country this people are to return to. Sometimes the question of peace does not mean that people only stop shooting to one another. The most suitable example that comes to my mind is the question of landmines. Huge numbers of people, hundreds of thousands of people in the world, live under the threat of landmines. What I find especially revolting is that children are exposed to landmines in these countries consciously and purposefully. Quite recently I met a journalist working in Cambodia. He told me how

families on purpose send their children for firewood to the woods. They do it because children are lighter and have therefore a greater chance for survival. Moreover, if a child dies, the parents can still provide care for the remaining members of the family. These are the choices that people all over the world must make every day. This is not a situation that would allow a safe return home.

Another question is related to the fact that returns must be dignified and lasting. I will not dwell upon this too long, as Janina mentioned that while we help people, we must always remember that these are people we aid. It is not meeting statutory goals, it is not spending money, it is not dabbling in the budget, it is not this thing or another but it is helping people who you came there for. Hard conditions of work may be one of the reasons why non-governmental organizations frequently forget this commandment.

Another condition is returning to your homeland for good. Unfortunately, we know of cases of returns that are not lasting, as for example happened in Afghanistan. It is good this has been already mentioned, for it does happen that the world considers a conflict closed and wants the refugees to return to their country, and the situation does not allow it. At the moment, the UNHCR has stopped the process of repatriation to Afghanistan due to the current developments in its territory. It is very important that the international community operates in long-term perspective, and is not influenced by impulse, which we see very often in Europe: as for example after the termination of the conflict in Bosnia. Immediately in Germany, in Belgium, and in all those other countries that hosted large numbers of Kosovo refugees, the impulse arose, followed by decision to send these people back. Another case is that of Iraqis, when European countries started to virtually order UNHCR to start repatriation action to Iraq immediately after the official end of the main military operation in the country. The decision to return to Iraq, taken individually and of their own accord, may be supported by us in any way we can. When someone makes such a decision, we help him or her. Yet, we believe that the current situation does not allow for the organization of mass returns, and our organization is not ready to assume the responsibility for such a decision. We believe that one should not encourage people to return to conditions such as those currently prevailing there. It happened otherwise in 2003, when UNHCR assisted around a million people who decided to return to their home countries then. This is this very situation I wanted to show you – to prove that also positive things take place.

We are left with two more conditions: safety of return and the possibility to starting life anew. Only a situation that is honorable for these people may count on our involvement. In our organization, we believe that ensuring such a situation requires a very broad cooperation: a consonance of various factors. Today's morning dispute was very interesting for me, as it proved the constant absence of dialogue between individual sectors and the total absence of planning, even at the level of ideas. It seems to me that neither in the media, nor in politics, nor in non-governmental organizations is there such a strategic, long-term reflection on what shape the world is to assume.

We have discussed the roles of different partners. Even though discussing this subject I am going beyond my competencies, I see that the media have a certain role to play, and they play it in many a case. Examples may be provided by the Rwandan radio mentioned before, as well as *Gazeta Wyborcza* which, possibly quite unaware, played a key role in a small conflict. Recently, you could read in that paper that in Moszna near Warsaw, in one of the little centers for refugees, a group of drunk youths attacked the refugees, which turned in a major conflict at the level of the local community. Initial accounts were very chaotic, panicky, and dominated by a highly emotional note. They spoke of an attack on the refugees, of racism. Later, however, it was possible to make the media meet representatives of the authorities managing the centre, and there was no place for anyone manipulating anyone else, simply both the parties understood the nature of the conflict and its possible solutions. Of its own, free will, as *Gazeta Wyborcza* published a series of articles that showed the conflict at an appropriate scale, and in the true light. The background of the situation was shown, and the situation was successfully explained. It was most probably the only form of aid for that community to stave the conflict off, which in fact did happen. There may be far more of such examples in the world of the media.

Now let me share a few words about the problem related to the international community. A few days ago I talked to the Chechens staying in Poland, and they naturally told me they wanted to return to Chechnya. We are discussing the potential losing of this war. My interlocutors believed that this war may end at any moment: in an hour, just like any other war, if only there were will to make it so. This role belongs to the international community: the existence of such a will, and its translation into reality. For no war continues due to no reason, there are always

reasons: wars do not wage on their own. If there exists an international will, the situation may improve.

What does UNHCR do? A handful of elements in our work have been enumerated by President Ochojska. Putting an end to the conflict is a multi-faceted task and means not only construction of homes, roads and bridges, and new cities but also the promotion of dialogue and peace-building thinking. Once I encountered the idea that after a conflict is over, under no circumstances may you lead to a situation that preceded it: conclusions must be drawn on the basis of the sources of the conflict. Naturally, they should be eliminated. This may, for example, be the joining of families, as a very frequent effect of wars and conflicts is their division. The Red Cross organized some time ago a beautiful action: they led to the reunion of approximately 300,000 children and their families near the Great Lakes in Africa. Another example of UNHCR operation is the support of dialogue, cooperation between various partners, not only media organizations, non-governmental organization, and governmental organization, the governments themselves, and also other partners, for example, business partners.

A continuous problem for non-governmental and international organizations is raising money for their operations. The more they are present in the media, the more money they receive. Here comes another task for the media: to consider the effects of their actions. I have seen very many rankings, yet I have never seen results of research on the impact of press publications. I do not even know whether research of the influence of the given paper on reality is made, yet its results would definitely be intriguing. There is a fairly interesting initiative, which is based on canvassing for support for the countries that have experienced conflicts. The best-known stakeholders of the program are the various agendas of the UN, numerous non-governmental organizations, media, and the governments of the countries in question. The idea is not to leave countries to themselves once the conflict is over, and to combat the fairly popular practice that in this most crucial of moments, when the country need for the most complex support is greatest, it is abandoned by the media, the non-governmental organizations, and financial support. The idea is also to ensure such potential to the people who would like to return.

I would like to present to you a few cases of such actions that have been successful, when people returned to their countries where the situation improved. The data concerning repatriation in 2003 claim over 500,000 returns in Afghanistan, and over 100,000 in Angola. The people returning to Afghanistan receive


training concerning landmines. Other conflicts have also become stable enough for the people to return to their countries: Burundi, Iraq, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Bosnia. Burundi and Rwanda each have seen the return of over 100,000 people last year. Sri Lanka is another case of stabilization. A few days ago agreements concerning the return of refugees to their country were signed in Liberia; there continue huge actions of returns to Namibia and to Mozambique. This last one must be the largest action of UNHCR. The conclusion is that if one wants to do it, it can be done. It is, however, only the beginning of the process: not everyone has returned to their homelands. Yet, the situation becomes sufficiently stabilized to allow positive thinking.

A few days ago, the UNHCR published press information stating that since the end of war in Bosnia, a million people returned there. The situation becomes stabilized very quickly. Naturally, there are still displaced persons, there is the problem of security as well as others, yet the situation continues to improve to the extent that it may already kindle some hopes. Poland is another case: I have tried to establish how many people returned to our country after 1989, yet I have nowhere found such data. On the other hand, during the two preceding decades, over 800,000 people had left the country.

At the moment there are 17 million people waiting for the possibility to return to their home country. My quick query on the Internet produced a list of more than 50 such conflicts in the world. This information may be intriguing in the context of our earlier discussion of our total ignorance of the number of conflicts. Participating in these are around 300,000 children, as the UNICEF report informs. I have not seen a major change in these data during the last five or six years. Over 50 million people live in exile.

Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska

Thank you for the good word about the media, as I feared that after today's discussion everyone will go their own ways, believing the media are evil, bad, cynical and prefer to talk about superstars' dogs than about people. Thank you very much for the words that prove that we are, after all, useful.



**Sergio Vieira de Mello
Prize**

SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO PRIZE

Introduction

Danuta Glondys

It is my great pleasure to welcome to our ceremony Professor Andrzej Zoll, the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection in Poland and a former assistant of Sergio Vieira de Mello, Paolo Uchoa.

The author of the statuette of the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize is also present today: Andrzej Renes, the well-known Polish artist.

A year ago, when together with Janek Piekło, we were preparing the conference on tolerance, we decided that we simply could not just close the conference and proceed with another project. Something was there to remain. Life has written a scenario we would never wish to see. On 19th August 2003, the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of United Nation, High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello, a most exceptional man who had helped hundreds of thousands of people, was killed in Baghdad. We decided to honor his life and work by establishing this prize in his name.

The prize will be presented every year, and today this is happening for the first time. It is our intention to award persons and non-governmental organizations for their exceptional efforts for peaceful coexistence and cooperation of communities, religions, and cultures.

Professor Andrzej Zoll

Your Excellencies, distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am honored that, in the capacity of the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection, I will be able to present today the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize to the person who in the most exceptional manner – in the times we are living – is the guiding light for behavior towards another person, for it was he, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who – being a high-ranking official of the United Nations Organization; being the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations Organization – was the one who helped so very many people who found themselves in extremely difficult position. He rescued Vietnamese, he rescued people in Cambodia, he saved people in Africa, and in various parts of the world, where the state of war, crises, and violations of human rights were the daily routine. He saved those values which have been most precious also to all of us. He gave his life for his ideals, for in Iraq he was also the one to protect human rights: he was to see to it that the principles he found most dear were observed there. I believe

that it is very good that here, in Poland, we will be presenting this Prize in his name. The prize for activity in the same direction, for actions to the good of other people, the actions that are to emphasize that the natural and inalienable dignity of every human is the common property of all people in every culture, in every social and legal system. I believe that the laureates of the award are the very persons and organizations that follow in his footsteps and are signposts for us too.

Announcement of the verdict

Ewa Łabno-Fałęcka

I would like to thank very much the initiator of the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize for the invitation to the Jury. We at DaimlerChrysler treat this invitation as an honor, as we are its only business partner. I do not want to take up your time unnecessarily, yet I shall share with you the reasons why we decided to be the founder of the Prize.

Firstly, because we believe that the goal of business is not only doing business, but also to change and shape attitudes, ways of thinking, and solving the problems of this world. The second reason is the fact that DC cooperates with the United Nations Organization, which, we believe, is experiencing the worst crisis since its establishment. This is another reason why we are so painfully touched by the loss of people like Sergio Vieira de Mello.

Let me proceed to the announcement from the session of the Jury of the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize under the honorary patronage of the Ambassador of the Federative Republic of Brazil to Poland and the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees.

On 21st September 2004, a session of the Jury of the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize was held at the Villa Decius in Kraków. It will be awarded for activity furthering and promoting peaceful coexistence and cooperation of communities, religions, and cultures. Participants of the session were Paweł Świdorski, Honorary Consul of the Federative Republic of Brazil in Poland on behalf of the Ambassador of the Federative Republic of Brazil; Agnieszka Kosowicz, External Relations Officer of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Janusz Kurtyka, director of the Kraków Branch of the Institute of National Remembrance on behalf of the Institute of National Remembrance; Iwona Sadecka, Advisor to the Consul General of the USA for Press and Culture in Kraków; Stefan Wilkanowicz, Chairman of the ZNAK Foundation; Jan Piekło, Secretary of the

Board of the ZNAK Foundation; Professor Jacek Woźniakowski, Chairman of the Board of the Villa Decius Association; Danuta Glondys, Director of the Villa Decius Association, and Ewa Łabno-Fałęcka, representative of DaimlerChrysler, the sponsor of the Prize. Barbara Labuda, Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, acting on behalf of the President of the Republic of Poland, appointed her candidates to the Prize by the telephone, as due to her other engagements she was unable to participate in the session. Neither could Andrzej Malanowski, the Director of the International Constitutional Legislative Affairs Division, but he notified us in writing that, let me quote, “I assign my vote to the other members of the Jury, and I agree to the verdict that they come to.”

Altogether, twenty-two applications were submitted, out of their number twenty-one met the criteria defined in the Rules of the Prize. Out of this number, eight applications pertained to the “person” category, and the remaining thirteen – to “non-governmental organization”. Nominated in the individual category were seven persons, as two applications pertained to the same candidate. The “non-governmental organization” category had eleven nominations, out of which one organization was mentioned in three applications.

I shall now read the list of all the organizations and persons who were nominated to the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize:

Centrum Żydowskie w Oświęcimiu (Auschwitz Jewish Centre); Dom Spotkań im. Angelusa Silesiusa (Angelus Silesius House); the “Dziedzictwo-Heritage” Foundation; Foundation for the International Youth Meeting Centre (Fundacja na rzecz Międzynarodowego Domu Spotkań Młodzieży); Kraków Local Committee of the AIESEC International Student Organization; Amnesty International; Stowarzyszenie Jeden Świat (One World Association); Stowarzyszenie Praw Człowieka im. Haliny Nieć (The Halina Nieć Human Rights Association); Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Wschód (The Democratic Society EAST); Towarzystwo im. Edyty Stein (Edith Stein Society, Poland); Towarzystwo Ochrony Kultury Zgierza (Association of Cultural Preservation of the City of Zgierz); and the following individuals: Dr. Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, Father Andrzej Augustyński, Konstanty Gebert, Father Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, Antoni Malczak, Liliana Olech, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Moleke Mo-Nije (a.k.a. Simon Mol).

Having learned the achievements of the candidates nominated to the Prize, after the voting, the Jury of the Prize authorised the following verdict:

The Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize in the “person” category is awarded to **Tadeusz Mazowiecki**. The Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize for “non-governmental organization” is awarded to **Stowarzyszenie Jeden Świat** (One World Association). My most heartfelt congratulations!

Justification of the verdict

Professor Jacek Woźniakowski

This person, as you must have noticed beyond doubt, is now sitting next to me, therefore I shall be cautious lest in my speech I might hurt his modesty. There is no saying, I must speak out my mind. What we are experiencing today, is a premiere. Not only because we are awarding the premiere person – the Prime Minister, or rather the prime Prime Minister of the 3rd Republic, but also because this is the first award of the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize. Besides this, there is an additional and a very peculiar circumstance that adds to the feeling that something is taking place for the first time. Our laureate has been awarded so many honors and distinctions for his achievements in many various fields, that our statuette is only an addition, yet I believe that it is an addition of a certain symbolic significance. It is a paradox, but we are awarding someone who assumed some difficult duties and gave them later up. Normally, one does not award prizes for such behavior, and nevertheless, this was just what was to be done in those circumstances, and this was done, thank God, and thank Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

I believe that both these activities required a great deal of specific courage, as the decision to assume the mission of the Rapporteur on human rights in the area as undermined and difficult as the former Yugoslavia, called for personal devotion and the renouncing of many pleasures and far more comfortable situations. Then again, his resignation from that function was the only thing Tadeusz could do. I know how difficult it is, we all surely know it from our experience, how difficult it is to shoulder certain obligations and say “no” – reject fulfilling them further. Then again, this was the only thing that Tadeusz could have done, faced with the muddle and chaos, idleness, and indifference of various international bodies, of which I shall say nothing more. This was the only step that could slightly shake those persons who were involved in and intent on those matters, and were in a certain manner responsible for them.

Thus both the assumption and the rejection are two symmetrical acts of courage, the courage that we need today so very badly, and which is never enough. In many matters it is generally missing from today's activities – reporting and political – and from all social undertakings. There is always slight insufficiency of this courageous decision that can tell people something and lead to certain situations. Tadeusz took such a decision and I believe that this is the reason why the Prize awarded to the Prime Minister additionally has a certain weight of primacy in this field, when we award one who accepted and refused just as was most right to do at the time.

We are very grateful to him for this, and we are grateful that he accepts this Prize, for this endows it with a most appropriate standing for the future. I do hope that these who will in future be the laureates of this Prize, will look back at this premiere of ours, possibly with a certain jealousy, that they do not necessarily live up to it. May God grant them the strength for the effort, and may indeed this first award be such a guiding light for laureates in the years to come.

Agnieszka Kosowicz

The Jury of the Sergio Vieira de Mello Prize has the pleasure to honor the Stowarzyszenie Jeden Świat (One World Association) with its seat in Poznań with this year's Prize. During the few years, the One World Association has made the teaching of tolerance an element of educational programs in hundreds of Polish schools, big and small, from Warsaw to Szczecin. The subjects of tolerance, multiculturalism, and human rights have entered all the milieus, and we are convinced that the operation of the Association shall bring us unexpected and long-term results.

Through the "Equal-Different" ("Równi-Różni") programme, the Association has kindled the interest in tolerance among teachers, pupils, students, and many other young people. The organization gathers also a growing group of people who find tolerance not only the subject of a few lessons but their life's attitude. The Association makes the world becoming better, and makes people better understand one another. We are convinced that the One World Association fully deserves this Prize.

Thanks

Tadeusz Mazowiecki

I would like to thank most warmly for this recognition. For me, it is very significant as I still feel very strongly connected indeed with that three-year-long activity.

I even frequently say that Bosnia became my other homeland, as I saw both the human drama and at the same time the beauty of that country. Once, when I was flying by helicopter and watching the scenic beauty of Bosnia, I told myself: Lord God created such a beautiful country, and what people did to it.

This Prize is also especially precious and pleasant to me thanks to the persons awarding it: Professor Zoll, Professor Kieres, and especially, Jacek Woźniakowski, who was kind to take the floor and justify it, the man whose friendship I have the hope to enjoy, and who I respect greatly.

I might have had an opportunity to meet Sergio Vieira de Mello, yet rather not – I do not remember. There was a Pole, Professor Kędzia, who was among those cooperating with him most closely, already in his capacity of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Among the people fulfilling such grand and responsible functions, Sergio de Mello, also due to his death, reminds me of another great international activist, namely Dag Hammarskjöld, who died, as is known, in the disaster over Congo. Sergio de Mello died in a disaster, too, much like Dag Hammarskjöld – bringing, or desiring to bring good to people, and this is what he was killed for. He was a great man and deserves to be remembered.

Professor Zoll spoke of this inalienable human dignity that is expressed in human rights. There are two tendencies to understand human rights that prevail now. One is the tendency I do not subscribe to – a tendency to use the term human rights to name the ever new problems that people promote in the name of their ideas, ideologies (frequently controversial) considering them to be human rights. Let this controversy remain, however. Everything creative develops in controversies.

There is still the other one; the other way of understanding human rights, which perceives how very much, and in what brief scope, these fundamental principles of recognizing another person as your neighbor, recognizing another person as a person like you in various continents are today ruined.

We should not become indifferent, and, making reference to the last words of the previous discussion, we should be able to understand that in various cultures, in various civilizations, in various religions, there is something common as related

to this human dignity, yet it finds such diverse manifestations. For we should not be able to impose our way of thinking but rather be able to, as has been said here earlier today, discover, with due humbleness, their way of thinking.

Grażyna Puławska

I am the President of the Stowarzyszenie Jeden Świat (One World Association) and have the great pleasure today to be receiving, together with my colleague, Marcin Princ, this magnificent Prize. I would like to thank the Jury for it, and also to thank the person who nominated us to this Prize, Marta Kołodziejczyk. Yet especially, I would like to thank the volunteers and staff: without the volunteers we would have never achieved what we successfully achieved and we would have won no Prize. Therefore, once again with all my heart, I would like to thank everyone who for ten years has cooperated with us, and who have since 1996 been involved in the activities of the “Equal-Different” programs, those who teach at schools, believing that we can change the world, yet also believing that if we want to change the world, we should begin with ourselves, and not with showing others what it is they are doing wrong. I am also happy because it is only a month since we celebrated ten years of our existence. Thank you once again for this fantastic distinction.

Marcin Princ

Martin Luther King said this famous sentence beginning with “I had a dream”. I believe that this dream and this thought are what we share here. We who have concentrated on working in the name of peace and human rights. Peace and human rights are also goals of the volunteers, who day after day share their unselfish gift with others, sharing what they have learnt at the university, what they have acquired from their older colleagues, and this is what I want to thank them – my colleagues – for.

I would like to mention here one of them, one “Grześ”, who after a stay at the Centre for Refugees, organized an action called “Kup Pan Kredkę” (Sir, Buy a Crayon). “Kup Pan Kredkę” – yes, this is so very simple and at the same time so very important for the children being brought up in the centre for the refugees, who have nothing to do, whose eyes are still filled with war. Thanks to these crayons, thanks to the drawings, children can pour onto the paper what they have experienced in their home country.

We are trying to convey what is the most important: that it is not enough to be born human. One must be a human, yet one should be – it is worth it.



**List of experts
and lecturers**

LIST OF EXPERTS AND LECTURERS

Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, Ph.D., Jagiellonian University

Victor Ashe, Ambassador of the United States of America to Poland

Tomasz Bielecki, *Gazeta Wyborcza* national daily

Lt. Gen. Mieczysław Bieniek,

2003/2004 Commander of Multinational Division S.C. – Iraq,

Commander of 2nd Mechanized Corps

Dariusz Bohatkiewicz, journalist, Polish Television (TVP)

Professor Michael Daxner, Principal International Officer for Education

and Science of UN Mission in Kosovo,

current Advisor to Afghanistan Minister of Education

Danuta Glondys, Director of the *Villa Decius Association*

Professor Andrzej Kapiszewski, Jagiellonian University,

former Polish Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates

Jan Kavan, former Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic,

2002/2003 Chairman of the General Assembly of UN

Katarzyna Kolenda-Zaleska, journalist (TVN)

Marta Kołodziejczyk, Jagiellonian University

Agnieszka Kosowicz, External Relations Officer of UNHCR

Krystyna Kurczab-Redlich, freelance journalist

Ewa Łabno-Fałęcka, PR Director, DaimlerChrysler

Marcin Mamoń, documentary film director, documentary reporter

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 1989/1990 Prime Minister of Poland,

1992-95 Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights

to the former Yugoslavia

Igor Melnik, editor of the *Postup* national daily in Lviv (Ukraine)

Grzegorz Miecugow, journalist (TVN24)

Col. Zygmunt Miłaszewski, Ministry of National Defense

Sikose Mji, Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa to Poland

Marcelo Andrade de Moraes Jardim, Ambassador of Brazil to Poland

Maj. Gen. William L. Nash, US Army, retired;

Director of the Center for Preventive Action,

Council on Foreign Relations

- Jerzy Marek Nowakowski**, *Wprost* national weekly
- Janina Ochojska**, President of Polish Humanitarian Organisation
- Jan Piekło**, Director of the Bridges to the East Institute
- Milica Pesic**, Director of Media Diversity Institute, London
- Mariusz Pilis**, freelance documentary film producer
- Marcin Princ**, *One World Association*, Poznan
- Danuta Przywara**, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights
- Grażyna Puławska**, *One World Association*, Poznan
- Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld**,
State Secretary of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Arne Ruth**, former editor in chief of *Dagens Nyheter*,
Stockholm Helsinki Committee
- Col. Krzysztof Sałaciński**, Director of Bureau of Defence Matters,
Polish Ministry of Culture
- Adam Szostkiewicz**, *Polityka* national weekly
- Szymon Szurmiej**, Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland (TSKŻ-P)
- Krzysztof Śliwiński**, Ambassador of Poland,
former Ambassador to Morocco and the Republic of South Africa
- Antonio Tarelli**, Minister Plenipotentiary and Special Envoy
of Italian Diplomatic Service,
former Italian Ambassador to Macedonia
- Róża Thun**, President of Polish R. Schuman Foundation
- Paul Uchoa**, former assistant to Sergio Vieira de Mello,
Brazilian Embassy in Paris
- Stefan Wilkanowicz**, chairman of the *Znak* Foundation
- Professor Jacek Woźniakowski**, Chairman of the *Villa Decius Association*
- Ernest Zienkiewicz**, UNHCR legal officer in Poland
- Professor Andrzej Zoll**, the Commissioner for Civil Rights
Protection in Poland

I l l u s t r a t i o n s



REBUILDING PEACE IN POST-CONFLICT COMMUNITIES



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Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld



Sikose Mji, Prof. Jacek Woźniakowski, Victor Ashe, Gen. Mieczysław Bieniek

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


Opening of the exhibition: Col. Krzysztof Sałaciński, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld


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Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
Grażyna Puławska, Marcin Princ – *One World Association*




Tadeusz Mazowiecki



Marcelo Andrade de Moraes Jardim, Janka Burianová, Consul General of Slovak Republic



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